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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC STAGES AND TRANSITION
FEBRUARY 2016
RICARDO R FUENTES RAMIREZ, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF PUERTO RICOMAYAGÜEZ
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor David M. Kotz

Cuba and Venezuela have been argued to be examples of state capitalism, populist
capitalism, socialism, or simply the ambiguous “mixed economy.” By focusing on these
countries as social formations in movement, or in transition, a more adequate
understanding is presented. The first essay develops a theory of socialist transition, with
focus on the dynamic, rather than static character of socialism. Furthermore, worker
cooperatives are analyzed with a focus on the roles they play in the different stages of the
transition to socialism. Finally, this framework is utilized to analyze the experience of the
Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela.
The second essay utilizes this framework to analyze the particular cases of
countries dominated by imperialist relations. As this essay argues, throughout history two
opposing conceptions regarding the relation between anti-imperialism and socialist
transition have been present in the Marxian tradition. The first argues that an antiimperialist capitalist development stage within dominated regions is required before a
socialist transition can begin. The second view argues that capitalist development is
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blocked in dominated regions, and as a result the only route to economic development is
through a transition to socialism. This essay undertakes an examination of key Marxist
thinkers and revolutionary processes across the globe to assess the theories and the
processes associated with these conceptions.
Finally, the third essay assesses the current direction of institutional change in
Cuba. Some analysts believe the current changes in the Cuban system indicate the
beginning of a transition to capitalism, while others disagree. By focusing on one
particular institution, the non-agricultural worker cooperatives, this essay demonstrates
that the current reform process in Cuba has included features that could contribute to the
mergence of a new socialist formation characterized by participatory planning.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Marxist scholars and activists have utilized the idea of distinct economic stages
while analyzing a variety of subjects. For example, transitions between modes of
production have been understood as stages of human development, while Marx and many
Marxists after him have paid close attention to stages of capitalism as well. Different
understandings of stages, in the theoretical realm, have had profound implications for the
political practice of many socialist movements. Some traditions have interpreted Marx's
writing as arguments for a single mechanical line of historical progression, where Europe
provides the general path all nations should or will follow. This interpretation led many
movements to actively postpone their social aspirations, believing that skipping a
particular stage would ultimately undermine their long-term objectives. In addition, Marx
(1875) introduced in The Critique of the Gotha Program the idea of stages of communism
as well.
A central claim of this dissertation is that socialism should be understood as a
dynamic system, emerging from one economic system and potentially moving toward
another. Such an understanding of socialism is appropriate and useful for radical scholars,
policy makers, and activists. By contrast, some analysts conceive of socialism as a static
and stable economic system. For example, Weisskopf (2014, 443) argues the real battle
“is not to bring about some form of socialism to replace capitalism, but to establish or to
maintain a form of social-democratic capitalism.” Socialism, or “post-capitalism,” is
relegated to the long run, if not abandoned entirely. While social democratic reform could
1

potentially be a first step in radical economic transformation, as the early social
democratic movement conceived, most contemporary proponents under-emphasize this
aspect. This stems in part from an underlying assumption that socialism is a static system.
Contemporary socialist scholars can be generally categorized into two main
groups: advocates of “market socialism” and of “participatory socialism.” In both cases,
these versions of socialism are generally understood as static systems, with little focus on
the predecessor system from which they might emerge, or how they may be transformed
in the future. A transition directly from contemporary social formations to either one of
these socialist forms is unlikely in the short run, fostering the belief that only a social
democratic capitalist social formation is feasible. In the alternative approach taken here,
the transition process is viewed as consisting of stages. The objective of this dissertation
is to analyze how stages that arise in the transition from one economic system to another,
and contending theories of such stages, affect transitions.
Two contemporary social formations, Cuba and Venezuela, provide a suitable
space to develop this analysis. Both cases have been argued to be examples of state
capitalism, populist capitalism, socialism, or simply the ambiguous “mixed economy.”
By focusing on these countries as social formations in movement, or in transition, a more
adequate understanding is presented. The first essay develops a theory of socialist
transition, with focus on the dynamic, rather than static character of socialism.
Furthermore, worker cooperatives are analyzed with a focus on the roles they play in the
different stages of the transition to socialism. Finally, this framework is utilized to
analyze the experience of the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela.
The second essay utilizes this framework to analyze the particular cases of
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countries dominated by imperialist relations. As this essay argues, throughout history two
opposing conceptions regarding the relation between anti-imperialism and socialist
transition have been present in the Marxian tradition. The first argues that an antiimperialist capitalist development stage within dominated regions is required before a
socialist transition can begin. The second view argues that capitalist development is
blocked in dominated regions, and as a result the only route to economic development is
through a transition to socialism. This essay undertakes an examination of key Marxist
thinkers and revolutionary processes across the globe to assess the theories and the
processes associated with these conceptions.
Finally, the third essay assesses the current direction of institutional change in
Cuba. Some analysts believe the current changes in the Cuban system indicate the
beginning of a transition to capitalism, while others disagree. By focusing on one
particular institution, the non-agricultural worker cooperatives, this essay demonstrates
that the current reform process in Cuba has included features that could contribute to the
mergence of a new socialist formation characterized by participatory planning.
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CHAPTER II
STAGES OF SOCIALISM AND COOPERATIVES: LESSONS FOR AND FROM
VENEZUELA

Introduction
Worker cooperatives have historically been linked to discussions on alternatives
to capitalism. Within the Marxist tradition, many scholars and activists tend to view
worker cooperatives as either utopian experiments destined for failure, or firms inevitably
doomed to foster rather than subvert capitalist relations. This paper will argue, from a
Marxist perspective, that cooperatives can play a progressive role in the transition to
socialism. To demonstrate this, in Part I, a theory of socialist transition will be developed
with focus on the dynamic, rather than static, character of socialism. In Part II, worker
cooperatives will be analyzed with focus on the roles they may play in the different stages
of the transition to socialism. Finally, in Part III, this framework will be utilized to
analyze the experience of the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela.

Part I: A Marxist Theory of Socialist Transition
Marx and Engels did not develop a systematic analysis of the transition to
socialism and Mandel (1968, 1) notes that this was a deliberate abstention, as the
“founders of historical materialism believed that it was not their task to formulate a
ready-made schema of the future society because that society could only be the concrete
result of the conditions in which it would appear.” I also agree with Mandel (1968, 1):
“Although Marx and Engels’ attitude is understandable, one cannot help regretting it.”
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This paper does not intend to formulate a ready-made schema of the future society, or
how to get there. Nevertheless, some theorization regarding the transition period is not
only useful, but also necessary for movements that desire to formulate economic policies
that contribute to the socialist transition. Specifically, this paper argues that in contrast to
understanding socialism as a static and stable economic system, conceptualizing it as a
dynamic system, emerging from one economic system and moving towards another, is
more appropriate and useful for radical scholars, policy makers, and activists alike.
Many radical scholars have recently concluded, as does Weisskopf (2014, 443),
that the real battle “is not to bring about some form of socialism to replace capitalism, but
to establish or to maintain a form of social-democratic capitalism.” The construction of a
post-capitalist alternative is thus relegated to the long run, if not abandoned entirely. I
argue that this conclusion stems in part from an underlying assumption regarding
socialism as a static system. During the decade that followed the fall of the Soviet Union,
socialist scholars could be generally categorized into two main groups: “market
socialists” and “participatory socialists.” This dichotomy is more or less still present
among the radical scholars who have not entirely abandoned the idea of socialist
transition in favor of simply establishing and maintaining social-democratic capitalism.
Both types of “socialism” are generally understood as static systems with insufficient
focus on from where they emerge and how, and into what they may transform in the
future. The difficulty of transitioning directly from our current scenario to either one of
these socialist forms enables the pessimistic conclusion that only social democratic
reform is attainable. While social democratic reform could potentially be a first step in
the socialist transition process, as the early social democratic movement conceived, most
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contemporary proponents under-emphasize this aspect. One way to remedy these
deficiencies, as this paper will argue, is to reemphasize that the transition process will
most likely consist of different stages.

Previous Conceptions of Socialist Transition
There have been a variety of conceptions on how to arrive at a new socialist or
post-capitalist institutional arrangement. Among the earliest visions were those of
anarchists like Proudhon, who argued in his book The Stockjobber's Handbook (1853):
...reciprocity exists when all the workers in an industry, instead of working for an
entrepreneur... work for one another and thus collaborate in the making of a
common product whose profits they share amongst themselves. Extend the
principle of reciprocity as uniting the work of every group, to the Workers'
Societies as units, and you have created a form of civilization which from all
points of view—political, economic and aesthetic—is radically different from all
earlier civilizations (as cited in Buber, 1950).

This tradition has continued today with theorists such as John Holloway (2012),
whose book’s title, Change the World Without Taking Power, summarizes the key idea
behind his vision of change. Holloway (2012, 203) argues that we should aim for “the
creation of interstitial spaces, spaces or moments in which experimental forms of social
cohesion are created on a different basis, consciously following a different logic,” for
these “can be seen as cracks in the texture of capitalist domination, cracks in the rule of
money, moments or spaces that push against-and-beyond existing society.” In other
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words, according to this tradition, building and expanding alternative institutions today
can achieve a socialist or post-capitalist institutional arrangement. According to this view,
seizing the state (through an electoral process or a vanguard revolutionary organization)
is not a fundamental task or step within this process. Therefore, scholars and activists
associated with this tradition have argued that cooperatives are key institutions to utilize
in the transition process.
Another view that is associated with the revolutionary Marxist tradition can be
best summarized in Marx's (1848) following statement from The Communist Manifesto:
“The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that of all other proletarian
parties: formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy,
conquest of political power by the proletariat.” According to this perspective, seizing the
state is a fundamental first step in the revolutionary process, closely followed by the
abolition of the capitalist mode of production and the initiation of the transition to
socialism. This idea remained dominant within many revolutionary socialist movements
throughout the 20th century, gaining strength with the Bolshevik revolution and
continuing to this day in numerous socialist organizations around the world.
In opposition to this view, the early 20th century also saw the development of an
evolutionary (in contrast to revolutionary) socialist movement. Among the first exponents
was Bernstein (1899), who argued:
Social conditions have not developed to such an acute opposition of things and
classes as is depicted in the Manifesto... the task of social democracy is, instead of
speculating on a great economic crash, to organize the working classes politically
and develop them as a democracy and to fight for all reforms in the State which
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are adapted to raise the working classes and transform the State in the direction of
democracy.

Throughout most of the 20th century, social democratic movements were
associated with this idea. However, various authors, such as Panitch, Albo, and Chibber
(2012) and Toscano (2012), have argued that most social democratic parties have
abandoned the idea of an evolutionary transition to socialism, reducing their scope to
simply managing capitalism. Nevertheless, this does not imply that a social-democratic
movement aimed at an evolutionary transition to socialism will inevitably give up the
final aim of transition to socialism. For example, some contemporary theorists, like Joel
Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck, argue:
The democratic left makes progress under capitalism when it improves the
material well-being of workers, solves a problem for capitalists that capitalists
cannot solve for themselves, and in doing both wins sufficient political cachet to
contest capitalist monopoly on articulating the 'general interest' (as cited in
Wright, 2010).

Using the anarchist, social democratic, and revolutionary socialist traditions as a
point of departure, Erik Olin Wright (2010) develops an overarching framework in order
to assess institutions and initiatives used, or proposed to be used, as tools in the transition
to socialism. Wright argues that there are three basic logics of transformation through
which institutions of social empowerment might be built: ruptural, interstitial, and
symbiotic (2010, 303). Ruptural change refers to creating new institutions through a
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sharp break with existing institutions and social structures. Existing institutions “are
destroyed and new ones built in a fairly rapid way” (2010, 303). Interstitial
transformation refers to building forms of empowerment in the niches and margins of
capitalism. Finally, symbiotic transformation refers to deepening social empowerment
through ways that also temporarily benefit the dominant classes (Wright, 2010, 303-5).
Wright explains that these visions respectively correspond to the revolutionary
socialist, anarchist, and social democratic traditions. Also, these transformative logics are
distinct in how they conceive the pivotal actors of transition, their stance toward the state,
and their stance toward the capitalist class. According to Wright, ruptural strategists
conceive the main actor as the working class, organized through a political party in order
to attack (seize) the state and confront the bourgeoisie. Interstitial strategists conceive the
main actors as social movements, which build alternative institutions while ignoring the
issue of obtaining state power, and with no interest in directly confronting the
bourgeoisie. Symbiotic strategists conceive the main actors as coalitions of social forces
and labor that use the state and collaborate with the bourgeoisie (2010, 305-7). Wright
explains that “none of these strategies is simple and unproblematic. All contain dilemmas,
risks, and limits, and none of them guarantee success. In different times and places, one
or another of these modes of transformation may be the most effective, but often all of
them are relevant... A long-term political project of emancipatory transformation... must
grapple with the messy problem of combining different elements of these strategies”
(2010, 307).
Another distinct and fundamental question is what this post-capitalist economy
will look like. In a discussion with Lassalle, regarding how the proceeds of labor were to
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be distributed in communist society, Marx first introduced the idea of stages of
communism. In his Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875), Marx argues that a
distinction has to be made between communist society as it has developed on its own
foundations (the higher phase) and communist society as it emerges from capitalism (the
first phase), which is “economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the
birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges.” In the first phase,
distribution would be according to one's work, whereas in the higher phase, “after the
productive forces have also increased with the all-around development of the individual,
and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly,” society would be
organized under the principle of “From each according to his ability, to each according to
his need” (Marx, 1875). He emphasized further on in the discussion:
Between capitalist and communist society there lies the period of the
revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a
political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary
dictatorship of the proletariat (Marx, 1875).

Lenin (1918) also grasped the usefulness of this particular way of understanding
the transition to communism, arguing:
What is usually called socialism was termed by Marx the “first”, or lower, phase
of communist society. Insofar as the means of production becomes common
property, the word “communism” is also applicable here, providing we do not
forget that this is not complete communism. The great significance of Marx's
explanations is that here, too, he consistently applies materialist dialectics, the
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theory of development, and regards communism as something which develops out
of capitalism. Instead of scholastically invented, “concocted” definitions and
fruitless disputes over words (What is socialism? What is communism?), Marx
gives an analysis of what might be called the stages of the economic maturity of
communism.

Yet, what distinguishes socialism from communism? What does the transition
from one to the other consist of? Conceiving this transition as simply the transition into
an allocation mechanism characterized by “to each according to his need,” is certainly
insufficient. Marx's brief comments in the Critique of the Gotha Program regarding the
dictatorship of the proletariat hint at the importance of systemic reproduction, and the
role the state plays in both socialism and communism. Jessop (1990, 289) notes that Marx
also employed the concept of the mode of production to characterize the overall pattern
of social reproduction. Thus, Jessop (1990, 290) argues:
For a distinct mode of production to exist, the forces and relations of production
must complement each other so that together they sustain the economic basis of
the relevant mode of appropriation. This does not mean that modes of production
can somehow reproduce themselves autonomously. There are always extraeconomic preconditions (such as law, the state, or specific systems of ideas)
which must be secured for economic reproduction to exist (emphasis added).

Other authors have emphasized that socialist transition should avoid markets, for
even if regulation were to correct market failures such as externalities or the inadequate
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provision of public goods, they would still “have features intrinsic to their very structure
that encourage anti-social competitive behavior [and] that undermine solidarity, equality,
self-management, and erode democracy (Donnaruma and Partyka, 43, 2012).
Specifically, “markets pit people against each other in an antagonistic manner that
undermines solidarity, cooperation, and collective decision making” (Donnaruma and
Partyka, 48, 2012). Similarly, the pressure to survive in market competition may push
workers into allowing all decision-making power to be in the hands of managerial or
technical staff, undermining self-management.
Kotz (2008, 5-6) offers another criticism of markets in a socialist transition that
involves the problem of the creation of a new capitalist class:
For markets to work, economic actors who are successful must be allowed to gain
the financial rewards of their success... A market economy within a socialist
system will inevitably, over time, give birth to a new wealthy class... The
contradiction between a small class of increasingly wealthy individuals, who are
playing a central role in the economy, and a socialist state dedicated to economic
justice for working people, cannot be indefinitely contained... Eventually, either
the new wealthy class will get its way and obtain the right to own productive
property, becoming a capitalist class—or the market system would have to be
abolished and replaced by another economic structure.

Many market socialist models (see for example Roemer, 1994; Schweickart,
1992; and Weisskopf, 1993) recognize this potential problem and propose as a solution
institutionalized limits on wealth concentration. However, these limits would be
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politically determined. What should prevent a moderately wealthy group of citizens
and/or cooperatives to organize, gain political strength, and succeed in having citizens
vote to eliminate these limits? This paper argues that market socialist economies are
inherently unstable. Conversely, a participatory planned economy, where workers,
consumers, and location-based or identity-based communities participate in the decisions
that affect them, enables the democratic utilization of the social surplus in a manner
characterized by equity and solidarity. Among the various processes are the following: 1)
self-managed workshops would allow workers to ensure that their work is gratifying,
rather than alienating; 2) consumers on enterprise boards or planning bodies may directly
shape the quantity and quality of the goods and services they wish to consume; 3) diverse
communities would be able to ensure their needs are addressed in terms of aspects such
as marginalization or environmental degradation; and 4) a higher degree of equity would
ensure decision-making bodies are not undermined by wealthy individuals (Kotz, 2008,
8-9). As an alternative to the market vs. planning dichotomy, Laibman (2013) introduces
the distinction between precursor socialism and mature socialism. Precursor socialism
embraces both central planning and “market socialism” as viable options at this particular
point. Laibman explains, “Both top-down central planning, and long-term coexistence
with market forces, will likely be present, in most situations, until the conditions for their
transcendence are in place,” and both “provide essential contributions for that
transcendence.” He concludes that both contain dangers, management is a central concern
to both, and both have been confused “with socialism as such” (Laibman, 2013, 502503).

13

A Dynamic Model of Socialist Transition
In regards to beginning the socialist transition, this model adopts the three
categories of transition logics: ruptural, interstitial, and symbiotic. Instead of strictly
adhering to one transition strategy, they should be combined based on the particular
political, economic, and cultural conditions in different contexts (i.e. into a combined
transition strategy). In addition, scholars, policy-makers, and activists must tackle
questions such as how ruptural, interstitial, and symbiotic strategies may be combined,
and which conditions favor different combinations. Socialism is understood as the
transitional stage between capitalism and communism. In this transition there is conflict,
or a period in which contradictory processes coexist that are associated with both the old
and the new system. Communism is defined as an economic form where the means of
production belong to society as a whole; surplus produced by direct producers is not
appropriated by another class (i.e. there is no exploitation of labor) and decisions
regarding the allocation of this surplus throughout society include the participation of all
citizens, including those that are not necessarily direct producers (i.e. some form of
democratic or participatory planning).
As discussed in chapter 1, communism will require political and ideological
structures that promote reproduction. However, communism is conceived as a system
where political and economic institutions have matured and obtained a substantial degree
of stability and legitimacy, and the state no longer needs to play a direct role in their
creation or reproduction. Socialism will require the active involvement of the state in the
design and implementation of, and the overall experimentation with new political and
economic institutions. An economy in which no distinct class appropriates the surplus

14

produced by direct producers can be considered a socialist economy. What distinguishes a
socialist economy from communism is the degree of maturity, stability, and legitimacy of
its institutions. As was previously noted, many scholars have concluded that socialism or
communism may not necessarily require some form of democratic planning as the main
allocation mechanism. However, as a result of concluding that post-capitalist market
economies are inherently unstable, this paper argues that democratic planning should be
considered a key aspect of communism.
This paper adopts the categories of precursor and mature socialism, and combines
them with the previous definitions. Precursor socialism is understood as the first substage within the socialist stage, occurring immediately after the political transition from
capitalism, and where 1) the democratic control over the means of production and the
decision-making processes regarding the allocation of the surplus throughout society are
characterized by rudimentary and inefficient institutions, 2) some types of private
ownership may still persist, 3) market forces may still be utilized as an allocation
mechanism, and 4) the system would be highly dependent on the state as a vehicle of
systemic reproduction. The first two characteristics imply that private ownership in
precursor socialism would be simple commodity production or cooperative forms and not
entailing wage labor. Mature socialism is the sub-stage where most of these inefficiencies
have been worked out, some form of democratic planning has become the main allocation
mechanism, and the system can begin to rely relatively less on the state as a vehicle of
systemic reproduction until the completion of the transition to communism. In other
words, no assumptions or arguments are made regarding which institutions should be
used in precursor socialism. However, the transition to communism would have to
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include the transition into some form of participatory planning. The transition into
participatory planning would take place within the transition from the precursor socialism
sub-stage to the mature socialism sub-stage. Nevertheless, this transition could
theoretically be in the distant future, as certain conditions might favor the use of market
forces for an extended period of time during the transition from capitalism to socialism
(i.e. in the precursor socialism sub-stage). The opposite holds as well. Certain conditions
might favor the rapid abolition of market forces as allocation mechanisms. The task of
socialists within each revolutionary experience is to analyze these conditions in order to
identify the particular institutional arrangement that best suits the transition process.

Possibilities for Precursor Socialism
A key idea underlying the theory of transition espoused by this essay is that we
cannot determine a priori the particular institutional arrangements that will be adopted
throughout the socialist transition. These must depend on the particular conditions faced
by the socialist movements across the world. Nevertheless, as previously discussed, this
does not imply that radical scholars should wait until the revolution is underway to begin
theorizing on possible economic models. One of the strengths of the theory developed in
this paper is that it can incorporate the wide range of socialist models developed by
radical scholars, not as competing models, but as part of the wide range of possibilities
that may or may not be strategic for socialist movements in different parts of the world.
The objective of this part of the essay is not to generate a ready-made list for socialist
movements to choose from, but to initiate the discussion on how different models found
in the literature can be employed or combined.
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For example, Wright argues that there are various institutional arrangements that
contribute to the transition to socialism by increasing social empowerment regarding the
way the state affects economic activity, the way economic power shapes economic
activity, and economic activity in general. He delineates several of these frameworks.
However, the bulk of his categories mostly refer to experiences under social democratic
governments across Europe and Canada. However, three of his categories (statist
socialism, cooperative market economy, and participatory socialism) do consist of
models of post-capitalist societies. “Cooperative market economy” refers to a system in
which private, worker owned, and self-managed cooperatives are the basic economic
unit. It should be noted that in capitalist countries, as well as in precursor socialist
economies such as the Soviet Union (see Kotz, 1997, 93), it has been clear that firms that
are cooperatives “on paper” can, in practice, function as capitalist firms. Thus, in order
for us to consider “cooperative market economies” as a type of “precursor socialism,”
cooperatives should minimally consist of firms where all owners are workers, and control
over the appropriation and allocation of surplus is not monopolized by a subset of the
workers. In this sense, firms within a cooperative market economy require selfmanagement in order for that economy to be considered a precursor socialist form.
Wright’s concept of “participatory socialism” intends to encompass the general
features of the various models proposed by economists such as Pat Devine, and Albert
and Hahnel. Wright summarizes it as a system in which the state and civil society jointly
play a direct role in the “organization and production of the economic activity” and in
which social power, defined as the capacity to mobilize people for voluntary collective
actions of various sorts, plays a higher role directly inside the productive activities
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themselves than in statist socialism (Wright, 2010, 131-143). This type of economy
would coincide with the mature socialism stage.
Finally, “statist socialism” refers to socialism as practiced in the USSR,
distinguished by public ownership of the means of production and central planning. This
type of economy would also be understood as a possible form of precursor socialism.
These categories, along with other conceptualizations, are adopted and analyzed within
this paper's theory of socialist transition.
For example, with feasible socialism Nove refers to a socialist society that “could
exist in some major part of the developed world within the lifetime of a child already
conceived, without our having to accept implausible or far-fetched assumptions about
society, human beings, and the economy” (Nove, 1991, 209). His idea of feasible
socialism can be succinctly described as a society where most firms are state enterprises,
worker self-managed state enterprises (referred to as socialized enterprises), or worker
cooperatives (or some other variant such as employee shareholding or long leases), but
where private firms also persist, subject to limits such as number of employees or the
value of capital assets. Feasible socialism would be characterized by market competition
but with state intervention in income policies, levying taxes, restraining monopoly power,
and setting the ground-rules for competition.
Nove’s use of the adjective feasible to describe his proposed model is problematic
for the current discussion. He is referring to feasible within advanced capitalism in the
short/medium term. Thus, there might be post-capitalist institutional arrangements that
are feasible elsewhere and/or in different time frames. Similarly, in some developing
countries his proposed model could be feasible as well. Perhaps it would be most useful
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to refer to Nove’s model as a Regulated market economy of non-capitalist firms. This
type of economy would be a possible form of precursor socialism. The different
conceptions of socialism are summarized in the following table:

Table 2.1: Possible Socialist Institutional Frameworks
Model
Statist Socialism
Cooperative Market
Economy
Market Economy of
Labor-Managed
Publicly-owned
Firms
Participatory
Socialism

Ownership

Coordination

Public
Private (Worker
Owned Firms)
Public

Central Planning
Market Competition

Public

Participatory
Planning

Market Competition

Stage of Socialism

Table 2.2: Stages of Socialism
Ownership
Coordination

Precursor Socialism

Public and Private

Combinations of
markets, central
planning, and
participatory
planning.

Mature Socialism

Public

Participatory
Planning

Control and
Participation
Relegated to the State
Worker SelfManagement
Worker SelfManagement
Worker SelfManagement and
Consumer Councils

Control and
Participation
Combination of state
or private firms with
no worker control,
worker self-managed
public firms, and
worker owned/selfmanaged firms.
Worker SelfManagement and
Consumer Councils

Table 2.1 is not exhaustive, as many other socialist institutional frameworks could
be included that also fall under this heading. Furthermore, in practice there could be
diverse combinations that cut across many of these frameworks. For example, a regulated
market economy of non-capitalist firms would combine elements from all of the
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discussed forms. Similarly, in Wright’s (2010, 140) discussion on cooperative market
economies, he adds that firms could be united through a large association of cooperatives,
stretching the “social character of ownership within individual cooperative enterprises
and mov[ing] it more towards a stakeholder model.” This type of model would be distinct
from the case where cooperatives are understood as individual units competing with one
another. It should also be noted that various models of market socialism have been
proposed, such as Roemer's “coupon socialism” (Roemer, 1996).
As previously discussed, by adopting Laibman’s categories of “precursor” and
“mature socialism,” this essay rejects the idea that during the stage immediately after the
political transition from capitalism 1) ownership must be private or public, 2)
coordination must be through markets, central plans, or participatory plans, and 3) that
worker self-management should be present throughout all the economy. In other words,
this essay is incorporating the idea that countries in this initial stage of socialism will
include, to diverse extents, combinations of market competition, private property, firms
with top-down managerial structures, central planning, worker self-management, or
participatory planning. To qualify as precursor socialism that is advancing toward mature
socialism, institutions and processes that deepen the transition to mature socialism would
need to be strengthened, while those that could foster a transition into capitalism would
need to be undermined. Table 2.3 includes examples of societies that have adopted
different forms that can be classified as precursor socialist forms.
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Table 2.3: Examples of countries that have adopted Precursor Socialism
Type of Precursor Socialism
Statist Socialism
Statist Socialism with Self-Management
Market Economy of Labor-Managed
Publicly-owned Firms

Countries
USSR, China (1950s), Cuba (1970s-1980s),
Yugoslavia (1950s-1964)
Yugoslavia (1965-1970s)

Another strength of this paper's theory of transition is that it facilitates a critical
analysis of particular cases, such as those included in Table 2.3, which acknowledges the
importance of the particular stage within the socialist transition in which they are found.
For example, statist socialism as practiced in the USSR should not be assessed as a static
model based on a given list of desiderata. It should be assessed as a socialist model in
transition and by recognizing the context from which it emerged. The deficiencies and
failures within the Soviet experience are conceived as useful lessons regarding the
obstacles that can emerge in the transition from capitalism to socialism. Finally, this
paper's theory of transition provides a useful framework to analyze attempts at transition
to socialism that have developed in various countries. The final part of this paper will
demonstrate this by applying this theory of transition in an analysis of the Bolivarian
Revolution in Venezuela.

Part II: Worker Cooperatives in the Transition to Socialism
Cooperatives in the Transition from Capitalism to Precursor Socialism
The term “cooperative” is used to refer to a wide range of institutions. In this
paper, focus will be placed specifically on “worker cooperatives,” defined as private selfmanaged firms, where workers collectively appropriate and distribute the surplus. In the
following analysis, this is what will be referred to when using the term “cooperative.”
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According to the theory of transition developed in this essay, cooperatives can be
understood as interstitial institutions that can play various roles in the transition from
capitalism to precursor socialism. Wright explains that the adjective “interstitial” refers to
the different processes that occur in the spaces and cracks of a social structure. An
interstitial strategy refers to the “deliberate development of interstitial activities for the
purpose of fundamental transformation of the system as a whole” (Wright, 2010, 324).
He explains that interstitial strategists believe that these activities can initiate transition in
two ways: 1) by altering the conditions for eventual rupture or 2) by gradually expanding
the effective scope and depth of their operations (Wright, 2010, 328). In the first case,
which he explains is the view of revolutionary anarchists, it is argued that interstitial
activities can improve the quality of life of individuals to a certain point at which
capitalism becomes a binding constraint. At this point, rupture would be necessary, but
already developed interstitial institutions would reduce the length and depth of the
transition trough. Also, interstitial activities serve as demonstrations that alternatives to
capitalism are possible; therefore, they contribute to the political will for rupture (Wright,
2010, 328-30). Even though Wright classifies this view as a revolutionary anarchist view,
it could just as well be understood as a socialist strategy of building toward rupture, as
will be discussed further on. The second case, which is the view of evolutionary
anarchists, does not assume that capitalism will impose a binding constraint for the
growth of interstitial activities, therefore a transition could be initiated within capitalism
without need of rupture (Wright, 2010, 332).
A mainly interstitial theory of transition, which focuses on worker cooperatives,
can be found in Wolff (2012). Wolff (2012, 105) defines socialism as a system where
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workers, the producers of the surplus, are also those who appropriate and distribute the
surplus. Therefore, it is this micro-level condition that distinguishes a system as socialist.
Macro-level characteristics, such as the role of planning and markets, or the particular
type of ownership that prevails, should be codetermined by workplace and community
democracies along the way, according to the particular context (Wolff, 2012, 144). Wolff
(2012, 122) therefore concludes that the development of firms where workers collectively
appropriate and distribute the surplus they produce would represent a social transition
beyond capitalism. He refers to these firms as “Workers’ Self-directed Enterprises,” or
WSDEs. Wolff (2012, 119-22) also clarifies that not all Worker-owned enterprises,
Worker-managed enterprises, or cooperatives are necessarily WSDEs.
In most Worker-owned enterprises, worker/owners simply leave the directing of
the enterprise in the hands of a board of directors, who continue appropriating and
distributing the surplus. Worker-managed enterprises are usually firms in which
capitalists give more control to workers expecting more profits or growth, thereby
serving the interests of capitalists. Finally, cooperatives include a wide variety of
institutions, including firms for cooperative purchasing or selling. Many cooperatives are
simply groups of small capitalists purchasing inputs cooperatively. To be considered a
WSDE, the appropriation and distribution of the surplus has to be done cooperatively,
and the workers who cooperatively produce the surplus are identical to those who
cooperatively appropriate and distribute it. He emphasizes that in these firms, workers
“collectively determine what the enterprise produces, the appropriate technology, the
location of production, and related matters” (Wolff, 2012, 118).
Wolff (2012, 157) believes that if WSDEs organize mutual support and sufficient
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political strength, they might prevail in competition with capitalist firms. This process
could be reinforced if workers in WSDEs prove to be more productive than workers in
other firms, they reduce the remuneration of managers and channel those funds into
technological innovation, and if they differentiate their products as being associated with
a democratic non-capitalist work organization. To ensure their growth and role in
transition, Wolff (2012, 169-79) delineates five main strategies. The first is to struggle for
a government job program that provides founding capital to workers willing to commit to
building WSDEs. He explains that “learning from and adapting the example of Italy’s
very successful 1985 Marcora Law, which enabled workers to take over enterprises that
were in crisis, the U.S. government could offer unemployed workers a similar choice”
(Wolff, 2012, 170). This includes providing government support for these WSDEs, such
as technical assistance, subsidized or guaranteed credit access, temporary tax exemptions,
preferential purchasing of WSDE goods and services, or requiring product labels to
reflect the organization of their production, so consumers could recognize and choose
WSDE products.
The second strategy is to seek alliances with the existing cooperative movement,
and, for example, to create joint campaigns for a U.S. version of the Marcora Law and
ease tax burdens on existing cooperatives. The third is to seek an alliance with the trade
union movement that coalesces around WSDEs developing alongside unions’ struggles
with capitalist employers. The fourth is to develop the organic intellectuals of the WSDE
movement, referring to people who believe in WSDEs as instruments of social change,
and are inclined and skilled enough to find effective means to communicate their beliefs
and thereby build such a movement. Wolff (2012, 179) argues that “the program for
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increased WSDEs needs to support and build—in universities, labor unions, social
movements, and beyond—the meetings, discussions, courses, and centers that can
generate and train organic intellectuals.” The last strategy is to aspire toward the creation
of a new independent political party that will compete for governmental power to
accomplish social change, with WSDEs as a major component. It should be noted that
Wolff’s conception of transition is evidently not purely interstitial, for he believes the
state should play a role in the process of interstitial transformation.
The interstitial logic of transition has received a wide variety of criticism. Wright
(2010, 335) argues that it is difficult to see how interstitial strategies will, by themselves,
erode the basic structural power of capital. In other words, Wright’s main criticism is that
we should not simply ignore the state; it must be engaged to further the process of
empowerment. Mimmo Porcaro (2012) has also critically analyzed this theory of
“changing the world without taking power.” Porcaro (2012, 91) explains that there have
been two widespread popular conceptions of revolution linked with this tradition. The
first is derived from a gradualist reading of Gramsci’s concepts of war of position and
war of movement. This line of reasoning argues that we should first wage a war of
position and conquer the fortresses of civil society (schools, cultural and religious
apparatuses, social reproduction structures, and factories). Only afterwards should we
engage in war of movement and conquer the “headquarters,” or state power and the
political power of the state as a whole. The second conception of revolution is that
derived from the postmodern notion of “liquid society,” which argues that “all social
relations are diffused throughout the whole society in the same way, without any one of
these relations occupying a dominant position in respect to the others, and consequently
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the problem of conquering the headquarters is thought to be completely obviated by the
fact that the headquarters does not exist, with power being evenly spread through the
whole society” (Porcaro 2012, 91). In other words, we live in a “liquid society” governed
by “flows” that have dissolved power; therefore, seizing power is no longer necessary.
Porcaro (2012, 86) declares this type of logic outdated for our present scenario.
He agrees that we should develop interstitial institutions, especially forms of selforganization and of participatory democracy; however, these must be accompanied by
“coordinated action, articulated in steps and phases, aimed at the conquest and
redetermination of state power” (Porcaro, 2012, 87). Without the later, there would be no
“political, juridical, and economic resources allowing popular institutions to construct a
new social order.” He concedes that the state and classes have evolved in the last century,
and seizing the state is not equal to “making communism.” However, he asserts, “without
class analysis (and struggle) and without the state it is impossible to go anywhere”
(Porcaro, 2012, 88). Regarding their view of transition, he argues “those who have
interpreted the advent of ‘flows’ as the beginning of the dissolution of power are way off
the mark, for these flows are brought forth by terribly solid entities capable of thought
and strategy: the ‘vertical’ apparatuses of the state (made still more effective by their
supranational dislocation) and the big corporations.” He concludes that it is “[neither] the
fortresses of civil society that must be taken, nor can we delude ourselves that we can
reach communism by navigating in capitalism’s flows. Rather, it is the general
headquarters of capital and the state that must be seized; it is to these we have to get near
through steps and phases” (Porcaro, 2012, 92).
For David Harvey (2012, 122), interstitial activities, like worker control,
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community-owned projects, “solidarity” economies, local economic trading systems and
barter, or creating autonomous spaces like those of the Zapatistas, have “not so far proved
viable as templates for more global anti-capitalist solutions.” The main reason is that “all
enterprises operating in a capitalist economy are subject to ‘the coercive laws of
competition’ that undergird the capitalist laws of value production and realization,” so
“worker-controlled or cooperative enterprises tend at some point to mimic their
capitalistic competitors, and the more they do so the less distinctive their practices
become.”
Furthermore, he explains, “the circulation of capital comprises three distinctive
circulatory processes, those of money, productive, and commodity capitals,” which
intermingle and co-determinate each other. Therefore, interstitial units of production will
rarely survive “in the face of a hostile financial environment and credit system and the
predatory practices of merchant capital” (2012, 122-3). Harvey concludes that we must
move beyond re-organizing within the labor process. Instead, struggle “must also be
about finding a political and social alternative to the operation of the capitalist law of
value across the world market” (Harvey, 2012, 123).
In addition, the idea of initiating some sort of de-coupling between interstitial
initiatives and capitalist processes seems close to impossible to Harvey (2012, 123), for
“effective management and survival almost always depends upon the availability of
sophisticated means of production.” He gives the example of a worker collective, where
the ability to coordinate flows throughout a commodity chain depends on the availability
of “power sources and technologies, such as electricity, cell phones, computers, and the
internet, that are procured from that world in which the capitalist laws of value creation
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and circulation predominate” (Harvey, 2012, 123).
With respect to interstitial transition, Harvey makes the analogy of it being a sort
of “termite theory.” Interstitial strategists argue that factory occupations, solidarity
economies, collective autonomous movements, agrarian cooperatives, etc. can eat away
at the institutional and material supports of capital until they collapse. The problem, for
Harvey, “is not lack of potential effectiveness; it is that, as soon as the damage wrought
becomes too obvious and threatening, then capital is both able and all too willing to call
in the exterminators (state power) to deal with it” (Harvey, 2012, 124-25). This resonates
with Wright and Porcaro’s critique, and it is perhaps the fundamental critique of
interstitial strategy.
In sum, it is unclear not only how interstitial activities will survive within
capitalism, but also how they will expand and erode capitalism itself. However, most of
the critics of interstitial transition recognize that interstitial institutions do have political
utility and transformative potential. Therefore, even though there are fundamental
differences regarding how socialism is defined and the role interstitial institutions will
play in the transition, there is probably consensus in that projects and movements that
work to construct and expand these institutions are worthwhile. Nevertheless, as Porcaro
argues, the development of these interstitial activities must be accompanied by
“coordinated action, articulated in steps and phases, [and] aimed at the conquest and
redetermination of state power” (Porcaro, 2012, 87).
In other words, cooperatives, in and by themselves, will not cumulatively lead to a
transition out of capitalism. Yet, cooperatives can still play a key role in political
education, organization, and agitation, and propel a socialist movement to obtain control
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over the state apparatus. Conversely, movements that already control the state apparatus
can utilize cooperatives to begin the transition out of capitalism. In order to clarify the
diverse ways that cooperatives can lead towards socialist transition, the diverse ways in
which they do not lead to transition should be further explored. For example, even if
worker cooperatives were to preserve their distinctive progressive character internally,
they would still need to be profitable in order to survive in the market. Worker
cooperatives could simply fail due to any of the numerous reasons why a typical capitalist
firm could fail (e.g. inadequate marketing, changes in consumer preferences, etc.).
Additionally, they not only need to remain profitable, but need to provide a level of
satisfaction (including a variety of aspects such as earnings and work environment), at
least equal to those that workers would receive if they decided to return to wage-labor.
Otherwise, cooperatives would consistently be disarticulated due to their workers
preferring to return to capitalist employment. Thus, market competition is an external
factor that pushes worker cooperatives away from becoming anti-systemic institutions.
Internally, as Laibman (2013, 502) notes, workers within capitalism will tend to
possess a limited consciousness, infused with the possessive-individualist ideology of
capitalist society. If this is not sufficiently tempered by the experience of cooperation in
production or a new ideology based on collective solidarity, intra-group conflict and/or a
subset of workers gaining increasing control over the surplus could emerge. This could
also be enabled by having management tasks only in the hands of some workers, or by
having differentiation between skilled and unskilled tasks. These in themselves are not
considered capitalistic or undemocratic features. For example, workers, in a participatory
and democratic manner, can delegate management tasks to a group determined as the
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most adequate to complete them, and install mechanisms to ensure that this group
acknowledges and upholds the authority of the workers' assembly. However, these
dynamics in combination with the possessive-individualist ideology of capitalism are
more likely to result in undemocratic and/or exploitative practices when compared to a
context of a predominant ideology of collective solidarity.
If, however, worker cooperatives were to survive in market competition without
gradually mimicking their capitalist counterparts, they could potentially become antisystemic institutions. Specifically, worker cooperatives would be considered antisystemic institutions if: 1) they preserve participatory democracy internally and 2) they
are linked to a broader movement aimed at social transformation. However, if the second
condition were not met, these isolated cooperatives would not be conceived as antisystemic institutions. In sum, worker cooperatives may or may not retain their internal
progressive character, and they may or may not survive in the capitalist market.
Furthermore, if they preserve their internal progressive character and survive in the
market, they may or may not be linked to a broader movement towards socialist
transition. Cooperatives face a hostile environment that makes it reasonable to assume
that they would be inclined towards failure or in practice would become capitalist
institutions. In other words, this paper argues that there is a tendency of worker
cooperatives to stray from becoming anti-systemic institutions. This does not imply that
efforts associated with worker cooperatives are futile. The main idea is that there are
processes working against the transformation of a cooperative into an anti-systemic
institution that have to be countered by movements that wish to utilize them in the
socialist transition process.
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Six key processes that can push cooperatives towards different outcomes can be
delineated:

1) The manner in which the cooperative is established: For example, cooperatives could
originate from a group of individuals who have organized to build an entirely new firm
from the ground up, from a group of workers who have struggled to seize their firm, or
out of the initiative of the state, re-organizing a state firm as a cooperative. This list is not
exhaustive. There are other ways a cooperative could be established, along with
important distinctions within these cases. The state could also establish entirely new
firms from the ground up, with individuals originating from various firms or
communities. In sum, the diverse conditions from which cooperatives could emerge will
shape the future course of the cooperative. For example, a cooperative that originates
from individuals who already share a cohesive link, such as being members of locationbased or identity-based communities, or a cooperative that originates from workers that
have struggled together to seize their firm, could have better prospects for becoming an
anti-systemic institution than a state-induced cooperative whose members are strangers.

2) Cultural factors: The wide range of cultural factors that could characterize the
individuals within the cooperative and the general population with which the cooperative
will interact plays an important role. Some communities could already be characterized
by cooperative and/or solidary traditions or behavior, and thus are more fertile ground for
the development of cooperatives. Conversely, cooperatives within areas characterized by
a commercial culture and/or with individualist values might face inferior conditions for
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their expansion.

3) The overall sociopolitical process: The social context in which cooperatives are
immersed will also co-determine the outcomes that they are most likely to reach. For
example, cooperatives within an active mass movement towards building a post-capitalist
society would most likely face substantially different conditions than cooperatives within
a relatively stable capitalist system.

4) Conditions of the capitalist class: Cooperatives within a system where the economic
power or the hegemonic position of the capitalist class is declining could face superior
conditions relative to cooperatives within a system where capitalists' hegemonic position
is stable and unquestioned, or where capitalists are actively struggling to defend their
hegemonic position. This would also shape the cooperative's ability to compete with
capitalist firms in the market.

5) Their relation to economic coordination: Cooperatives competing within unregulated
market economies, competing within regulated market economies (with or without
support from the state), linked to central plans, or linked to participatory plans, would all
face significantly diverse conditions that could push them towards diverse outcomes. On
the one hand, for example, cooperatives in an unregulated market economy could tend
toward failure, or mimicking and becoming capitalist firms in practice. On the other
hand, cooperatives in a highly centralized planning system could tend toward becoming
state firms in practice.
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6) Oversight and regulation: Finally, if cooperatives are not supervised and/or regulated
with the objective of ensuring that they continue to be self-managed firms, where workers
collectively appropriate and distribute the surplus, many of the previously discussed
factors could ultimately allow them to become other types of institutions in practice.

These factors interact with each other and push the cooperative towards becoming
an anti-systemic institution with links to socialist transition, an isolated cooperative with
no links to a socialist transition, or to becoming a capitalist institution in practice, or
simply disintegrating.

The case of Mondragón
The experience of the Mondragón Corporation provides useful insights for this
discussion. During the 1940s, when catholic priest José María Arizmendiarrieta arrived,
the town of Mondragón was still recovering from the Spanish Civil War, plagued with
widespread poverty and unemployment. Arizmendiarrieta founded a technical school that
led to the creation of the cooperative Ulgor in 1956, signaling the birth of the Mondragón
cooperative movement. The autarkic character of the Basque economy under the Franco
regime contributed to the cooperatives consistently finding demand for their products
during their initial decades of growth. (Altuna, Loyola & Pagalday, 2013, 167-168).
According to the company website, by 2013 the Mondragón Corporation grouped more
than 200 cooperative firms or businesses, employing over 70,000 people.1
1

http://www.mondragon-corporation.com
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With the foundation of the movement’s credit union, Caja Laboral, in 1959,
individual Mondragón cooperatives began to engage in diverse forms of integration,
ultimately creating different cooperative groups. Whyte and Whyte (1988, 207) explain
that by the 1980s, in order to deal effectively with an increasingly competitive
environment, the Caja Laboral and its Entrepreneurial Division, along with the
management of the cooperative groups, took over some of the responsibilities of the
individual cooperatives, strengthening the trend towards the centralization of decision
making. At this stage, it was understood that the advantages to an individual cooperative
belonging to a larger group were associated with the fact that group management fostered
taking a broad view, concentrating on strategic planning, and therefore seizing
opportunities that might not have been grasped by the management of individual
cooperatives. When interviewing managers at Mondragón, Whyte and Whyte (1988, 207)
found that none of them believed their cooperatives would be better off as independent
units, albeit while expressing concerns over trends towards centralization.
In 1991, the cooperatives were officially established as the Mondragón
Corporation, where corporate organs would make strategic decisions but would not be
able to make decisions related to internal aspects of the individual cooperatives. This
transformation implied further centralization and coordination, sacrificing some of the
autonomy cooperatives previously had regarding medium and long term policies.
Nevertheless, it is in the general assemblies of workers that it is decided to what extent
they are willing to make sacrifices (such as cuts in wages or benefits, or larger
contributions to capital or capitalization of surplus), which is a benefit to the cooperative
as a whole (Altuna, Loyola & Pagalday, 2013, 176-179).
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Despite there being debate regarding whether the source is a change in
perspective or a necessary response to historical circumstances, there seems to be
agreement that there is a tendency in Mondragón towards the application of language and
concepts more closely related to a traditional capitalist corporation than to a worker
cooperative (Altuna, Loyola & Pagalday, 2013, 182). Kasmir (1996) notes that these
changes are closely related to class conflict within the firm between workers and
managers. It is the managers that have shed their cooperativist ideology in favor of an
“efficiency” ideology, arguing that cooperatives will not survive unless capitalistic
changes are made, such as higher, more competitive managerial salaries (Kasmir, 1996,
35). Kasmir (1996, 194-195) also notes that there is evidence that workers within
Mondragón cooperatives are subject to the same pressures as workers within similar local
capitalist firms. She compared workers under the Mondragón cooperative Fagor Clima
and those of the local private firm Mayc. S.A. and found no substantial differences in
shift work, assembly lines, task routinization, and speedup. What is perhaps most
significant is that her survey results indicated that cooperative workers felt less a part of
their firm, and it was Fagor Clima’s managers who most identified with the cooperative
and were convinced that the democratic organs were effective.
Kasmir (1996, 195) also argues that from their inception, cooperatives were tied
to the Basque Nationalist Party’s anti-socialist project. Instead of generating solidarity or
political militancy, Kasmir found that belonging to a cooperative actually engendered
apathy in most workers. Cooperativist workers are consistently absent from solidarity
strikes with workers from nearby private firms. Furthermore, the particular dynamism of
working-class and revolutionary nationalist struggles that characterized Mondragón since
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the early 1900s was undermined as the cooperatives transformed the consciousness of
many workers. More cooperative workers in Fagor Clima said they saw themselves as
middle class than workers within Mayc (Kasmir, 1996, 196).
Within this paper's framework, Mondragón has not become an anti-systemic
institution, for it has no links with a broader political movement which aspires for radical
social transformation, and it has been unable to counteract the internal and external
tendencies which push it towards capitalist dynamics. It is one of the best examples of
how interstitial institutions, in isolation, lose their revolutionary character (i.e. their
ability to foster the transition into precursor socialism). Nevertheless, it still provides
insight into how a cooperative could survive capitalist competition. As Piñeiro Harnecker
(2013, 11-12) notes, despite its various shortcomings, Mondragón has also been
characterized by cooperation between the corporation’s cooperatives. 10% of profits of
each individual cooperative are redistributed towards cooperatives in need of assistance.
Similarly, instead of laying-off workers in periods of crisis, workers are transferred to
other cooperatives that can employ them. As a result of these practices, only six
cooperatives have been forced to shut down in the more than fifty years of operation of
Mondragón. Also, Piñeiro Harnecker (2013, 12) notes that their experience has shown
that cooperatives are willing to sacrifice autonomy as long as decision-making continues
to be undertaken in a democratic manner, and structures are in place for them to
participate directly or indirectly in most processes. Many key aspects, such as wage
scales, maximum number of non-member employees, and criteria regarding the use of
profits are decided by the congress of all Mondragón cooperatives. Similarly, executives
of the cooperative groups and of the industrial divisions of the corporation participate in
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the governing of the individual cooperatives. Thus, Piñeiro Harnecker (2013, 12)
concludes that Mondragón has provided insight into how to combine firm autonomy with
planning.
In sum, the skepticism placed by traditional Marxists on cooperatives, as well as
the hope placed on them by scholars and activists from other traditions, are similarly
justified. The main conclusions of this discussion are not necessarily new. Many of Marx
and Lenin's speeches and comments on cooperatives hint at the main conclusions of this
discussion (see Miranda Lorenzo, 2013). Nevertheless, using the theory of socialist
transition utilized in this essay, a more systematic understanding of the possibilities for
cooperatives in the transition from capitalism to precursor socialism has been developed.
This framework may prove useful for scholars and activists in different countries and
contexts that wish to evaluate the role cooperatives should play in their local transition
strategies. To illustrate the utility of this framework, the final part of this essay will
employ it to analyze the Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela.

Cooperatives in Precursor Socialism
Once the transition from a capitalist economy to a precursor socialist form is
complete, what role can cooperatives play? According to the theory of transition utilized
in this essay, we cannot provide a general answer to this question that may apply to all
precursor socialist forms. Precursor socialist forms will be primarily shaped by the
political, economic, and ideological conditions from which they emerge, and it is these
conditions that will determine the role cooperatives may play. Nevertheless, there are
theories and experiences worth discussing.
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Research on cooperatives within post-capitalist economies conceived as
transitioning towards mature socialism or communism is scarce. One notable exception is
Che Guevara, who worked within a framework similar to the one developed in this essay.
In a letter to Fidel in 1965, Guevara (2012, 7) wrote: “Marx established two periods to
reach communism, the transition period, also known as socialism or the first period of
communism, and communism or fully developed communism.” He went on to explain
that Marx suspected that socialism was a system where a series of market categories have
already been suppressed. Furthermore, Guevara (2012, 7-8) argued,
[The USSR] established a new period not foreseen by Marx. The first period of
transition or the period of construction of the socialist society, that later
transforms into socialist society, to ultimately become communist society. This
first period, the soviets and the czechs [sic] assume they have surpassed it; I
objectively think this is not true.

In other words, Guevara was also proposing a three-stage framework for
understanding socialist transition. Using this framework, Guevara analyzed the role
worker self-management should play in the Cuban case. He recognized deficiencies in
worker participation within central planning. For example, Guevara (2012, 17) wrote in
the same letter to Fidel: “We are criticized because workers don't work in the elaboration
of the plans, in the administration of state units, etc. and this is true.” However, he
disagreed with solving this problem with absolute autonomy and worker selfmanagement:
The remedy that is sought for this is that workers direct the factories and be
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responsible for them financially, that they have incentives and disincentives
according to their effort. I think here lies the crux of the matter; for us it is a
mistake to have workers direct their units; some worker must direct it, as a
representative of the rest, if you will, but representative with regard to the
function, honor, or responsibility he is assigned, not as representative of the unit
before the greater unit of the state, in an antagonistic form. In proper central
planning, it is very important to rationally utilize every single element in
production, and that cannot depend on a worker's assembly or the will of a worker
(Guevara, 2012, 17).

Guevara (2012, 17) recognized that the smaller the amount of knowledge within
the central apparatus and the intermediate levels, the greater the improvements from the
worker's self-direction. However, he argued that their experience during the first years of
the revolution had shown the following:
A technical cadre, well located, can do much more than all the workers in a
factory, and a direction cadre placed in a factory can completely change its
characteristics...Why can a direction cadre change everything? Why does it make
work, technically, that is, administratively superior for the employees as a whole?
Or provide participation for employees so they perceive work in a new way, feel
enthusiasm, or a combination of both? We have not found an answer, and I think
we have to study this more (Guevara, 2012, 17).

Guevara expanded on these ideas in his personal annotations on his 1963 edition
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of the USSR Manual of Political Economy. Within his notes on the agricultural
cooperatives in the USSR (the kolkhoz), he was emphatic about three main ideas: 1)
cooperatives are not a socialist form, 2) their presence in the USSR does not imply that
cooperatives are necessarily characteristic of the socialist transition, and 3) there is a
fundamental antagonistic conflict between the individual interests of the cooperative
(even if internally it is completely collective and democratic) with the greater collective
of society as a whole. He argued, “I think this is one of the biggest mistakes of socialism.
[Worker cooperatives] are an advance in contrast to capitalism. But in socialism it is a
setback, as it places these groupings in opposition to society’s ownership of the means of
production” (Guevara, 2012, 108).
Afterwards, in response to a paragraph within the Manual that argued kolkhoz
cooperatives had successfully educated individual peasants in a collectivist spirit while
developing the forces of production in socialist agriculture, Guevara (2012, 109) wrote “I
am in disagreement in the long run; that may be correct in the short run... but measures
should have been taken to eliminate this system in the short run.” Similarly, he later
wrote, “it might be best to consider the kolkhoz as a presocialist category, of the first
period of transition” (Guevara, 2012, 116). Guevara's main point becomes clear in his
notes on the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the USSR. He believed the USSR's legal
and economic structure in the 1960s originated directly from the NEP, which represented
one of the greatest setbacks, as “it planted the great Trojan horse of socialism, material
interest as a direct economic lever” (Guevara, 2012, 9; 112). Therefore, this essay agrees
with Yaffe (2013, 124) that Guevara was aware that certain concrete conditions required
some measures that might contradict with socialist objectives, but that “his concern was
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that these measures be openly understood to be concessions to those problems, not
paradigms of socialist transition.” He argued that in place of cooperatives, or the
promotion of other types of private enterprise or market exchanges, countries such as
Cuba and the USSR should achieve material improvements through “administrative
controls (the plan, the budget, supervision and audits, workers democracy); state
investment in skills training, education, science, and technology research; exploiting
endogenous resources; fostering industry; and diversifying agricultural production”
(Yaffe, 2013, 139).
More recently, another author who has analyzed cooperatives within socialist
transition towards communism, with a perspective significantly different from that of
Guevara is Bruno Jossa (2014). Jossa (2014, 278) argues that as “Marx and Engels
defined socialism as the transitional society immediately before communism, nothing
should prevent a Marxist from categorizing a system of democratically managed workerowned firms operating in a market economy as a genuine form of socialism.” He later
clarifies that a system where firms are run by workers and where means of production are
the property of the state would be the “purest” possible system of democratic or socialist
firms (Jossa, 2014, 280). Jossa (2014, 288) asserts that the key contradiction in capitalism
is the clash between labor power and capitalistic relations, and from this contradiction it
“clearly follows that the only way to attain socialism is to reverse the current capitallabor relation and establish a system in keeping with the principles of market socialism.”
In other words, within our framework, Jossa’s focus is on demonstrating that a regulated
market economy of labor-managed firms, where means of production belong to the state,
is not only a valid transitional form, but also the most strategic form of precursor
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socialism.
While it is questionable to argue that his model of market socialism is the only
way of attaining a form of precursor socialism, Jossa’s work is valuable as it recognizes
that socialism should be conceived as a dynamic process instead of as a static system. In
this case, the following question emerges: under what circumstances will worker
cooperatives contribute to a transition to mature socialism? The type of precursor
socialism in place would condition this, but we may delineate general outcomes of
worker cooperatives within this stage.
An initial possibility is that worker cooperatives, at the outset of their
establishment, function as capitalist firms, with one or few workers exploiting others. On
the one hand, if, however, they begin operating internally in a democratic and
participatory manner, but engage in profit-maximizing behavior that conflicts with social
goals (Che Guevara's concern), they could potentially become an anti-systemic institution
with respect to socialism. On the other hand, if they avoid internal capitalist dynamics,
are linked with social goals, and are embedded with an ideology of broad collective (in
contrast to their own individual collective) solidarity, worker cooperatives could function
as institutions that reinforce rather than undermine socialist relations.
Similar to the discussion in the previous section, various factors or processes may
work in favor of the transformation of cooperatives into destabilizing institutions within
precursor socialism. Various historical processes provide insight regarding the
possibilities for cooperatives in precursor socialism. For example, in the late 1980s, the
Soviet Union approved the Law on Individual Labor Activity and the Law on
Cooperatives. These measures were intended to allow and encourage private business in
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the form of individual craft or service businesses (from sale of handmade products to
repairs), and cooperative enterprises. Cooperatives could operate as restaurants, repair
businesses, retail stores, wholesale trading firms, banks, or small consumer-goods
manufacturing firms. Even though cooperative members had to actually work in the
business and capital could not be raised from outsiders, a significant number of the
cooperatives were “in effect capitalist businesses, in which one or a few owners ran a
business employing wage workers” (Kotz, 1997, 92-93). This contributed to the creation
and development of a new group of private capitalists within the Soviet Union.
Despite never experimenting with cooperatives as defined in this essay (private
self-managed firms), the Yugoslav experience with self-management is also worth
discussing. Tensions between the CPSU and the CPY ultimately led to Yugoslavia
breaking away from the Soviet sphere of influence. Yugoslavia not only distanced itself
politically, but also regarding the particular form of precursor socialism to which they
aspired. A series of reforms in the 1950s were initiated and aimed at self-managed state
socialism. The objective of these reforms was to create a more committed and productive
workforce; however, by the end of the 1950s neither economic performance nor the
degree of self-management proved satisfactory (Flaherty, 2009, 119).
During the 1960s, the country adopted liberalizing reforms, opening up the
domestic economy to the discipline of the world market. Inflation and unemployment
soared, with the government responding by supporting unwise investment in order to
avoid massive bankruptcy. As a result, during the early 1970s, Yugoslavia launched
reforms that aimed at even further decentralization. Firms were excessively broken up
into their smaller constituent units, assuming these would enable more worker
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participation. In practice, managers and experts, not workers, exercised control within
firms. By the end of the 1970s, the government again faced the alternative of emitting
inflationary credit or allowing widespread unemployment. In this case, the government
emphasized bankruptcy and the market as neutral arbiters of performance. Inequality and
inflation continued to increase until the collapse of the entire country in 1991 (Flaherty,
2009, 120-121).
The fact that Yugoslavia was made up of highly heterogeneous regions played a
major role in these outcomes. Yugoslavia’s eight regions were separated by religion,
ethnicity, language, and economic conditions. Some regions had experienced some
degrees of industrialization while others were still predominantly agrarian. Yugoslavia’s
liberalizing reforms significantly increased inequality between regions, which itself
increased regional antagonisms as well (Flaherty, 1988, 101). These processes translated
into political instability, which was further exacerbated with the death of Tito. The
presidency was placed on a one-year rotation, so it was impossible for any new leader to
implement a long-term program of stabilization or unification (Gardner, 1998, 492).
Finally, perhaps one of the few aspects that can be categorized as something
beneficial that arose out of the Yugoslav experiment was the quality of goods. Gardner
(1998, 500) notes that Yugoslav consumer goods and services were often superior in their
style, variety, and quality to those of many of the more developed countries of Eastern
Europe, and they could be obtained without standing in long lines. Performance in
consumer goods production was closely related to its activities in the tourism industry.
Tourists not only provided foreign currency, but also allowed Yugoslav firms to be more
aware of competitive trends in style and production quality than their counterparts in
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other socialist countries.
The Yugoslav experience provides concrete examples of several of the processes
that this essay has argued may push cooperatives into becoming destabilizing institutions
within precursor socialism. Furthermore, this experience suggests that the use of market
forces as a primary allocation mechanism intensifies or increases the likelihood of the
destabilizing tendencies within emerging cooperatives. This coincides with the analysis in
Part I, which argued that market forces within the socialist transition would ultimately
fetter the transition to a stable and durable communist economy.
Finally, one analyst (Xu, 2012) made a convincing case that the collectivization of
Chinese agriculture in the 1950s made a positive contribution to fostering socialist
transition. The collectivization process had various steps, beginning with individual
peasants organizing mutual aid teams. These teams laid the foundation for establishing
agricultural cooperatives, where peasants received income based on their labor, but also
dividends from the resources they contributed to the cooperative. These cooperatives
provided the foundation for a more advanced form of cooperative, where dividends were
canceled and worker-members received income solely based on their labor. Finally, it was
these cooperatives that laid the foundation for the transition into People's Communes in
the 1960s. The communes, usually the size of a town, were composed of brigades, while
these were composed of production teams. The production teams, the basic level of
governance, were largely autonomous in production and decision-making. The
commune’s leaders, typically appointed by upper level communist party officials,
combined decision-making at the production team level with society-level goals. Despite
various problems and shortcomings, the communes were relatively stable until the early
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1980s, and greatly contributed to the quality of peasant life (Xu, 2012, 104-106). After
the anti-socialism faction became hegemonic within the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP), the communes were dismantled (Xu, 2012, 3). In other words, it was the
ideological shift of the CCP that led to this dismantling, not internal deficiencies or
peasant struggles in favor of decollectivization (Xu, 2012, 136). Similarly, even though
these same institutions later played a role in the current transition to capitalism, this procapitalist utilization mostly stems from the ideological shift of the CCP. The Chinese
experience during the 1950s provides a concrete example of how cooperatives can be
used to advance the socialist transition in a relatively successful manner, as they were a
key institution in transitioning from simple commodity production into precursor socialist
institutions.
Thus, as has been consistently emphasized throughout this essay, the objective is
not to argue that cooperatives will always be pro-capitalist institutions within precursor
socialism. On the contrary, by understanding how they may become obstacles in the
socialist transition, insight is provided regarding how they may become institutions that
strengthen the socialist transition. As has also been consistently emphasized, precursor
socialist forms will most likely be significantly different in different parts of the globe,
depending on national and international factors at the particular moment in question. In
some cases, it might be ideal to completely avoid cooperatives and/or market allocation
while in others they might be the most ideal institutions for various purposes.
Nevertheless, discussions such as the one developed in this section are fundamental for
those countries that conclude that cooperatives should be utilized.
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Part III: The Bolivarian Revolution
Some view the current political process in Venezuela as a populist movement that
merely attempts to better manage capitalism. Other analysts regard it as a case of
transition to socialism. This paper's dynamic model of socialist transition may be utilized
to evaluate the Venezuelan case. In order to consider Venezuela a country undergoing a
transition to socialism, we would expect to find 1) some combinations of interstitial,
symbiotic, and ruptural strategies, and 2) concrete steps towards an institutional form that
can be considered precursor socialism. In addition, utilizing this paper's model to analyze
Venezuela may highlight lessons for similar movements elsewhere. Furthermore, the
Venezuelan process has intended to utilize cooperatives in its transition process as well.
Thus, the discussion in Part II of this essay can also be contrasted with the Venezuelan
experience.
While some authors, like Ciccariello-Maher (2013, 88), emphasize that we may
trace continuity from the Venezuelan guerrilla struggles of the 1960s to the electoral
radicalization process in the 2000s, perhaps the most clear-cut event that signaled the
beginning of the current process was the so-called “Caracazo” in 1989. Neoliberal
policies led to rioting throughout the country and the government responded with violent
repression. The death toll was anywhere between 300 and 3,000 dead (Wilpert, 2007, 17).
At this point, Leftist militants grouped around the three transition logics. In the symbiotic
branch, parties such as Movement toward Socialism and Radical Cause (LCR) focused
on electoral politics. The ruptural branch focused on creating radical cells within the
armed forces, intending to organize a coup. Finally, the interstitial branch focused on
creating alternative grassroots institutions. For example, by 1991, the Barrio Assembly of
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Caracas had emerged as a sort of general assembly of local community groups, and was
relatively successful in becoming a coordinating agent for popular struggles (CiccarielloMaher, 2013, 100). All three strategies proved useful in the Bolivarian process. Despite
the ruptural branch failing in in their coup attempts, they proved to be successful in
fostering popular support for Leftist politics. For example, Chavez's one-minute
television appearance after his failed coup in 1992 turned him into a folk hero (Wilpert,
2007, 17). Thus, it enabled an alliance with the symbiotic branch that led to Chavez
winning the presidency in December 1998.
Electoral support during this initial stage was mostly from the middle-class. The
Chávez government was originally only calling for national sovereignty and social
justice. The objective was to transform Venezuela’s backward economy, characterized by
lopsided growth and little redistribution of oil revenues, into a modern economy. There
was no mention of socialist transition. Interestingly, as Wilpert (2007, 9) explains, the
country’s conservative forces attempted to prevent revolution before one had even begun,
and Chávez and his followers were then radicalized in reaction. Various factors may
explain the local elite’s preemptive attack on Chávez. For Wilpert (2007, 20), a key
aspect was that Chávez progressively removed the country’s old governing class (in
politics, the economy, and culture) from power. This loss of institutional class power was
sufficient for the old elite to oppose the government and conflicts with local elites
consistently radicalized the “Bolivarian” movement. The radicalization of the Chavez
government led to its alliance with the interstitial branch as well, and the “barrio
assemblies” were the prototypes of the “community councils,” which will be discussed
further on.
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Beginning in 2001, the government set out to facilitate the creation of new
cooperatives by eliminating the need to present feasibility studies, previously required by
law for cooperatives to be established. Similarly, it eliminated incorporation fees and
other bureaucratic obstacles, while establishing that the state had the obligation of
supporting cooperatives. However, significant growth in the number of cooperatives did
not arise until after 2004, when the government began to systematically support their
creation through the Ministry of the Popular Economy. The underlying presumption was
that the democratic character of cooperatives would not only serve to replace the wagelabor relation with that of associated workers, but also to transcend capitalist logic within
the Venezuelan economy (Piñeiro Harnecker, 2009, 310).
In 2006, the national cooperative supervision institute (SUNACOOP) conducted a
census on the new cooperatives. The government found that due to insufficient training,
poor supervision, and lack of follow-up support, the vast majority of registered
cooperatives never became active or collapsed (Maheshvarananda, 2014). Furthermore,
among those that were active, it became clear to policy makers that many were behaving
like capitalist enterprises. The government believed that the solidarity that characterizes
cooperatives internally would spontaneously develop into social consciousness. Thus,
cooperatives would guide their activities towards the satisfaction of community needs, or
at least be somewhat aware of the needs of the communities where the firms were
located. When providing technical support to new cooperatives, the Ministry of the
Popular Economy focused on explaining the character of the internal relations among
members, with little or no mention of the role that cooperatives were expected to play in
communities. In practice, cooperatives focused almost entirely on maximizing their
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narrow individual and collective benefits without consideration of the ways that they
could work with the needs of their communities. Rather than supplying their products to
local markets, where many were needed, some cooperatives chose to export to other
countries because it would generate higher profits. Similarly, some cooperatives chose to
sell their products to capitalist distributors instead of to the government distribution
network, Mercal. Many cooperatives refrained from incorporating new worker-members
(Piñeiro Harnecker, 2009, 316-17). Finally, some cooperatives were basically small
capitalist firms that were incorporated as cooperatives “on paper” in order to receive tax
exemptions, subsidies, and preferential treatment in the awarding of public sector
contracts (Orhangazi, 2014).
Due to the cooperatives' high rate of failure, the government shifted its attention
to a new institution, called the Social Production Enterprises (EPS in Spanish), in 2005,
and in September 2007 delineated their role in the transition process in a document titled
“Simón Bolívar National Project-First Socialist Plan: Economic and Social Development
of the Nation 2007-2013.” This report outlined how the government intended to guide
Venezuela toward 21st-century socialism: “the socialist productive model will basically
consist of Social Production Enterprises, which constitute the seed and path toward 21stcentury socialism, even though state enterprises and private capitalist enterprises will
persist.” By Social Production Enterprises, they refer to “economic entities dedicated to
the production of goods and services in which work has its own meaning, non-alienated
and authentic, there is no social discrimination within the workplace and of any type of
work, there are no privileges associated to hierarchic positions, with substantive equality
among its participants, and based on participatory and protagonist planning” (Proyecto
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Nacional Simón Bolívar 2007: 21-2). The plan set out to construct a network of EPS
firms that would “progressively compose the majority of economic activity,
complementing and supporting each other for [the] collective benefit of the community
and the people as a whole.” In addition, state enterprises would eventually be transformed
into EPS firms through different strategies.
However, an official, clear-cut definition of what the property and management
structure of EPS firms should be, or what their relation to overall society should be was
never established. The government merely stated that to be considered an EPS it should
dedicate 10% of its net revenue to “social labor”, without specifying what was meant by
“social labor” (Piñeiro Harnecker, 2009, 315). Many EPS firms in practice were
traditional capitalist firms seeking subsidies. Other problems included
the lack of institutional support for those EPS that did represent alternative structures, and
lower level state bureaucrats in many cases obstructing the growth of new EPS firms
(Azzellini, 2013, 269). As a result of these deficiencies, a new conceptualization of EPS
firms was promoted after 2008. Instead of social production enterprises, the most recent
focus has been on direct and indirect social property enterprises.
Chávez defined “social property” as property that belongs to the people as a
whole and to future generations. Indirect EPS referred to state enterprises, such as the
national oil company PDVSA, while Direct EPS firms were those directly administrated
by workers and communities. Workers, communities, local governments, and the national
government can legally own Direct EPS firms. To be considered a Direct EPS, workers
must originate from adjacent communities, and it is these, through communal councils,
that should direct the firm. This integration with local communities was established
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precisely as a result of policy makers and workers studying the deficiencies of the
Yugoslav experience. By 2009, 271 Direct EPS firms had been established, along with
1,084 firms with some sort of co-management between the state and the community
(Piñeiro Harnecker, 2009, 333; Azzellini, 2013, 269-270).
Another type of EPS currently being developed is the “socialist factory.” The
idea is to build factories with foreign assistance, particularly from Belorussia, China,
Iran, Russia, and Argentina, and engage in import substituting activities. In these firms,
workers are selected among members of the adjacent communities, through communal
councils. Only technical staff positions are filled with workers from outside the
community, but with the condition that these train the other workers so that eventually
even technical positions can be staffed with members of the community. In practice
however, management has not been proactive in seeking this transition. By 2009, close to
80 EPS socialist factories had been established (Azzellini, 2013, 270). A particularly
interesting example, which illustrates the shift in focus from cooperatives towards EPS
firms, is that of INVEVAL. This valve manufacturing company was the first firm
expropriated (in 2005) and turned into a mixed enterprise, with the state having 51% of
shares and the workers as a cooperative 49%. Azzellini (2013, 267) quotes one of
INVEVAL’s workers as saying: “we didn’t take out one capitalist to replace him with 60
capitalists.” The workers argued that being in the position of owners pushed them
towards applying a capitalist logic and they only focused on generating profits to pay off
the loans they incurred in buying their shares. Furthermore, deciding the direction of the
firm was relegated to a board of directors, generating apathy and discontent among most
of the workers. The workers proposed that the firm become completely state-owned, but
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self-managed by workers through a worker council. The transition took place, and
through the worker council, workers participated in the discussions and decisions
previously monopolized by the board of directors of the cooperative.
It should also be noted that even though the government shifted its focus away
from cooperatives, many grassroots cooperative firms continued to emerge out of the
initiative of unemployed or informal sector workers. By 2009, more than 70,000
cooperatives were operational (Azzellini, 2013, 263). Approximately half of these
cooperatives were in the services sector, mostly in areas such as tourism, business
services, cleaning services, industrial maintenance, and hair salons; 25% were in
production, mostly in agriculture, livestock, fishing, and manufacturing; 11% were
transportation cooperatives; and close to 8% were communal banks. Around 13% of the
economically active population (approximately two million people) worked in a
cooperative (Azzellini, 2013, 263). Few linkages have materialized between the
cooperative firms. As was previously discussed, many cooperatives have links with large
local and/or foreign capitalist firms.
Beginning in 2006, the government also began emphasizing the creation of a new
alternative political institution: the “communes” (Orhangazi, 2014). Although the new
EPS firms have not been abandoned, focus during the last five years seems to have
shifted mostly towards the communes. Communes are made up of community councils,
which are small neighborhood organizations representing 250-400 families. Each
community council elects a representative for the communal parliament. In addition, by
registering with the Ministry of Communes, they become eligible for funding for
productive, educational, cultural, infrastructure, or other development projects. As of
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May 2014, there were approximately 40,0000 communal councils and 600 registered
communes, with many more underway (Robertson, 2014). Despite being mainly political
institutions, a significant amount of communes have initiated their own communal
enterprises or intend to do so. Most “communards” tend to have a higher degree of
revolutionary consciousness relative to workers within cooperatives. While the latter
tended to focus on maximizing net revenue, the communes have tended to be more
political, strongly supporting the Bolivarian government. The communes were key forces
behind the political mobilizations that ensured the Chávez government's survival in many
elections (Orhangazi, 2014). Similarly, Robertson (2014) points out that in the
Venezuelan state of Mérida, 600 communards representing 50 communes met specifically
to discuss how they could combat what they understood to be the “economic war”
orchestrated by Venezuelan capitalists against the Bolivarian revolution. Precisely due to
the food shortages associated with this “economic war,” the Maduro government is
hoping to solidify agricultural production through the communes. In September 2014,
Maduro announced the creation of the Communal Development Bank with this purpose
(Fischer-Hoffman, 2014).
Some communes have incorporated their enterprises as Direct EPS firms. For
example, “Confecciones La Veguita” is a Direct EPS within the Macarao Commune. The
factory has been making book-bags, school uniforms, and baby clothes since 2010. The
commune also has a bookshop, transport services, blacksmith services, and a carpentry
factory that is currently under construction (Pearson, 2013). Concrete steps have been
taken by the government and the communes to create a solidified and united commune
movement. The First National Commune Conference took place in 2013, and in 2014 the
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National Communard Council was created. As one communard argued:
The commune movement is a launching pad to consolidate this process of change
toward socialism, to put people first. It's a way for us to end the state as it is
currently constituted, with regional state governments and mayors, and for us to
arrive at a communal state with constituent power [direct participatory bodies],
the base of which are the communes (Robertson, 2014)

Despite what seem to be promising experiments with the new EPS firms and with
communal enterprises, no phasing out of the capitalist economy by a new social economy
has taken place to any significant degree. Within state firms, middle-level state officials
have blocked the development of worker councils to engage in self-management
(Azzellini, 2013, 272). Similarly, many chavista mayors have opposed communes in fear
of losing decision-making power (Orhangazi, 2014). Capitalism is still present in the
banking system, in large agricultural estates, and in the import-processing sector, while
the political system is still predominantly of a bourgeois character, plagued with
corruption and clientelism (Lebowitz, 2012a). Thus, the transition into a precursor
socialist stage will most likely not occur in the short run. Furthermore, after the death of
Chávez, local elites intensified destabilization practices through economic sabotage. For
example, Latin-American television network TeleSUR has documented how many
enterprises have deliberately hoarded goods (TeleSUR, 2015, January 13). Other
businesses take advantage of the government’s currency controls in order to acquire U.S.
dollars at low rates with the pretense of importing goods for consumption in Venezuela,
but instead selling these dollars in the black market. A significant amount of the goods
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that are actually imported are eventually smuggled out of the country for sale elsewhere,
while what is offered in stores is overpriced at black market exchange rates (Levingston,
2014).
Utilizing this paper's theory of transition, the conclusion that emerges is that the
Bolivarian movement is not simply a social democratic project aimed at better managing
capitalism. This movement elaborated a plan combining symbiotic, ruptural, and
interstitial transition strategies in order to begin the transition into a precursor socialist
form. Nevertheless, there have been various obstacles that have hindered a transition out
of capitalism. Many of the problems discussed in this paper regarding the obstacles for
cooperatives as vehicles for transition have emerged. It would seem that the Bolivarian
Movement has exhausted the potential symbiotic strategies, and has not combined its
control over the state apparatus with engaging interstitial strategies in such a way that
cumulatively leads to transitioning out of capitalism. In the face of the economic boycott
conducted by the propertied classes and the growing menace of a general paralysis of
production, the Venezuelan government might need to expropriate a more substantial part
of its capitalist economy, putting less emphasis on collaboration with local capitalists (a
key aspect of symbiotic strategies). This process, however, would need to be
accompanied by a substantial offensive against corruption and clientelism within the
government, and the expansion of institutional support structures for interstitial
institutions, most importantly the EPS cooperatives and other types of non-capitalist
firms. Similarly, creating new structures for the integration and coordination of the new
non-capitalist economy would be a crucial part of this phase as well.
It should also be noted that within the Bolivarian movement, there is a significant
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non-revolutionary faction focusing on consolidating the movement's social programs and
achievements, with less focus on radical structural change (Orhangazi, 2014). This
faction was gaining support even prior to the death of Chávez. For example, Chávez
himself argued in 2008:
I am obliged to slow down the pace of the march. I have been imposing a speed
that is beyond our collective capacity.... I accept that [this] has been one of my
mistakes... we cannot allow ourselves to be dragged along by extremist currents...
we have to seek alliances with the middle classes, even with national
bourgeoisie... we haven't abandoned socialism... Only by way of socialism [can
we improve the situation] little by little. (Alo Presidente, 6 January 2008, quoted
in Orhangazi, 2014).

The recent shortages and “economic war,” may have strengthened this faction
even further, for the government is currently advancing its Networks of Free and
Associated Agricultural Producers (REPLA), where food production and distribution is
prioritized, regardless of whether the model of organization or ownership is capitalist or
socialist (Fischer-Hoffman, 2014). However, as this paper has argued, this “economic
war” implies that the government would require the opposite if it wishes to ensure a
transition to precursor socialism. In other words, it would require expropriating a more
substantial part of its capitalist economy and transitioning directly into precursor socialist
forms, for it is unlikely that the national bourgeoisie will move towards a conciliatory
attitude with respect to the Bolivarian movement. Ultimately, 1) the wavering electoral
support for Maduro, 2) the complex task of handling right-wing violence and the
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economic sabotage by local elites (see Azzellini, 2014), 3) the increasing strength of the
non-revolutionary faction, 4) increasing U.S. intervention (see Harris, 2015; Weisbrot
2015), and 5) decreasing oil prices since 2014 might result in the eradication of this
particular attempt at a transition to socialism. Thus, the Venezuelan experience provides
concrete examples of several of the processes that this essay has argued may hinder the
transition to precursor socialism. Nevertheless, the Bolivarian Movement might still be
able to correct these issues and move closer to precursor socialism. In any case, this
movement has already provided insight into the obstacles that similar movements in other
parts of the world could face.

Concluding Remarks

The theory of transition developed in this paper facilitates the analysis of previous
historical experiences, contemporary socialist politics, and the role specific institutions
may play in transition. It has been applied to analyze the role one institution, the worker
cooperative, can play, and the recent experience of the Bolivarian Revolution in
Venezuela. Focus was placed on the ways cooperatives may fail as vehicles of socialist
transition. Nevertheless, the objective was not to discard this particular institution, but to
begin identifying ways to overcome the obstacles it could face. Cooperatives have been
associated in diverse ways with economic theory and practice. Thus, discussions that
contribute to understanding the role they can play in different social formations are, in
this author's view, significantly worthwhile.
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CHAPTER III
ECONOMIC STAGES AND ANTI-IMPERIALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Introduction

Historically, two opposing conceptions regarding the relation between antiimperialism and socialist transition have been present in the Marxian tradition. One,
which this essay will call the stadial approach, argues that an anti-imperialist capitalist
development stage within dominated regions is required before initiating a socialist
transition. The other, which this essay will call a non-stadial approach, argues that
capitalist development is blocked in dominated regions, and the only alternative is
socialist development. A wide range of heterodox scholars has challenged the latter view,
associated with radical dependency and world-systems theorists. The objective of this
essay is to present an alternative theory that nevertheless arrives at a similar conclusion.
This essay will argue that while capitalist development is not necessarily or indefinitely
blocked by exchange relations associated with core-periphery dynamics, the internal class
dynamics of dominated regions do in fact obstruct capitalist development. Furthermore,
when capitalist development is not obstructed, the conditions that enable it will tend to
obstruct the possibilities for socialist transition. In other words, if the long-term objective
is building a socialist economy, a two-stage approach may in fact delay rather than
promote a socialist transition. The analysis consists of an examination of key Marxist
thinkers and revolutionary processes across the globe, while applying a framework of
transition logics, developed by Wright (2010), to assess the underlying logic within
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stadial and non-stadial theorists and processes. By focusing on both the underlying
theories and the actual historical experiences, this essay concludes that as a result of the
class structures associated with imperialist domination and the deficiencies within
approaches that emphasize the need for a capitalist development stage prior to socialist
transition, it is both feasible and strategically superior to move directly from direct or
indirect imperialist domination to the transition to socialism. Before proceeding, the
particular definition of imperialism that will be employed will be further specified.
Generally, the concept of imperialism refers to the domination of one country
over another, at the expense of the latter. Capitalist imperialism usually refers to the case
where this domination is exercised by advanced capitalist states and corporations over
less developed areas. While today imperialism is also commonly used to refer to military
interventionism, for Marxists, imperialism generally refers to economic domination
(Griffin and Gurley, 1985, 1091). Nevertheless, these definitions of imperialism have
various shortcomings. Different conceptions of imperialism will be evaluated with the
objective of specifying a more useful definition, which will be utilized throughout this
essay's analysis.
Among the first Marxists to discuss the economic domination of “backward
areas” by advanced capitalist countries was Rosa Luxemburg, who paid close attention to
the masses of people being incorporated or who still remained outside capitalist
dynamics. Luxemburg (2003, 447) argued:
Capitalism is the first mode of economy with the weapon of propaganda, a mode
which tends to engulf the entire globe and to stamp out all other economies,
tolerating no rival at its side. Yet at the same time it is also the first mode of
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economy which is unable to exist by itself, which needs other economic systems
as a medium and soil.

Luxemburg argued that she detected a flaw in Marx's reproduction schemes and
attempted to show that capital accumulation was impossible in a closed capitalist system
due to the inability of capitalists to find buyers to realize surplus value. On the basis of
this underconsumptionist argument, she concluded that capitalist countries were required
to find buyers in the non-capitalist world. Capitalist countries competing for what
remained of the non-capitalist world was the cause of imperialism. Capitalism does
require non-capitalist processes to perform certain duties, such as reproducing the
working class. However, her main point, that the capitalist world can exist only if there is
a non-capitalist world that can buy the products of the capitalist world, has been shown to
be simply incorrect by a variety of authors, including both critics and supporters of
underconsumptionist theories (Sweezy, 1942, 201; Harvey, 2003, 138; Brewer, 1990, 58).
While she was wrong in arguing that capitalism needs a non-capitalist world, by
describing how capitalism expands into non-capitalist systems, she highlighted that
processes usually associated with the birth of capitalism actually continue to play a
fundamental role throughout capitalist development. Luxemburg (2003, 350) argued:
At the time of primitive accumulation, i.e. at the end of the Middle Ages, when
the history of capitalism in Europe began, and right into the nineteenth century,
dispossessing the peasants in England and on the Continent was the most striking
weapon in the large-scale transformation of means of production and labor power
into capital. Yet capital in power performs the same task even to-day, and on an
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even more important scale—by modern colonial policy.

In other words, the processes Marx associated with primitive accumulation, such
as accumulation through the use of force, state power, and fraud, actually persist
wherever capitalist and non-capitalist forms meet. This insight is one of the fundamental
ideas underlying David Harvey's concept of 'accumulation by dispossession,' as will be
discussed further on (Harvey, 2003, 184).
Hilferding, Bukharin, and Lenin, who were in many respects theoretical
opponents of Luxemburg, are regarded as the founders of the classical Marxist theory of
imperialism (Brewer, 1990, 88). Specifically, it was Hilferding who first introduced
imperialism into Marxist theory. His notion of imperialism, which became that of
Bukharin and Lenin as well, was mainly referring to rivalry between major capitalist
states. Hilferding (1981, 370) argued:
Finance capital, in its maturity, is the highest stage of the concentration of
economic and political power in the hands of the capitalist oligarchy. It is the
climax of the dictatorship of the magnates of capital. At the same time it makes
the dictatorship of the capitalist lords of one country increasingly incompatible
with the capitalist interests of other countries, and the internal domination of
capital increasingly irreconcilable with the interests of the mass of the people,
exploited by finance capital but also summoned into battle against it.

For Bukharin, imperialism was defined as the policy of finance capital, which is,
“the conquest policies of modern capitalist states” (Bukharin, 1929, 79). He agreed with
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Hilferding that there was a tendency toward concentration and centralization of capital in
the form of finance capital, but he added that there was also a process of
internationalization and nationalization of capital. With this he referred to the growing
interdependence of the world economy and its division into national blocks. In other
words, there was a contradiction between expanding productive forces internationally,
and continued national appropriation of surplus value. These two contradictory
tendencies, according to Bukharin, lead to conflict and war between the advanced
capitalist countries. For example, Bukharin (1929, 106) argued:
Production is of a social nature; international division of labor turns the private
“national” economies into parts of a gigantic all-embracing labor process, which
extends over almost the whole of humanity. Acquisition, however, assumes the
character of “national” (state) acquisition where the beneficiaries are huge state
companies of the bourgeoisie of finance capital. The development of productive
forces moves within those narrow limits. Under such conditions there inevitably
arises a conflict, which, given the existence of capitalism, is settled through
extending the state frontiers in bloody struggles, a settlement which holds the
prospect of new and more grandiose conflicts.

The purpose of Lenin’s pamphlet, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism,
was not to expand theoretically on Hilferding and Bukharin’s contributions, but to
popularize them. Perhaps the only key difference is that Lenin regarded imperialism as
the monopoly stage of capitalism, not a specific or set of policies. The policies described
by Hilferding and Bukharin, along with other phenomena such as the rise of monopoly
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and finance capital, were all characteristics of the imperialist stage of capitalism.
According to Lenin (1975, 243), “If it were necessary to give the briefest possible
definition of imperialism we should have to say that imperialism is the monopoly stage of
capitalism.” For Lenin, as for the other classical Marxist theorists of imperialism, the
effect of imperialism on less developed countries would be greatly accelerated capitalist
accumulation. Nevertheless, he regarded imperialist oppression as a form of “capitalist
parasitism of a handful of wealthy states” (Lenin, 1975, 227).
A key turning point in how Marxist theory regarded imperialism was the
publication of Baran's The Political Economy of Growth in 1957. One of the various
significant breaks with classical Marxist theory of imperialism was that the focus shifts
from rivalry between advanced capitalist countries to the determinants of growth in both
advanced and backward countries. Baran’s main argument is that monopoly capitalism
hampers growth in advanced capitalism, for there is a lack of investment outlets for the
rising economic surplus and military expenditures become a significant source of surplus
absorption (Baran, 1957, 118-119).
Another significant departure from classical Marxist analyses is the consequence
of imperialism in backward areas. For Baran, the result would be surplus flows (profits
and dividends) from backward to developed countries, which deprive the former of
resources for its own development. However, even if the resources were available, they
might not be used for national development, as imperialism creates an internal mode of
utilization of the economic surplus that obstructs development. Baran (1957, 177) argued:
The economic surplus appropriated in lavish amounts by monopolistic concerns in
backward countries is not employed for productive purposes. It is neither plowed
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back into their own enterprises, nor does it serve to develop others. To the extent
that it is not taken abroad by their foreign stockholders, it is used in a manner very
much resembling that of the landed aristocracy. It supports luxurious living by its
recipients, is spent on construction of urban and rural residences, on servants,
excess consumption, and the like.

More specifically, as a result of imperialist domination, a domestic stratum of
merchant capitalists, which Baran called “lumpenbourgeois”, along with wasteful,
corrupt, and reactionary regimes, which he referred to as “comprador governments”,
emerged in backward areas. These sectors unproductively used a significant proportion of
the available economic surplus, thus hindering capital accumulation (Baran, 1957, 173;
218). World-system theorists such as Frank and Amin further developed Baran’s thesis,
and argued that the capitalist world system is divided into a metropolis-satellite structure
(or Core-Periphery), where:
...each of the satellites... serves as an instrument to suck capital or economic
surplus out of its own satellites and to channel part of this surplus to the world
metropolis of which all are satellites... We must conclude, in short, that
underdevelopment is not due to the survival of archaic institutions and the
existence of capital shortage... On the contrary, underdevelopment was and still is
generated by the very same historical process which also generated economic
development: the development of capitalism itself (Frank, 1966, 116-120).

Similarly, Amin (1976, 201) argues that various structural features characterize
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underdevelopment “that oblige us not to confuse the underdeveloped countries with the
now-advanced countries as they were at an earlier stage of their development.” These
structural features include the “orientation of production in the periphery to the needs of
the center, which prevents the transmission of the benefits of economic progress from the
poles of development of the economy as a whole,” along with overall economic
domination by the center (Amin, 1976, 202). Amin (1976, 202) concludes:
The accentuation of the features of underdevelopment, in proportion as the
economic growth of the periphery proceeds, necessarily results in the blocking of
growth, in other words, the impossibility, whatever the level of production per
head that may be obtained, of going over to autocentric and autodynamic growth
(emphasis added).

By the 1980’s the general view of development in the core and underdevelopment
in the periphery as two sides of the same coin had undergone strong attacks and classical
Marxist ideas on imperialism were gaining support. One of the most notable contributors
in this trend was Warren, who believed that development based on foreign capital is
complementary to the development of national capital. Warren (1973, 3-4) argued,
“Empirical observations suggest that the prospects for successful capitalist development...
of a significant number of major underdeveloped countries are quite good; … that the
imperialist countries' policies and their overall impact on the Third World actually favor
its industrialization.” The main problem in Warren’s argument is that while some
peripheral countries have grown at quite unprecedented rates, other country’s per-capita
incomes have actually fallen for substantial periods of time (Brewer, 1990, 283). In other
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words, Warren is unable to explain why imperialism leads to capitalist development in
some areas but not in others and what the underlying determinants of these outcomes are.
Evidently, there has been great divergence in how imperialism has been defined
within the Marxist tradition. Most significantly, there have been a variety of conceptions
of how imperialism shapes development in dominated areas, which has profound
strategic and tactical implications for anti-imperialist and/or socialist movements.
Nevertheless, there are commonalities that have been consistently present. Even within
the classical conception of imperialism, the idea that capitalists from abroad are
exploiting the working classes in dominated areas has been present. As stated above,
Lenin regarded advanced capitalist countries to be parasitic with respect to less developed
areas, even though the result would be rapid capital accumulation in the latter. Although
Warren vehemently refused to call advanced capitalist countries parasitic, he also
conceded that their dominant classes exploited the working classes in the periphery.
Taking the commonalities and divergences into account, this essay shall
conceptualize imperialism as the political and economic domination of one country or
region by the ruling class of another. Capitalist imperialism is a particular type of
imperialism, and it can also manifest in diverse ways. Economically, capitalist
imperialism is defined as the economic domination of one country or region by the
capitalist class from another, through mechanisms such as the appropriation and
distribution of the surplus produced by the working class of the oppressed country by the
capitalist class from the imperialist country, and/or the control of resources and/or
markets in the oppressed country by the capitalist class from the imperialist country.
Politically, capitalist imperialism is characterized by exercising political and military
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power to support and protect the economic interests of the ruling class of the imperialist
country through mechanisms such as the building or undermining of political movements
within the oppressed country. This essay will focus on capitalist imperialism and this is
what will be referred to as 'imperialism' in the following analysis.
Imperialism can result in diverse consequences. For example, some countries
may have significant amounts of its surplus transferred abroad, which immediately
represents a disadvantageous scenario compared to the case where the surplus is
reinvested domestically. Imperialist relations may also result in the development of class
structures within the dominated country that utilize available surplus unproductively. In
most cases, this is represented by what has been referred to in the literature as
“comprador” bourgeoisies. In addition, these processes may be reinforced by policies
from the imperialist state that seek to build conditions favorable to its own capital and
destroy conditions unfavorable to it.
Thus, imperialism may manifest in diverse combinations of these processes.
Breaking from imperialist domination implies putting an end to the particular imperialist
processes that are taking place in a dominated country. A key process in breaking with, or
avoiding, imperialist domination is closing the gaps of uneven capitalist development.
Anti-imperialism, therefore, is not intrinsically socialist. A dominated country could
simply seek capitalist development as a means of reducing the asymmetries that enable
their domination. However, historically, imperialism and anti-imperialism have had a
close theoretical and practical relationship with the transition to socialism. Different
conceptions on the relation between anti-imperialism and socialist transition can be
categorized based on their views on stages and the role assigned to domestic capitalist or
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other ruling classes within dominated regions. This paper identifies two main
perspectives: a stadial approach and a non-stadial approach.
The stadial approach argues that the transition to socialism can only be initiated
after dominated countries successfully complete a stage of anti-imperialist capitalist
development. The opposing non-stadial approach emphasizes the feasibility and strategic
superiority of moving directly from direct or indirect imperialist domination to the
transition to socialism. With this framework, the writings of key Marxist thinkers and
revolutionary processes across the globe will be examined. The main argument
throughout this paper is that domestic capitalists within dominated regions have a
tendency to ally with foreign capital, and thus prefer to perpetuate rather than combat
imperialist relations. In these cases, non-stadial approaches do in fact prove strategically
superior to stadial approaches. Furthermore, even if anti-imperialist capitalist
development is feasible, it might still be advisable to adopt a non-stadial approach, for the
resulting class relations of this development might ultimately delay or obstruct a
transition to socialism rather than enabling it.
In the following analysis, the transition to socialism will refer to the transition to
precursor socialism, based on the theory of transition developed in previous essays. Thus,
this paper acknowledges that different institutional arrangements will have been sought,
attempted, or built depending on different conditions faced by socialist movements
around the world. Furthermore, Erik Olin Wright's (2010) framework for assessing
institutions and initiatives used, or proposed to be used, as tools in the transition to
socialism will also be re-employed. As was discussed in previous essays, Wright argues
that there are three basic logics of transformation through which institutions of social
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empowerment might be built: ruptural, interstitial, and symbiotic (2010, 303). Ruptural
change refers to creating new institutions through a sharp break with existing institutions
and social structures. Existing institutions “are destroyed and new ones built in a fairly
rapid way” (2010, 303). Interstitial transformation refers to building forms of
empowerment in the niches and margins of capitalism. Finally, symbiotic transformation
refers to deepening social empowerment through ways that also temporarily benefit the
dominant classes (2010, 303-5). It is with this framework of ruptural, interstitial,
symbiotic, and combined transition strategies that this paper will analyze the relationship
between imperialism and the transition to socialism. As this paper will demonstrate,
different conceptions of the relationship between imperialism, anti-imperialism, and
socialism can also be understood as different instances of ruptural, interstitial, symbiotic,
and combined transition strategies.

Classical Perspectives on Imperialism and Socialist Transition
Marx did not use the word ‘imperialism’, nor is there anything in his work that
corresponds exactly to the concepts of imperialism advanced by later Marxists. Similarly,
Marx did not discuss colonialism in general terms, and his views on this subject must be
deduced from scattered references in his major writings and from articles about special
cases, notably about Ireland and India (Brewer, 1990, 48). Marx's different conclusions
regarding the stages that Ireland and India had to follow provide insight into his
understanding of the relation between socialist transition and what we now call
imperialism. For example, neither Marx nor Engels thought that revolution in Ireland
could be socialist. Instead, they were concerned with seeing a nationalist revolution
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against the aristocracy in Ireland, since this would undermine their hold in England,
reduce divisions between Irish and English workers in England, and thus advance the
socialist revolution in England (Marx, 1870; Engels, 1888). For Marx, Ireland had to first
pass through this initial political stage before embarking on capitalist development.
However, his focus was not particularly on political conditions, but on the economic
processes underlying the Irish case. Industrial development in Ireland was being blocked
by the fact that Irish industry could not survive English competition. For example, Marx
(1967, 708) argued that “The European states.... forcibly rooted out, in their dependent
countries, all industry, as, e.g., England did with the Irish.” Similarly, Marx (1867) argued
that “Every time Ireland was about to develop industrially, she was crushed and
reconverted into a purely agricultural land.” In sum, Marx was arguing that British rule
had a regressive role on capitalist development in Ireland. In order to advance a transition
to socialism, it had to first pass through a political stage of liberation and then a
successive stage of capitalist development. The latter stage would create the
preconditions necessary for the socialist transition.
This is significantly different from his analysis of India, and the source of the
divergence again lies in his focus on the underlying economic processes. For Marx, while
merchant capital and its allies exploit and destroy without transforming, industrial capital
destroys but at the same time transforms. In contrast to Ireland, British rule had a
progressive role with respect to capitalist development in India. For example, while Marx
(1972a, 662) recognized that England built railways with the exclusive view of extracting
raw materials for their manufactures, he argued:
when you have introduced machinery into the locomotion of a country, which
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possesses iron and coals, you are unable to withhold it from its fabrication. You
cannot maintain a net of railways over an immense country without introducing
all those industrial processes necessary to meet the immediate and current wants
of railway locomotion.

Marx (1972a, 658) believed that while England acted “only by the vilest
interests,” it was nevertheless an “unconscious tool of history” in bringing about a “social
revolution.” For Marx (1972a, 659), “England [had] to fulfill a double mission in India:
one destructive, the other regenerating—the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the
laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia.”2
However, Marx argued that although British rule created the preconditions for
massive advance, it had to be overthrown before its benefits could be enjoyed (Marx,
1972a, 662). Thus, the stages India should go through were not political liberation,
capitalist development, and transition to socialism (in that order), but instead: 1) capitalist
development, 2) political liberation, and 3) transition to socialism. The difference
between Ireland and India, as stated above, was whether domination was enabling or
hindering capitalist development.
What remains constant is that a stage of capitalist development must precede a
stage of transition to socialism. There are two main arguments found in Marx for this
stadial approach to socialist transition. One argument is given at the level of the
development of the productive forces, where it is argued that capitalism can only be

2
Marx's analysis of India was based on the information available to him at the time, and Brewer
(1990, 49) notes that there was much that he did not know simply because it was not available. A Marxian
analysis of Indian-British relations with the information known today could provide alternative
explanations and conclusions.
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abolished at the point where it has exhausted its ability to nurture technological creativity
and expand production. Marx (1972b, 478) argued that just as feudal relations became
fetters, incompatible with the already developed productive forces, which had to be burst
asunder, a similar movement was going on before our own eyes. He explained:
the productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the
development of the conditions of bourgeois property; on the contrary, they have
become too powerful for these conditions, by which they are fettered, and so soon
as they overcome these fetters, they bring disorder into the whole of bourgeois
society, endanger the existence of bourgeois property (Marx, 1972b, 478).

The other argument, given at the level of the relations of production, argues that
revolution is only possible where capitalism has simplified and polarized the social
structure into openly opposed armies of proletarians and bourgeois. He argued:
the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: it has
simplified the class antagonisms: Society as a whole is more and more splitting up
into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other:
Bourgeoisie and Proletariat (Marx, 1972b, 474).

Marx (1877) clarified that his work did “not pretend to do more than trace the
path by which, in Western Europe, the capitalist order of economy emerged from the
womb of the feudal order of economy,” and emphasized that it was not a “historicophilosophic” theory of the general path “imposed by fate upon every people, whatever the
historic circumstances.” Nevertheless, the stadial approach to socialist transition was one
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of the key underlying ideas within orthodox and Soviet Marxism.
In Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin (1975, 227) argued, “The
export of capital affects and greatly accelerates the development of capitalism in those
countries to which it is exported.” In other words, Lenin understood imperialism to be
accelerating capitalist accumulation in the periphery. Thus, his views on the relation
between imperialism and socialist transition were similar to Marx’s, and argued that
communists in developing countries should ally with bourgeois democratic movements.
However, some particularities in Lenin’s stadial approach should be noted. For Lenin, the
rights of oppressed nations to self-determination, i.e., the right to politically secede, were
in themselves something that revolutionaries should defend. He argued, “socialists must
not only demand the unconditional and immediate liberation of the colonies without
compensation… but must render determined support to the more revolutionary elements
in the bourgeois-democratic movements for national liberation in these countries and
assist their rebellion” (Lenin, 1916). In other words, Lenin was defending a position such
as the one Marx had with respect to Ireland, where political liberation was the initial
stage preceding capitalist development. He directly refers to the Irish case when stating
that the tasks of the proletariat in “ruling nations are the same as those of the proletariat
in England in the nineteenth century in relation to Ireland” (Lenin, 1916). However, he
later clarifies that “the rights of nations freely to secede must not be confused with the
advisability of secession by a given nation at a given moment. The party of the proletariat
must decide the latter question quite independently in each particular case, having regard
for the interests of social development as a whole and the interests for the class struggle
of the proletariat for socialism” (Lenin, 1917). This is basically Marx’s position, where
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the advisability of liberation in the Irish and Indian cases depended on the particular class
processes in operation, as previously discussed.
It should be noted that Brewer (1990, 133-134) argues that Lenin also “flirted
with the idea that it was possible for backward areas to move to communism without
passing through a capitalist stage,” and refers to authors, such as Warren, who also point
out there was a shift in Lenin’s strategy that marked a fundamental change of direction.
This shift within the communist movement towards non-stadial approaches to
imperialism and transition, mostly developed after Lenin’s death, will be further
discussed in the following section.
Finally, although Wright defined his concept of symbiotic transition with the
social-democratic movement in advanced capitalist countries in mind, the logic behind it
is similar to the stadial approach of transition in dominated countries. For Wright (2010,
337), the basic idea behind symbiotic transition is that advances in social empowerment
within capitalism will be most stable and defendable when they also help solve certain
real problems faced by capitalists and other elites. Thus, empowerment will be more
durable, more deeply institutionalized, and harder to reverse if it also serves to solve real
problems faced by the system as a whole. Similarly, from the stadial perspective, it is
argued that advances in working class organization are most stable and defendable if they
are accompanied by the replacement of pre-capitalist relations with capitalist relations.
Also, it is argued that if a working class government were to be achieved prematurely
with respect to the development of the forces of production, it would be unstable and
easily reversible. Thus, in oppressed countries, the symbiotic logic of transition suggests
(as it does in advanced capitalist countries) that the socialist movement should
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collaborate with the bourgeoisie in order to create conditions for a subsequent transition
to socialism.
There are fundamental problems underlying symbiotic logic. The main weakness
in symbiotic logic is that it is unclear how it will cumulatively lead to a transition to
socialism, for resolving certain problems for capitalism means that the capitalist class is
advancing as well. As Wright (2010, 364) himself notes, “the historically most impressive
examples of symbiotic strategies—the first resulting in extending the franchise to the
working class and the second in empowering the labor movement as a central player in
the expansive welfare state—both contributed to consolidating very robust forms of
capitalism.” While Wright (2010, 364) calls this reading of symbiotic logic the
pessimistic view, historical evidence seems to suggest that symbiotic strategies, when
successful, strengthen the hegemonic capacity of capitalism more than they undermine it.
Furthermore, the idea that victories achieved through symbiotic strategies are more
difficult to reverse is questionable. The dismantling of social democratic welfare states
during the neoliberal stage of capitalism, and the intensification of this dismantling after
the fall of the Soviet bloc, suggest that the irreversibility or reversibility of certain
victories will ultimately be determined by class struggle. This translates into symbiotic
transition logic in oppressed countries having the following problem: how can the
socialist movement ensure (or increase the likelihood) that a socialist transition stage will
actually follow the initial stage of capitalist development?

Development of Non-Stadial Approaches to Imperialism and Transition
Discussions in Russia regarding the character of the revolution, prior to and after
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1917, influenced later debates regarding the character of revolutions in developing
countries. The orthodox position, defended by Plekhanov (1885), was that workers
should support rather than hinder the development of capitalism in Russia. In Lenin’s
April Theses, published in 1917, a significant break occurred. There was agreement on
the fact that the content of the revolution would be bourgeois-democratic, but there was
disagreement over which class would be playing the leading role. Unlike Plekhanov,
Lenin argued that it was an alliance of workers and peasants that should be hegemonic
and carry out the necessary bourgeois tasks. However, the events of 1917 unfolded
differently. Most notably, “once in power the working class was unable to confine itself
to merely democratic reforms; the dynamic of the class struggle forced it… to undertake
explicitly socialist measures,” for “in the face of the economic boycott conducted by the
propertied classes and the growing menace of a general paralysis of production, the
Soviets were led… to expropriate capital [through] the socialization of the principal
branches of industry.” Thus, “in the light of the experience of the Russian revolution,
Lenin and the Third International attempted to outline a global strategy for the backward,
underdeveloped, colonial, or semi-colonial societies” (Löwy, 2010, 63-64).
By 1928, the Communist International officially reversed the traditional Marxist
position by arguing that capital export and imperialism hindered development in colonial
territories rather than accelerating it (Brewer, 1990, 133). This shift in orientation was
influential in the development of Latin American Marxism from the 1920s until the early
1930s, where we find some of the first theoretical manifestations of a non-stadial
approach to imperialism and transition to socialism; that is, an understanding of the
feasibility and preferability of transitioning directly from backward economies into
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socialism.
For example, Julio Antonio Mella was one of the first Latin American Marxists to
analyze the relation between imperialism and socialist transition, favoring a non-stadial
approach. Mella participated in the founding of the Cuban Communist Party in 1925, but
was soon forced into exile in Mexico. He began preparing an armed landing on Cuba but
was assassinated in 1929. Mella (1992, 27) argued that local bourgeoisies understand “in
the end that it is better to ally with imperialism, as they ultimately pursue similar
interests;” therefore, they are content with being minor partners of foreign big business.
He concluded that as the national bourgeoisie becomes a reactionary class, “only the
proletariat can obtain absolute national liberation, and this will be by means of a workers’
revolution” (Mella, 1992, 28).
José Carlos Mariátegui, considered by many as the founder of Peruvian
communism, also developed a similar approach until his death in 1930. For Mariátegui
(1992a, 32), in most South American countries “it is impossible to be truly nationalistic
or revolutionary without being a socialist.” He explained that in Peru there was not and
there had never been a progressive bourgeoisie “with a national sensibility that declares
itself liberal and democratic and bases its politics on the postulates of its theory.” He
concluded that “The Latin American revolution… will simply and purely be a socialist
revolution. To this word you may add, according to the particular case, whatever
adjective you like: ‘anti-imperialist,’ ‘agrarian,’ or ‘national revolutionary.’ Socialism
supposes, precedes, and encompasses all of these.” The reasoning behind this conclusion
was that “Latin American countries came late to capitalist competition,” therefore “the
inside lanes had already been assigned” and “the destiny of these countries in the
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capitalist order is that of being simple colonies.” As Mella showed, the key argument
behind favoring a non-stadial approach to socialist transition was the character of the
national bourgeoisie. Mariátegui (1992b, 39) argues that the national bourgeoisies in
Latin America “see cooperation with imperialism as their best source of profits,” thus
they feel themselves secure enough to not be “too greatly preoccupied with national
sovereignty.”
Also during this period, Trotsky published perhaps the first systematic exposition
of a non-stadial approach to transition in his books The Permanent Revolution and
History of the Russian Revolution, both published in 1930. Underlying Trotsky’s
approach was his “law of combined and uneven development.” Trotsky argued that late
industrializers are unable to follow the same path as advanced countries. Backward
countries are in many cases required to adopt advanced features, and thus skip
intermediate stages. This leads to a process of uneven and combined development.
Trotsky (1964b, 85) explained: “The development of historically backward nations leads
necessarily to a peculiar combination of different stages in the historic process. Their
development as a whole acquires a planless, complex, combined character.” Furthermore,
this process leaves democratic tasks, such as the agrarian democratic revolution (abolition
of pre-capitalist forms of exploitation and including radical land reform), national
liberation (including the creation of a national market protected from foreign competition
and control over strategic natural resources), and democracy (including the conditions for
popular participation in political life, reduction of the working day to eight hours, and
universal public education), unresolved. For Trotsky, these tasks are bourgeois in
character, but must be completed by a proletarian revolution that must also grow into a
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socialist revolution. Trotsky (1964a, 64) concluded:
The theory of permanent revolution... pointed out that the democratic tasks of the
backward bourgeois nations led directly, in our epoch, to the dictatorship of the
proletariat and that the dictatorship of the proletariat puts socialist tasks on the
order of the day.... While the traditional view was that the road to the dictatorship
of the proletariat led through a long period of democracy, the theory of the
permanent revolution established the fact that for backward countries the road to
democracy passed through the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus democracy is
not a régime that remains self-sufficient for decades, but is only a direct prelude to
the socialist revolution. Each is bound to the other by an unbroken chain. Thus
there is established between the democratic revolution and the socialist
reconstruction of society a permanent state of revolutionary development.

The main arguments to support this conclusion, as in Mella and Mariátegui, are
again based on the character of the bourgeoisie in developing countries. According to
Trotsky, under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie, completion of these tasks would
be impossible, for uneven and combined development leads to a particular relationship
between domestic and foreign ruling classes. Although contradictions might emerge
between local and foreign capitalists, the former would always prefer moderate
conciliatory policies towards foreign capital to mass anti-imperialist upheavals that might
ultimately pose a threat to them. Trotsky did not deny that it was possible for national
bourgeoisies, in collaboration with imperialism, to achieve certain degrees of
industrialization or to complete some of the unresolved democratic tasks. However,
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Trotsky insisted on the limited, half-hearted, and subsequently ephemeral character of
such progress, which would always provide easily reversible partial results. For example,
in his analysis of India, Trotsky (1964c, 248-251) argued:
The Indian bourgeoisie is incapable of leading a revolutionary struggle. They are
closely bound up with and dependent upon British capitalism. They tremble for
their own property. They stand in fear of the masses. They seek compromises with
British imperialism no matter what the price; they lull the Indian masses with
hopes of reforms from above...“People's Front” is only a new name for that old
policy, the gist of which lies in class collaboration, in a coalition between the
proletariat and the bourgeoisie. In every such coalition, the leadership invariably
turns out to be in the hands of the right-wing, that is, in the hands of the
propertied class... Coalition with the bourgeoisie leads to the proletariat's
abnegating the revolutionary struggle against imperialism. The policy of coalition
implies marking time, temporizing, cherishing false hopes, hollow maneuvers and
intrigues. As a result of this policy, disillusionment inevitably sets in among the
working masses.”

It should be clarified that Trotsky did not argue that all types of alliances with
national bourgeoisies were to be excluded. His argument was that they should be engaged
with while recognizing two factors: 1) the national bourgeoisie was unable to lead the
completion of these democratic tasks and 2) the national bourgeoisie will eventually
become an obstacle for their completion. For example, Trotsky (1964c, 251-252)
explained:
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If the Indian bourgeoisie ever finds itself compelled to take even the tiniest step
on the road of struggle against Britain's arbitrary domination, the proletariat will
naturally support such a step. But they will support it with their own methods...
depending on the relationship of forces and the circumstances. Precisely to do this
the proletariat must have its hands free. Complete independence from the
bourgeoisie is indispensable to the proletariat... Only the proletariat is capable of
advancing a bold, revolutionary agrarian program, of rousing and rallying tens of
millions of peasants and leading them in struggle against the native oppressors
and British imperialism.

The non-stadial approaches so far discussed generally follow a ruptural logic of
transition, where revolutionary classes (workers and peasants) must seize the state in
order to break with imperialist and pre-capitalist institutions. The local and foreign ruling
classes are understood as an obstacle to this process and thus should be confronted.
Although in Trotsky’s formulation there is room for some collaboration with local
bourgeoisies, this is still conceived as temporary and in no way conceived as an alliance
of equal partners. The bourgeoisie should be subjected to the leadership of the
revolutionary classes.
In Wright’s discussion, the main critique of ruptural transition is related to what
he calls “transition troughs” (2010, 311). He argues that “any rupture with capital would
necessarily entail significant economic disruption and thus sacrifice” and “certainly
precipitate a significant decline in production and standards of living” (Wright, 2010,
315). This transition trough would probably lead to socialists losing the support of the
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population, causing the country or region to revert back to capitalism. The only
alternative would be for socialists to turn to authoritarian rule, which according to
Wright, would undermine the transition to socialism (Wright, 2010, 318). Wright’s
assessment is based on advanced capitalist countries. In the case of ruptural transitions in
developing countries with already low standards of living, the possibility of the
population beginning to see improvements relatively quickly, and consequently
increasing support for the transition, is not necessarily far-fetched. For example, as a
result of redistribution after the Cuban Revolution, the population began to see
improvements in access to food, health, education, and housing relatively quickly during
the early 1960s (Brundenius, 1989, 113). In fact, even in advanced capitalism, due to the
size of the economic surplus, it is not implausible to conceive its redistribution
ameliorating a transition trough.
However, the persistence of an antagonistic local bourgeoisie, or of hostile
imperialist interventions (ranging from covert destabilization to military invasions),
would likely undermine the effectiveness of a ruptural transition in diverse ways.
Bourgeois-democratic political institutions would easily become tools for destabilization
policies from imperialist states, but turning to democratic centralist policies at a national
level might hinder the democratic character of the revolution. Breaking with institutions
gradually, while pursuing symbiotic and interstitial processes, might be an alternative
way of engaging in ruptural transition that facilitates dealing with these challenges. This
possibility of combined transition will be discussed further on.
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Return to Stadial Approaches
Even though by 1928 the understanding within the Communist International went
against the classical view that capital export and imperialism hindered development in
colonial territories rather than accelerating it, the return to a classical stadial
understanding of transition was already developing and was soon to become the official
position. Two years earlier, in 1926, the Executive Committee of the Communist
International approved the Thesis on the Situation in China, containing Stalin and
Bukharin’s strategy of the bloc of four classes. They argued that the appropriate tactic in
developing countries was to carry out the bourgeois-democratic revolution through a
coalition government where workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie
were all represented. Furthermore, Stalin (1926) openly urged Chinese students, workers,
and peasants to be subordinated to the ideological and political influence of the
nationalist Kuomintang. Despite the failure of this strategy due to the Kuomintang
turning against workers and communists in 1927, the official position of the Communist
International regarding socialist strategy in the developing world remained the same.
After 1935, this approach was subsumed under the Popular Front strategy, which,
although it entailed different variations, remained within a classical stadial framework of
transition and was the official position of Soviet leadership for the following decades
(Löwy, 2010, 109).
Mao further developed the strategy of the bloc of four classes in his writings on
“New Democracy.” In 1940, Mao argued that the Chinese revolution must be divided into
two stages: first forming “an independent, democratic society,” and then carrying the
revolution forward and building a socialist society. Thus, China had to pass through an
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initial stage consisting of a “new-democratic state under the joint dictatorship of several
anti-imperialist classes.” In theory, Mao’s exposition was clearly within Stalin’s stadial
framework of transition. However, it also contained elements that, in practice, pointed
towards a non-stadial approach to transition. In the same document Mao argued: “In the
new-democratic republic under the leadership of the proletariat, the state enterprises will
be of a socialist character and will constitute the leading force in the whole national
economy, but the republic will neither confiscate capitalist private property in general nor
forbid the development of such capitalist production as does not "dominate the livelihood
of the people", for China's economy is still very backward.” Similarly, large banks, large
industrial and commercial enterprises, and the management of key areas such as railways
and airports were all to be managed by the state. It should be noted that “the joint
dictatorship of several anti-imperialist classes” and “under the leadership of the
proletariat” actually meant that the CCP held state power. Nevertheless, this was
significantly different from the stadial approach proposed by Stalin for China in the late
1920s. Instead of having the workers and peasants subordinated to a nationalist bourgeois
movement, Mao was basically arguing in favor of a precursor mode of socialism, where
remaining bourgeois elements were to be subordinated to the workers.
In 1949, Mao distinguished between a national bourgeoisie and a bureaucratic
bourgeoisie. The former represented elements of the bourgeoisie that could temporarily
be part of the people’s democratic dictatorship, while the latter were those that, due to
their link to imperialism, had no revolutionary capacity. Regarding the national
bourgeoisie, he explained that when “the time comes to realize socialism,” their
enterprises would be nationalized as well. Within our framework of transition logics, Mao
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was perhaps the first example of a combined logic of transition, where both ruptural and
symbiotic elements were combined according to the particular context. Whereas a stadial
approach is predominantly symbiotic in character regardless of the context, a combined
approach is predominantly mixed in character, with the particular combination of
symbiotic, interstitial, and ruptural elements being shaped by the particular context.
Nevertheless, China evidently followed a ruptural path of transition, as the newdemocratic republic stage was rapidly replaced with the importation of the Soviet model.
Outside of China, as mentioned above, the strategy proposed by the Communist
movement was the Popular Front, grounded on a stadial approach of transition. In
practice, this led to many communist parties around Latin America supporting right wing
political parties, such as the Communist Party of Peru, which supported the oligarchy’s
candidate Manuel Prado in 1939, or the Communist Party of Cuba, which in the same
year supported the Batista government. Ultimately, the Popular Front strategy
significantly weakened not only the political strength of the Left in many countries, but
also eroded its anti-imperialist character (Mandel, 1959; Löwy, xxxi, 1992).
Among the most significant failures of stadial approaches of transition are those
associated with the Guatemalan and Chilean coups in 1954 and 1973, respectively. The
Communist Party of Guatemala changed its name to the Guatemalan Party of Labor
(PGT) in order to facilitate legal activities. The PGT became one of the dominant forces
within the coalition that won the elections in 1950, with Jacobo Arbenz as president. The
Arbenz government in Guatemala set out to accomplish only bourgeois-democratic tasks,
in alliance with the bourgeoisie. It declared that it did not struggle for the establishment
of socialism, but only against feudal backwardness and imperialist oppression. Some
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Guatemalan leftists were critical of this strategy. For example, Ismael Frías (1992, 123)
argued that the Arbenz government was essentially a bourgeois government, that “while
always defending the general political interests of the bourgeoisie, [it] maintain[ed] an
equilibrium between the bourgeoisie and the masses and between the masses and
imperialism.” The PGT communists argued that its alliance with the bourgeoisie had
notable success, but at the same time recognized that “the bourgeoisie exercised a certain
influence on [the] party that in practice constituted a break upon many activities”
(Guatemalan Labor Party, 1992, 118). Meanwhile, as a self-criticism party document
prepared after the coup explains, the PGT to a certain degree accepted the idea that the
army was apolitical (Guatemalan Labor Party, 1992, 119). However, the coup did not
consist entirely of external aggression. Various sectors within the Guatemalan
bourgeoisie, such as plantation owners and large merchants, also financed the invasion,
while right-wing members of the army High Command were ensuring that the
Guatemalan army would not adequately respond to the invasion and, most importantly,
that the army did not allow the arming of the workers and peasants. In the same selfcriticism document, the PGT concludes “the party conceded more importance to the
alliance with the bourgeois-democratic parties than to forging a firm alliance between the
working class and the peasantry” (Guatemalan Labor Party, 1992, 121). Furthermore, the
party admitted:
The PGT did not correctly estimate the weakness of the bourgeoisie's capacity for
resistance and did not always take into account its conciliatory character in
relation to imperialism and the reactionary classes... It did not struggle with the
necessary tenacity for the working class to conquer the leadership of the
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revolutionary movement, nor did it put forward or resolve the concrete tasks
necessary to assure the hegemony of the working class in the revolutionary
movement... the PGT definitely favored the workers and peasants arming
themselves.... Yet the party did not lay this task before the working class with the
necessary energy and audacity... The party was dominated by the fear that it might
precipitate an army coup (Guatemalan Labor Party, 1992, 118-20).

In Chile, despite Allende belonging to the Socialist Party, the hegemonic group
within the Popular Unity (UP) government was the Chilean Communist Party, which
strictly adhered to the stadial approach to transition. Thus, the predominant idea within
the government was that Chile first had to pass through an anti-imperialist stage before
pursuing a socialist transition. The Chilean Communist Party actively tried to limit
nationalizations, searched for rapprochement with the Christian Democracy, and pushed
for returning to the national bourgeoisie enterprises seized by workers, all while having
stout faith in the armed forces’ loyalty to the parliamentary system (Löwy, 2010, 108).
The UP underestimated the power of the Chilean bourgeoisie to sabotage the economy
and to undermine the UP's political support within the population (Steenland, 1974, 10).
The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force had different class compositions. While the Navy
and the Air Force were composed of soldiers from upper middle-class or bourgeois
background, the Army was mostly working class. Thus, the right-wing forces concluded
that the coup needed to occur before the Left could subvert the rank-and-file Army
soldiers (Steenland, 1974, 13). The UP was unsure if the Army and the National Police
would ultimately support the suspected Navy/Air Force coup, or if it would defend the
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constitutional government (Steenland, 1974, 15). In other words, for the UP, it was
possible that the Army and the National Police would defend the Allende government. In
practice, the Army and the National Police supported the coup. Nevertheless, it should be
noted that the coup leaders ensured that leftist soldiers were murdered days before and
during the coup (Steenland, 1974, 15). Furthermore, it was quite possible that more Army
soldiers and police officers would have fought against the coup if they had seen an
effective method to resist in unison with a massive civilian struggle. The UP's refusal of
arming and organizing workers and peasants led to leftist soldiers finding few civilian
allies. The only options were fleeing, following orders, or refusing orders and being
slaughtered (Steenland, 1974, 16).
The class character of the coup organizers is also of importance. Top ranking
generals that were also close relatives of wealthy upper and upper middle-class families
led the Chilean coup (Ratcliff, 1974, 81). In Chile, domestic capitalists restructured
themselves as a class dependent on and responsive to the interests of foreign capitalists,
maintaining a moderate and enduring level of prosperity through its ownership of vast
agricultural estates, various corporations, and banks, and its other alliances with foreign
capitalists. The most powerful property owners in Chile were tied together into one single
cohesive core of upper class families, which shared kinship relations and economic
interests (Ratcliff, 1974, 84). The upper class used the power it retained to block most
reforms (Ratcliff, 1974, 83). The UP's stadial approach led to putting crucial functions in
almost every sphere of economic activity into the hands of private capitalists. Thus, the
Allende government remained significantly vulnerable to obstruction organized by the
Chilean wealthy upper class (Ratcliff, 1974, 87). Production was held down, machinery
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was destroyed, food was allowed to spoil, and crucial consumer goods were diverted to
the black market. In addition, the same families that owned the agricultural estates,
banks, and corporations linked to foreign capital also had family members in influential
positions, such as doctors, lawyers, engineers, bureaucrats, judges, university
administrators, professors, and most importantly, military officers (Ratcliff, 1974, 88). At
UP meetings held four and five days before the coup, many leftist sectors within and
outside the UP coalition, most notably the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR),
advocated for arming the workers and preparing for an armed confrontation. However,
Allende and the Communist Party insisted on an institutional solution (Steenland, 1974,
12). On September 10, the left as a whole knew a coup was planned for the next day.
However, Allende insisted that he could trust the Army's Commander-in-Chief, Augusto
Pinochet, therefore no decisions to prepare for an armed confrontation were made
(Steenland, 1974, 15).
In both the Guatemalan and Chilean cases, the understanding of the political
process as one carried out by an alliance of all anti-imperialist sectors in society, instead
as one carried out under the leadership of the workers and peasants, led to avoiding
arming the latter. Thus, the approach to transition played a role in leaving the workers’
and peasants’ movement without the means to combat the counter-revolutionary violence.
Furthermore, the underlying stadial/symbiotic logic obstructed a critical analysis of the
role the local capitalists and armed forces could play in the completion of bourgeoisdemocratic tasks or in imperialist aggression. In many cases, as previously discussed, the
local bourgeoisie is quite content with being a junior partner with respect to foreign
capital, and have little interest in competing against it. However, even if local capitalists
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do not have a conciliatory relation to imperialism, it is unclear why they would support
an anti-imperialist development project that would grow into a socialist transition at a
later stage. Thus, this stadial/symbiotic approach seems unlikely to result in a socialist
transition, and historical experience supports this conclusion. In Chile, a well-organized
domestic capitalist class and its allies, who had no interest in working towards a project
that identified itself as socialist even if it was limited to anti-imperialist policies, defeated
the socialist transition. Imperialist assistance from the U.S. government helped but was
not the centerpiece of the developments. In the Guatemalan case, imperialist assistance
played a central role, for the U.S. government organized the invasion that overthrew the
Arbenz government. In this case, the Guatemalan elites were supportive of the imperialist
aggression. Both these experiences provide evidence that seeking alliances with local
capitalists might ultimately obstruct any attempts at transition, even if they are limited to
anti-imperialist policies. In this sense, the character of the local ruling classes blocks the
initial capitalist stage required in the stadial framework.

Return to Non-Stadial Approaches
As mentioned above, despite China originally espousing a stadial framework in
line with Stalin’s, in practice it opted for a non-stadial approach. From the outset of
communist victory, democratic-bourgeois tasks were combined with socialist measures,
and within a few years the transition into a socialist society was underway. Vietnam,
under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, followed a very similar path. In both cases, the
revolution was from the beginning under the leadership of communist parties. This
contrasts with the Cuban revolution, where an anti-dictatorship/pro-democracy revolution
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in practice grew into a socialist revolution. After the 26 of July movement obtained
power in 1959, it set out to accomplish moderate social reforms, such as land reform and
literacy campaigns. It faced growing hostility not only from foreign capital, but also from
local ruling classes as well. Facing economic sabotage by the Cuban bourgeoisie, the
Cuban government began taking over factories and expropriated the local big bourgeoisie
in 1960. The socialist character of the revolution was made official in 1961, after the
defeat of the Bay of Pigs invasion (Mesa-Lago, 1989, 69).
During this period, Fidel (1992, 169) argued: “We had to make an anti-imperialist
and socialist revolution. Well, the anti-imperialist and socialist revolution could only be
one revolution, because there is only one revolution. This is the great dialectical truth of
humanity: imperialism, and socialism against imperialism… Perhaps the building of
capitalism is a historical stage that some underdeveloped countries can leap over today.
This means they can begin development of a country’s economy through the road of
planning, the road of socialism.” It was an explicit departure from the stadial approach
proposed by the CPSU, which had a profound impact on anti-imperialist movements
across the developing world. Che Guevara became one of the most prominent and
influential theorists of this return to a non-stadial approach of transition. Guevara (1992,
180) argued that “the national bourgeoisie have totally lost their ability to resist
imperialism—if they ever had any—and now form its rear guard. There are no other
alternatives: either a socialist revolution or a caricature of revolution.” A significant
number of “Guevarist” organizations grew across the developing world, but most
prominently within Latin America.
Also worth noting is the significant growth of theoretical work within economics
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that supported the arguments behind the Guevarist non-stadial approach, including
authors such as Paul Baran, Andre Gunder Frank, and Samir Amin, as previously
discussed. There are notable differences between the various economists associated with
Dependency Theory, but their theories can be synthesized as the idea advancing that
capitalist nations (the core) exploit the periphery by direct extraction of profit, unequal
exchange, and/or monopolistic control over trade. Thus, development in advanced
countries and underdevelopment in the periphery are opposite sides of the same coin. The
political conclusion was that because capitalist development is blocked, the only
alternative is socialist development. A notable critic of this thesis, particularly in the
variant developed by Frank, is Robert Brenner.
Brenner argued that core-periphery relations did not necessarily imply that
development was blocked, as “neither the expansion of trade leading to the incorporation
of greater human and natural material resources, nor the transfer of surplus leading to the
build-up of wealth in the core, nor the specialization of labor control systems leading to
more effective ruling-class surplus extraction can determine a process of economic
development” (Brenner, 1977, 31). He adds that the export-dependent role assigned to the
periphery and the transfer of surplus from it to the core are mechanisms that “clearly
capture important aspects of the functioning reality of underdevelopment,” but these
remain to be explained.
Specifically, Brenner argues that it was the internal class structure of the periphery
that resulted in the outward transfer of surplus value, not the other way around (1977, 8385). He concedes that bourgeois revolutions are not on the agenda of peripheral countries,
while international capitalists and local ruling classes have remained interested in and
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supportive of the class structures of underdevelopment. However, he clarifies that this
does not imply that a dynamic of development could not be set in motion under a banner
of “anti-dependency, national development and anti-imperialism”, which could bring
improvement to the working population of underdeveloped areas (1977, 91-92). In other
words, Brenner concedes that bourgeoisies within the periphery have remained
supportive of imperialist relations, but does not conclude from it that capitalist
development is structurally, or indefinitely, blocked across the periphery. Nevertheless,
across all the historical experiences so far discussed, it has been clear that the local
bourgeoisies have favored or supported preserving imperialist relations.
What distinguishes the approach in this essay from that of Brenner is that it
addresses the question of why local ruling classes may remain interested in and
supportive of the class structures of underdevelopment. Furthermore, if only fortuitous
conditions promoted a context where bourgeoisies within the periphery promote rather
than obstruct anti-imperialist capitalist development, then mainly non-stadial/ruptural
approaches would be viable for most dominated countries. While future conditions might
foster a revolutionary anti-imperialist character in local ruling classes, the main argument
in this essay is that throughout history, imperialism has mostly fostered an antirevolutionary/pro-imperialist character in these groups. Thus, while dependency/worldsystems theorists argued that capitalist development of the world economy as a whole
will always be blocked by exchange relations and core-periphery dynamics, this essay
argues that capitalist development is usually hindered in areas dominated by imperialism
due to the particular class dynamics associated with their domination. The political
implications are nevertheless the same; non-stadial approaches are the most likely to
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succeed in achieving development and/or initiating a transition into a socialist economy.

Political Stages and Stadial Approaches
The first stadial conception, found in Marx, paid attention to political conditions
and their implications for transition tactics. Stalin’s stadial approach seemed to apply
equally to all backward areas, no matter their political conditions. Thus, it did not matter
if the country was already independent or still under colonialist rule, allying with the
bourgeoisies in a four classes bloc/Popular Front was the necessary tactic. However, in
some developing countries, communist movements applied an approach with Marx’s
focus on political conditions, but at the same time one closer to the Guevarist tradition’s
understanding of non-stadial transition. On the one hand, for example, similar to Marx’s
views on Ireland, it was understood that independence was a necessary first step. On the
other hand, once independence was obtained, it was understood that the revolution could
grow into a socialist transition, skipping the capitalist stage. Notable examples include
the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and the South
African Communist Party (SACP).
For example, Amílcar Cabral, one of the founders of the PAIGC, distinguished
between direct imperialism (colonialism) and indirect imperialism (neocolonialism).
Cabral understood neocolonialism as the strategy of smothering national liberation
movements across the underdeveloped world while simultaneously dominating the
working class within advanced countries. This strategy took place in a specific phase of
imperialism after World War II, characterized by the rise of monopoly capitalism and the
emergence of a system of multinational corporations. During the anti-imperialist struggle
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against colonialism, the absence of political power composed of national elements could
have facilitated the formation of a broad united front. For Cabral, these broad fronts were
indispensable to the success of the national liberation movement. Furthermore, the petty
bourgeoisie had to assume the leadership of these fronts, as they were the only stratum
capable of having both the consciousness of the reality of imperialist domination and the
ability to handle the State apparatus inherited from this domination. In Cabral’s (1969)
own words:
Our problem is to see who is capable of taking control of the state apparatus when
the colonial power is destroyed. In Guinea the peasants cannot read or write, they
have almost no relations with the colonial forces during the colonial period except
for paying taxes, which is done indirectly. The working class hardly exists as a
defined class, it is just an embryo. There is no economically viable bourgeoisie
because imperialism prevented it being created. What there is, is a stratum of
people in the service of imperialism who have learned how to manipulate the
apparatus of the state—the African petty bourgeoisie: this is the only stratum
capable of controlling or even utilizing the instruments which the colonial state
used against our people. So we come to the conclusion that in colonial conditions
it is the petty bourgeoisie which is the inheritor of state power (though I wish we
could be wrong). The moment national liberation comes and the petty bourgeoisie
takes power we enter, or rather return to history, and thus the internal
contradictions break out again.

In other words, after independence (in the neocolonial stage), the national state,
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now composed of local elements, serves to intensify contradictions and makes it
impossible for the formation of a broad national front. Cabral concludes in this case that
the working classes and the peasantry form the vanguard of national liberation. The
solution to the neocolonial condition could not be simply a nationalist solution, but
instead could only consist of the transition to socialism. Cabral also noted that a key
weakness of the national liberation movement was that the petty bourgeoisie, after
playing its role for national independence, had to commit suicide as a class. He
explained:
What attitude can the petty bourgeoisie adopt? Obviously people on the left will
call for the revolution; the right will call for the 'non-revolution', i.e. a capitalist
road or something like that. The petty bourgeoisie can either ally itself with
imperialism and the reactionary strata in its own country to try and preserve itself
as a petty bourgeoisie or ally itself with the workers and peasants, who must
themselves take power or control to make the revolution. We must be very clear
exactly what we are asking the petty bourgeoisie to do. Are we asking it to
commit suicide? Because if there is a revolution, then the petty bourgeoisie will
have to abandon power to the workers and the peasants and cease to exist qua
petty bourgeoisie. For a revolution to take place depends on the nature of the party
(and its size), the character of the struggle which led up to liberation, whether
there was an armed struggle, what the nature of this armed struggle was and how
it developed and, of course, on the nature of the state...So that to hope that the
petty bourgeoisie will just carry out a revolution when it comes to power in an
underdeveloped country is to hope for a miracle, although it is true that it could do
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this (Cabral, 1969).

Precisely these tensions played a key role in the failures of the PAIGC following
independence, as “democratic principles were undermined by internal struggles and
conflicts of interest among militants of different social origins” (Chilcote, 1992, 76). In
1980, a coup deposed Luis Cabral, of Cape Verdean origin, from the presidency of
Guinea-Bissau. There were ethnical differences between Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau
which the colonial authorities exacerbated by utilizing Cape Verdeans as auxiliaries to
colonial rule in Guinea-Bissau. Furthermore, while access to education in Cape Verde had
progressed significantly, 99% of the population of Guinea-Bissau remained illiterate in
1980 (Munslow, 1981, 110). Thus, educational differences further exacerbated racial
differences. The coup seems to have been a combination of racism toward Cape Verdeans
and blaming Luis Cabral for the country's structural economic problems (Munslow, 1981,
110). The coup also represented the victory of the PAIGC's right-wing petty bourgeoisie,
and as Amílcar Cabral foresaw, they quickly sought a capitalist road. During the 1980s,
the PAIGC supported a Structural Adjustment Program sponsored by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Galli, 1990, 52).
After the 1980 coup in Guinea-Bissau, the Cape Verdean branch of the PAIGC
split and established the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV).
Once again, the right-wing petty bourgeoisie within the party became the hegemonic
group and socialist policies were never sought (Baker, 2006, 494). During the 1990s and
2000s, the PAIGC continued moving toward the right, following policies aimed at
controlling public spending, pursuing privatizations, and implementing growth and
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poverty reduction programs in a manner that met the IMF's approval (Baker, 2006, 499).
While the UN has praised Cape Verde for being the second country to rise from the Least
Developed Countries category into the Medium Development Category, more than a third
of the population is still below the poverty line and income inequality has been
consistently rising since the late 1980s (United Nations, 2007; Baker, 2006, 507). Its
improvements in certain indicators are also closely related to particularities of the Cape
Verdean case, such as its significantly small and homogenous population of less than
500,000 people (Baker, 2006, 493). Finally, the socialist aspirations within the PAICV
have completely faded away.
Similar tensions and problems emerged in post-apartheid South Africa. The SACP
had a similar approach to political stages and transition. Apartheid was understood as
“colonialism of a special type.” On the one hand, the SACP concluded that the
destruction of colonialism and the winning of national freedom was an essential condition
and the key for future advancement to the establishment of socialism in South Africa. On
the other hand, the party regarded “as a dogmatic distortion of Marxism the concept that
African countries which are in a precapitalist stage of development must necessarily pass
through a period of capitalism before achieving socialism… in our epoch it is possible for
the people of colonial countries to advance along non-capitalist lines towards the building
of socialism.” Their conception also shared some commonalities with Mao’s concept of
the New Democracy, as they argued, “the needs of the people will be best met at the
present time by the formation of states of national democracy as a transitional stage to
socialism… The basis of a national democracy is a leading alliance of workers and rural
people. Such a state will provide the most favorable conditions for advance, along non-
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capitalist lines, to socialism” (SACP, 1962).
Similar to Cabral’s approach, the SACP argues that a key step in independence
struggle is “building and forming part of the united front of all patriotic classes for
national liberation.” In South Africa’s case, the African National Congress (ANC) made
up this patriotic front. In other words, “the central and immediate task of the Communist
Party [was] to lead the fight for the national liberation of the non-White people, and for
the victory of the democratic revolution,” continuously striving towards building and
strengthening a “united front of national liberation, the unity of Communists and nonCommunists,” and “the unity of freedom-loving people of all nationalities and all anticolonialist classes in the national democratic revolution” (SACP, 1962). Other similarities
to Mao’s writings in the 1940s are found in the SACP’s focus on aspiring for a national
democratic state that lays the foundations for socialist transition without immediately
abolishing private property. The SACP argued that to ensure development and a balanced
industrial-agricultural economy, distinct from the lopsided growth of colonialism, the
country should apply large-scale planning and the nationalization of mining, banking, and
monopoly industrial establishments. While the goal was to lay the foundations for
advancing to socialism, at this stage the party argued that the state should “protect the
interests of private business, where these are not incompatible with the public interest,”
and it should “offer assistance, by way of state loans, to non-monopolist producers.”
These measures had the objective of “paving the way for a gradual and peaceful
transition to socialism” (SACP, 1962).
In 1993, the SACP further clarified their understanding of the national democratic
state, emphasizing that it is not a distinct stage separate from a socialist stage. Instead, the
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national democratic state is an initial stage within the socialist transition itself. Thus, “in
the course of the national democratic revolution we should continuously seek to create
momentum towards socialism, capacity for socialism, and even elements of socialism.”
Similar to Cabral, the SACP recognized that within the ANC, there was a growing
struggle over the class nature and character of the organization, where demagogic
populism was a key tendency to be combated through the development of a socialist
perspective. After victory over apartheid in 1994, these tensions have continued within
the ANC and the SACP has not been relatively successful in having a socialist
perspective become of the hegemonic tendency within the alliance. On the contrary, the
ANC has become a multi-class capitalist organization, whereas the SACP has become a
relatively marginal actor in policy formation (Thomas, 2007a, 261).
In 1996, the ANC introduced its Growth, Employment, and Redistribution
(GEAR) plan, which consisted of a package of neoliberal macroeconomic policies
(Thomas, 2007b, 124). The SACP continued to insist on giving priority to steering the
ANC from within, toward leftist policies. Thus, the SACP has intended to act in
opposition to the ANC's neoliberal, anti-worker, and anti-poor policies, while at the same
time continuing to actively struggle to preserve the ANC's electoral hegemony. This has
resulted in profound contradictions, such as having SACP leaders in government
positions in charge of implementing neoliberal policies. In fact, Alec Erwin, an SACP
leader who served as Minister of Trade and Industry, has been commonly referred to as
one of the architects of GEAR. Similarly, SACP leader Jeff Radebe was responsible for
privatizing public enterprises while he served as Minister for Public Enterprises (Thomas,
2007b, 129). Furthermore, by prioritizing the struggle within the ANC, the SACP has
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neglected the struggles most relevant to the working class, such as basic service
provision, HIV/AIDS, and land reform. Other organizations have emerged, such as the
Landless People's Movement, the Anti-Privatization Forum, and more recently the
Economic Freedom Fighters, that are actually involved in organizing around issues that
directly impact the working class and the poor (Thomas, 2007b, 135; Piper, 2014, 66). In
other words, other social movements and parties have emerged to fill the void left due to
the SACP's decision to prioritize the electoral victory of the ANC.
This current strategy has become significantly divisive within the SACP. Many
members point out that while the SACP strives to have influence by working within the
ANC, if it were to actually articulate socialist policies, it would unsettle the ANC to the
extent that they would no longer be welcome. In addition, there is very little to suggest
that working within the ANC has resulted in any kind of progress toward the
implementation of the SACP's program (Thomas, 2007a, 262). As a result, many rank
and file members argue in favor of independently contesting in elections, against the
ANC. However, this tendency, while gaining strength, has not become dominant. The
dominant idea is that if the SACP were to contest independently, the ANC would still be
in power, but with the center-right and right-wing elements dominating the ANC, and by
extension the country (Thomas, 2007a). Nevertheless, the ANC's neoliberal, anti-worker,
and anti-poor trajectory suggests that the SACP has failed in steering the ANC toward
“centrist” policies. If the center-right and right-wing elements are already dominating the
ANC, then seeking alliances with other social movements and leftist parties, and
contesting against the ANC, might provide better results for the SACP.
The PAIGC and the SACP followed a symbiotic logic, where temporary class
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compromises were constructed in order to achieve long-lasting victories and were
difficult to reverse. Regarding national liberation, symbiotic logic appears to be
significantly successful. However, in regards to socialist transition, the key deficiency of
the symbiotic logic again presents itself, as nothing ensures that after the particular goal
(in this case independence or dismantling apartheid) is obtained through class
compromise, the resulting context will favor transitioning to socialism. This does not
imply that symbiotic strategies are necessarily destined to fail. The SACP could have
successfully become hegemonic within the ANC, and thus actually initiated a transition
to socialism. Similarly, the socialist factions within the PAIGC and the PAICV could have
become hegemonic. However, historical experience suggests that the forces that are
successful in obtaining national liberation become obstacles in constructing a socialist
transition afterwards. The South African, Guinea-Bissauan, and Cape Verdean cases
further evidence the inherent contradictions of the symbiotic logic. In sum, there is a
tendency within these types of symbiotic/stadial coalitions towards being dominated by
their right-wing, and most of the case studies discussed provide further evidence for this
theory.

Neoliberalism and the New Imperialism
Beginning in the 1970s, we have witnessed the rise of distinctively neoliberal
forms of imperialism, where accumulation by dispossession re-emerged to become a
major feature (Harvey, 2003, 184). Accumulation by dispossession refers to processes of
accumulation by means such as predation, fraud, and violence (i.e. Marx's primitive
accumulation). The substitution of this term with ‘accumulation by dispossession’ serves
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to emphasize that these processes have remained powerfully present within capitalism’s
historical geography until now and do not correspond simply to some ‘original’ or
‘primitive’ stage (Harvey, 2003, 144-145). Similarly, accumulation by dispossession has
taken new forms distinct from those of the initial stages of capitalism. Imperialist
dynamics during this period have given rise to two main forms of anti-imperialist
politics: 1) broad anti or alter-globalization social movements and 2) a turn to the left in
Latin America governments. Within the second group, a distinction must be made
between the Venezuelan process and the other left-leaning Latin American governments.
Venezuela is singled out as it is the only government that has actually defined a socialist
transition plan and attempted to take deliberate steps to fulfill it. These new forms of antiimperialism will be discussed in further detail.
According to Harvey (2003, 166), the broad anti-globalization social movements,
particularly those associated with the first editions of the Porto Alegre World Social
Forum, have been in many instances quite hostile to socialist politics. He includes as
possible reasons for this attitude their views on socialist movements’ “patchy record of
successes” as well as their opposition to “socialist developmentalism.” The only
precursor form of socialism that has been extensively experimented with (i.e.
bureaucratic central planning) has been generally disregarded as an inefficient and
undesirable path, therefore their hostility toward socialist politics is understandable in this
sense. These movements also coalesce around a variety of issues and engage in various
types of struggles. Therefore, they shifted the terrain of political organization away from
traditional political parties and labor organizing to a less focused political dynamic of
social action. As a result, they often found it hard to extract themselves from the local and
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the particular, and were unable to understand the macro-politics of capitalism and
imperialism (Harvey, 2003, 169). The outcome has been a disempowered and limited
vision of change, in which many of these movements reject the goal of taking state
power, considering it an irrelevant or illusory diversion (Harvey, 2003, 175). These antiglobalization movements operate within an interstitial logic of transition. However, this
transition is not conceived as a transition to socialism, but towards some unspecified form
of post-capitalist system.
One of the main problems with interstitial logic, as discussed in previous essays,
is that if an institution or process were to pose a threat to the capitalist class, it would be
willing and able to use the state to repress it. Nevertheless, there is probably consensus in
that many, if not most, of the anti-globalization movements involve local goals or
projects that are in themselves worthwhile for a variety of reasons. In order to preserve
their transformative character, the development of interstitial activities must be
accompanied by coordinated action, articulated in steps and phases, and aimed at the
conquest and redetermination of state power (Porcaro, 2012, 87).
In contrast to these interstitial movements, left-leaning electoral movements in
many Latin American countries have successfully obtained power over the state
apparatus, but it is unclear if and how they are creating conditions for a socialist
transition. Even though the leftist parties who have won elections in countries such as
Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay have produced some gains for the working class
and the poor, they have not been able to impose a clear and resolute post-neoliberal
agenda. The result of electoral politics in Latin America is characterized by a sense of
generalized frustration and the reinforcement of political alienation of working classes
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and other marginalized populations (Boron, 2012, 247).
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela are usually considered exceptions to this
tendency. However, other authors have recently argued that Bolivia and Ecuador are in
practice moving closer to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay than to Venezuela. In
Ecuador, the PAIS Alliance argues that it is aspiring to construct socialismo del buen
vivir, which roughly translates to “good living socialism.” Radical economists within
Ecuador have argued that Buen vivir has become more of a marketing campaign than an
actual political project (Fernández, Pardo, & Salamanca, 2014, 110). There have been no
structural transformations of the Ecuadorian economy and Ecuadorian president Rafael
Correa has openly stated: “we are doing things better with the same accumulation model,
before changing it, because it is not our intention to harm the rich, but it is our intention
to have a more just and equal society” (Fernández, Pardo, & Salamanca, 2014, 110).
Ecuador’s principal economic activities have remained concentrated in a few
enterprises. Furthermore, the profits of the largest economic groups have been
significantly increasing during recent years. In fact, in many sectors profits have been
higher than under neoliberal governments. In this context of increasing profits, local
capitalists have not opposed higher tax rates, while government policies have reduced
poverty rates. Thus, the government celebrates: “never before have powerful economic
groups been better off, never have the excluded of the Fatherland been less worse.”
Nevertheless, there have not been transformations in Ecuador’s model of accumulation, it
has preserved its extractivist essence, and the concentration of wealth has remained
untouched (Fernández, Pardo, & Salamanca, 2014, 111-112).
Similarly, for Petras (2013), the “Movement towards Socialism” government in
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Bolivia has been able to successfully manipulate radical rhetoric while applying orthodox
economic policies with a populist style. The Morales government has built a broad
alliance between social movements and overseas investors, mining executives, domestic
bankers, and agro-business exporters and business leaders. Most policies have
consistently upheld orthodox economic policies, completely in line with international
financial organizations. The state has ensured a budget surplus and kept social spending
and public investment at levels comparable to previous neoliberal regimes, while holding
the line against public sector unions, strongly resisting strikes and other forms of labor
pressure. As a result, “bankers and business people, both national and foreign, have
benefited from low taxes, a stable currency, and business friendly fiscal incentives”
(Petras, 2013).
In Bolivia, corporate profits are high, remittances are unencumbered,
environmental and safety regulations are lax, and labor conflicts are at historical lows.
Morales has rejected workers' co-participation in public sector enterprises and upholds
the authority of capital to hire and fire workers without adequate indemnification except
under specific circumstances. Agro-business plantation owners receive subsidies and tax
exemptions to encourage exports, while land reform for landless peasants was relegated
to marginal public lands. In addition, Morales has extended his electoral coalition to
incorporate the elites in Santa Cruz, formerly the bastion of the Right. While Morales
actively denounces imperialism in international forums, he is careful to emphasize
imperial militarism that threatened his regime and foreign investment, which fits in with
his economic development strategy (Petras, 2013).
Petras (2013) concludes that the Morales regime has successfully imposed a
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political economic model that has generated an unprecedented decade of political and
social stability and a growth rate between 4% and 6%. The government has secured joint
ventures and investments from over fifty of the biggest multinational corporations and is
in good standing with the international financial organizations. In sum, “Evo Morales has
secured a political-economic formula which has succeeded in gaining the support of the
left and right, Fidel Castro and the IMF, the Santa Cruz agro-oligarchy, and the Indian
peasant coca farmers” (Petras, 2013).
Supporters of the Morales government counter-argue that the government has
nationalized key enterprises, previously privatized by right-wing governments, in a
variety of industries such as communications, mining, oil, and energy. Furthermore, the
government has successfully improved various social indicators, including but not limited
to poverty rates, infant mortality rates, and access to education. In other words, according
to Morales supporters, it would be difficult to argue that a government with such policies
is a neoliberal government. Furthermore, they argue that while the current political
process certainly needs to undergo radicalization, it should happen at “the people's own
pace,” rather than at the pace suggested by “armchair revolutionaries” (Esprella, 2014). If
Morales supporters are correct in their own assessment of the Bolivian context, the
conclusion is that the process could be characterized as an attempt at social democratic
reform, which will, at some point in the future, radicalize into a socialist transition.
What is clear is that most left-leaning Latin American governments are applying
symbiotic transition logic. However, they are not applying a classical Marxist stadial
approach. Instead, despite constant socialist rhetoric, they seem to have arrived at the
conclusion that some form of regulated capitalism is the only feasible alternative (at least
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in the short/medium run), and are seeking the collaboration of foreign and local
capitalists to achieve this. In other words, they are applying symbiotic logic as Wright
(2010, 337) originally defined it, with the idea of establishing some form of regulated
capitalism, to cooperation between capital and labor, and relegating the socialist
transition to the long term. Many factors may have led these political movements toward
this stance. As was previously discussed, non-stadial/ruptural strategies might provoke
hostile intervention from imperialist states or local elites, which in many cases leads to
extremely violent processes. Similarly, precisely because bureaucratic central planning
has been generally disregarded as an undesirable path, the best strategy seems to be to
confine themselves to simply attempting national development under a banner of antidependency. The alternative would be experimenting with entirely new and uncertain
institutional frameworks for the transition to socialism that in addition might cause
violent internal and/or external opposition. The demise of state socialism has left socialist
parties unsure of what path they are advocating; thus, it is difficult to act decisively about
an undefined goal. The absence of a clear vision of socialism is an additional obstacle in
this process. In this context, these movements have apparently concluded that it is best to
discard altogether any attempts at socialist development. Even if local capitalist classes
do not obstruct capitalist development, it currently seems unlikely that these processes
will eventually result in a transition to socialism.
However, non-socialist anti-dependency programs have been sufficient to spark
violent and hostile responses both from within and outside developing countries.
Furthermore, the relative ease with which regulated capitalism can be transformed into
neoliberal capitalism points towards the strategic superiority of keeping the socialist
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transition on the agenda and experimenting with new institutions for socialist
construction that overcome the vast problems that emerged during the 20th century in
countries that were attempting to transcend capitalism.
This seems to be the case in Venezuela. As was discussed in previous essays, the
problems in Venezuela seem to be a result of the symbiotic/interstitial logic underlying
the government's strategy reaching its limit, and what is necessary is a phase of rupture
with capitalist political and economic institutions, which are hindering the transition to
socialism.
In conclusion, the neoliberal period has seen the rise of three main perspectives
regarding anti-imperialism and transition. The first, associated with the anti-globalization
social movements, is characterized by the rejection of both stadial and non-stadial
approaches, preference for an interstitial logic, and focus on revitalizing traditional forms
instead of transitioning to socialism. The second, associated with left-leaning Latin
American governments (excluding Venezuela), is also characterized by abandoning the
issue of stages. Instead, the objective is simply transitioning into a social-democratic
model of regulated capitalism through a symbiotic logic of class compromise. The last
perspective, associated with the Venezuelan Bolivarian process, is characterized by the
combination of elements of both stadial and non-stadial perspectives, as well as by
elements from all transition logics. Thus, while the Venezuelan government believes that
private property cannot be abolished in the short or medium term, it also seeks to begin
developing socialist institutions in the present. At the same time, there is focus on
creating socialist institutions in the interstices of the system, with the objective of further
deepening the transition process.
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Recapitulation and Concluding Remarks
This essay has categorized the different understandings of historical stages, antiimperialism, and socialist transition within a framework of transition logics, which have
inherent contradictions or tradeoffs. For example, while stadial/symbiotic transition
logics are successful in bringing about certain initial goals, the class compromises
necessary for this success become obstacles for socialist politics afterwards. In fact, most
political experiences applying a symbiotic logic, within both developed and developing
regions, have had little success in initiating socialist transition relative to countries where
ruptural/non-stadial logic was applied. Nevertheless, ruptural transitions also have
tradeoffs, as they may lead to transition troughs, intensify resistance of antagonist classes,
or promote more hostile or direct imperialist interventions. As previously discussed,
bourgeois-democratic political institutions would easily become tools for destabilization
policies of imperialist states, but turning to centralist democratic policies at a national
level might hinder the democratic character of the revolution. Finally, interstitial
practices, while they may provide initiatives more directly linked to the daily lives of the
population, they are in themselves insufficient for obtaining macro-level goals.
Combining these logics may allow for their strengths to be reinforced and their
weaknesses to be undermined.
From the historical survey presented in this paper, it becomes clear that the
fundamental factor that consistently led movements to adopt or reject stadial and nonstadial approaches was their understanding of the character of their domestic bourgeoisie.
Specifically, the issue was whether the domestic bourgeoisie was a progressive,
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revolutionary force, or if it was an obstacle in the process of development (capitalist or
socialist). If we conclude that combining different transition logics according to particular
conditions is more appropriate than strictly adhering to only one approach, then the
decisive factor behind the particular mix of transition logics is the class structure in the
particular country. Where bourgeoisies are more conservative and averse to change,
combined transition logics should tend to avoid giving significant weight to symbiotic
processes of class compromise. Historically, this seems to have consistently been the case
in most developing countries.
As discussed, Left-leaning Latin American governments (excluding Venezuela)
are currently attempting to achieve capitalist development in collaboration with their
local bourgeoisies. It remains to be seen if the result will be economic development or
simply economic growth in a context where the structural problems of these economies
remain unaddressed. In any case, unlike Venezuela, most of these governments have
allowed local elites to continue participating in the exercise of political power. Thus, if
capitalist development is obtained, it is unlikely that the resulting political conditions will
enable the initiation of a socialist transition. Despite its limitations, ruptural transition
logic seems to be the most effective in ensuring that at least some mode of precursor
socialism is constructed. The weaknesses of ruptural or non-stadial approaches can be
ameliorated through the application of some elements of symbiotic and interstitial
strategies. For example, in Venezuela, it might be useful to seek compromises with some
sectors of the petty bourgeoisie, while building interstitial institutions, such as
cooperatives and communes, to take the currently antagonist sector’s place in the
economy.
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While, as Brenner noted, there is no reason to exclude the possibility of antiimperialist capitalist development, in most countries, as Che Guevara (1992, 180)
warned, “the national bourgeoisie have totally lost their ability to resist imperialism—if
they ever had any—and now form its rear guard.” Having to face the choice between a
socialist revolution and a caricature of revolution is the result of how historical processes
have shaped domestic capitalists in the developing world. While future processes could in
theory transform the character of these bourgeoisies, they would still remain
fundamentally antagonist classes and the main weakness of the symbiotic approach
would still be present. Thus, even if capitalist development is feasible, it might still be
preferable to engage in some sort of combined development strategy towards a precursor
mode of socialism.
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CHAPTER IV
THE UPDATING OF THE CUBAN MODEL:
WORKER COOPERATIVES AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIALISM IN CUBA

Introduction
Capitalist media, and even many among the Left, seem to have concluded that
Cuba is undergoing a transition to capitalism (e.g. The Wall Street Journal, 2010; Reid,
2012; Feinberg, 2014; Martínez, 2011). For those who agree with this idea, the
restoration of diplomatic relations with the U.S. will only fuel this process. This essay has
two main objectives: 1) asses the claim that Cuba is in transition to capitalism and 2)
demonstrate that the current reform process in Cuba has included features that could be
foundational with respect to a new socialist formation characterized by participatory
planning. For the first objective, I will employ a Marxian theory of socialist transition,
grounded on the idea of socialism as a dynamic process consisting of distinct stages, to
critically evaluate party documents, academic publications, and available data on the
Cuban economy. For the second objective, I will focus on one particular institution: the
non-agricultural worker cooperatives. This part of the analysis will depend upon both
secondary sources, such as published reports and discussions with researchers and
informed observers, and primary data. Primary data consists of the author's field study of
three non-agricultural cooperatives, which included both informal observation and indepth interviews with the firms' presidents.
Although some of the top leaders of the Cuban revolutionary movement were
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socialists, the Cuban Revolution in 1959 was directed toward social reform rather than a
transition to socialism. However, “hostile U.S. response to nationalizations and the flight
of Cuban capital pushed the country’s leadership to officially adopt socialism as the
national discourse for development and economic policy” (Carmona Báez, 2012, 300). In
1960, under the leadership of Che Guevara, all financial institutions and 83.6% of
industry (including all sugar mills and 42.5% of land) were nationalized (Yaffe, 2012,
14). Furthermore, Guevara examined the documentation from companies passing into
state hands and was impressed by their management structures, centralized accounts and
budgets, determinate levels of responsibility and decision-making, and departments for
organization and inspection. Thus, Guevara incorporated them into his planning model
for the transition to socialism, known as the Budgetary Finance System (BFS). Firms that
used similar technologies were merged and administered smaller units and workshops.
Centralized planning was applied, firms were allocated a budget, and all revenue went
directly to the state. In addition, there were no commodity-relations between enterprises
(Díaz Vázquez, 2010, 27). In an interview conducted by Yaffe (2012, 14-15), Cuban
economist Alfredo González Gutiérrez argued:
What took place under Che’s management was the transition from a capitalist
industrial sector to a socialist-run industrial sector. It was such a smooth and
positive transition, without trauma or a fall in production. There has never been a
more profound change with less trauma or with a better response to the new
conditions created.
In 1961, through the new Ministry of Industries, Guevara continued to strengthen
the BFS apparatus, while, as a result of his continuing studies on Marxism, embedding it
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with a Marxist theoretical framework. However, as Cuba moved toward greater
integration with the Soviet bloc, there were increasing pressures to move towards a
management system closer to that of the USSR, known in Cuba as the “auto-financing
system” (AFS) (Yaffe, 2012, 16). The Soviet system was adopted in the National System
for Agrarian Reform (INRA) and in the Ministry for Foreign Trade (MINCEX). Under
this system, enterprises functioned as independent accounting units responsible for their
own profits and losses (Yaffe, 2012, 18). Thus, there were two competing management
systems, the AFS and the BFS, overseen by one Central Planning Board, leading to what
is known in Cuban economic history as “the Great Debate.”
This debate “took place concurrently with a broader discussion within the
socialist bloc as part of a rightward push to 'liberalize' the planned economy, advocating
'market socialism' and increasing reliance on capitalist mechanisms” (Yaffe, 2012, 19).
For Guevara, those favoring the use of capitalist mechanisms, or favoring some sort of
market socialism, were essentially proposing the complete freedom of the law of value,
and thus a return to capitalism (Yaffe, 2012, 19). Instead, Guevara proposed central
planning and state regulation as substitutes for such mechanisms. When Guevara
departed for Congo in the mid-1960s, there was an attempt to implement a new
management system, the Registry System, considered to be in the spirit of Guevara’s
arguments, as it eliminated all market relations between state firms. However, it
abandoned economic analysis and cost controls, both key premises of Guevara's BFS
(Yaffe, 2012, 35). The improvements in productivity that were expected from the
Registry System never materialized. In 1970, the government began to argue in favor of
rectifying what it understood as idealist mistakes in economic policies. Thus, between
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1971 and 1975, the government accentuated its move towards Soviet-style planning (Díaz
Vázquez, 2010, 29).
In 1976, Cuba officially adopted the “System of Economic Management and
Planning” (SPDE), which was based on the Soviet model. From 1976 to 1989, the Cuban
government began experimenting with enhanced decentralized production, management
autonomy, and also a search for access to Western markets. According to the
government's official statistics, from 1959 to 1989, Cuban GDP grew an average of 4%
per year (Pérez Villanueva, 2010, 14). Western estimates for the same period report a
similar number (3.9%) (Maddison, 2010). Furthermore, Cuba successfully linked
economic growth with improvements in other areas such as health and education. As
illustrated in Table 4.1, Cuba's Human Development Index has consistently been above
the average for Latin America and the Caribbean since 1980, even during the Special
Period crisis (UNDP, 2014).

1980
Cuba

Table 4.1: Cuba: Human Development Index Trends
1990
2000
2013

0.681

0.729

0.742

0.815

Latin America
0.579
and the Caribbean

0.627

0.683

0.740

The disintegration of the Soviet bloc implied the loss of 80% of Cuba’s trade
while industrial production practically collapsed, leading to the Special Period in Time of
Peace. The Cuban government allowed for the opening of limited market spaces, further
promotion of foreign investment, the legalization of the use of hard currency, bank
decentralization, growth of self-employment and agricultural cooperatives, and the
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temporary abandonment of 5-year plans (Carmona Báez, 2012, 301). The direction
shifted again in the 2000s. Ludlam (2012, 48) notes that “as far as the crucial balance
between state and markets is concerned, what was evident for some years after the turn of
the century was a reassertion of the regulatory power of the state. In 2009, it was
announced that 5-Year plans would be revived starting in 2011. Similarly, Yaffe (2012,
36) notes that “During the 1990s, Cuban enterprises were granted greater financial
autonomy than the AFS enterprises in Cuba which Guevara opposed in the 1960s…
However, in 2005, the year when Cuban GNP finally recovered its pre-Special Period
levels, financial autonomy was removed from Cuban enterprises. The result was a degree
of financial recentralization not seen since Guevara’s BFS.”
However, more recent work within and outside Cuba suggests that while it is true
that there was a process of recentralization between 2003 and 2006, beginning in 2007,
Cuba has witnessed a return to decentralization, which was consolidated with the Sixth
Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba and the adoption of its Economic and Social
Policy Guidelines in April 2011 (García, 2012, 9; Mesa-Lago & Pérez-López, 2013, 23).
The contradictory accounts regarding the direction of Cuban policy may be due to two
factors. The first is that the authors who argue that there has been a return to
centralization were writing when it was still unclear how the Sixth Congress resolutions
were going to be put into practice, but recently it has become evident that there would be
significant decentralization through the transfer of economic activities to a non-state
sector. The second factor is that the ongoing process has contained both elements of
centralization and decentralization. While a significant portion of the economy is being
transferred to a non-state sector, 5-year plans will continue and planning has been
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reinforced as the main method of directing the economy.
Beginning in July 2007 and ending in December 2010, a national debate took
place regarding the future of the Cuban model. Public meetings and debates were held to
discuss the first draft of the Communist Party’s Economic and Social Policy Guidelines.
8.9 million Cubans participated (79.5% of the population), producing over 780,000
opinions, of which 46.5% resulted in adding elements to the Guidelines, 4.9% in
eliminating aspects, and 1.8% in modifying aspects (García, 2012, 9). The approval of the
Guidelines marked the official initiation of the “Updating of the Cuban economic
model,” or actualización in Spanish. The choice of the word actualización (i.e. updating)
is deliberate. The word ‘reform’ is avoided due to its association with the collapse of
socialism elsewhere (Ludlam, 2012, 49).
The first two of the 313 guidelines summarize the key aspects of the
actualización:
01. The socialist planning system will continue being the main method of
directing the national economy, and should be transformed in its methodological,
organization, and control aspects. Planning will take the market into account,
influencing it, and considering its characteristics.
0.2 The management model recognizes and promotes, in addition to the socialist
state firm, which is the main form of the national economy, the modalities of
foreign investment provided by law (mixed enterprises, international economic
association contracts, among others), cooperatives, small farmers, usufruct
owners, renters, self-employed workers, and other forms, all of which, as a whole,
must contribute in elevating efficiency (Partido Comunista de Cuba, 2011).
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Specific changes within the state sector listed in the Guidelines include no longer
providing budgetary financing for production of goods and services. Instead, these firms
need to finance themselves with their own revenue (Guideline #31 & #32). In addition,
enterprises with persistent losses, failure to fulfill contracts, or unsatisfactory audits will
be liquidated (Guideline #17). The government has set as a goal that the non-state sector
represent 45% of GDP and occupy more than one third of the labor force in 2015 (García,
2012, 13). Although not explicitly articulated, this policy goal subtly implies that the
government foresees the non-state sector being more productive than the state sector.
While this might be a realistic assumption due to current challenges within the state
sector, eventually this would need to be explicitly addressed in order to specify the
particularities of the new social formation the government intends to build. This will be
further discussed in the section on The Future of the Cuban Model. According to the
National Office of Statistics and Information of Cuba, in 2013 26.2% of the labor force
was already in the non-state sector. Within the non-state sector, 4.6% was in cooperatives,
8.6% was “own-account” workers, and 13% was in other private businesses (mostly
private farmers and family-employment). With only 2,300 workers in 2013, nonagricultural cooperatives made up 1% of employment within the cooperative sector.
The introduction of the Guidelines states that their objective is to “ensure the
continuity and irreversibility of Socialism.” They explain:
...in the updating of the economic model, planning will prevail, not the market.
The centralized planning of the economy and systematic control the State,
government, and its institutions must practice, will ensure the efficient
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functioning of our systems. These principles must be harmonized with more
independence for state firms and with the development of non-state management
forms in production and in services…” (Partido Comunista de Cuba, 2011).

However, without a proper institutional framework to guide these reforms towards
socialism, Cuba's leadership would simply be hopeful that the transformations would go
in this direction, without actually taking concrete steps to ensure that they do. As a result,
the revolution could easily become socialist in name only. For example, as Cuban
economist García (2012, 13) has also emphasized, the new cooperatives in nonagricultural activities must demonstrate in practice that they represent a step towards
socialism through their integration of the socialist plan and their material contribution to
the economy. It is not sufficient to declare them, a priori, as socialist.
It is clear that cooperatives will be among the key factors that will shape the
character of the new Cuban model. If they are left to marginal activities, without proper
institutional support, Cuban precursor socialism might simply continue as a form of state
socialism. If, on the other hand, they are not integrated into planning, the Cuban model
could shift toward some form of market socialism. Another scenario would involve the
cooperatives beginning to function as capitalist firms, and thus becoming the breeding
ground for a new domestic capitalist class, a scenario that would represent a significant
obstacle in the transition to socialism. Finally, if cooperatives are linked to the plan and to
communities, they could set foundations for a new precursor form, closer to participatory
socialism, and thus create conditions for the transition to mature socialism.
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Transition to Capitalism or Updating Precursor Socialism?
Among capitalist media outlets, there seems to be consensus on the idea that Cuba
is in transition to capitalism. The decision to reduce the scope of the state and expand the
private sector in Cuba has been reported as a package of capitalist reforms (e.g. The Wall
Street Journal, 2010). Similarly, a special report by The Economist argues that despite
constant socialist rhetoric intended to appease the Communist Party's top-leadership,
Raul Castro's policies have led to an emerging private sector and the beginning of the
“journey towards capitalism” (Reid, 2012). An article published by the Brookings
Institution argues that allowing Cubans to abandon the public sector and create their own
small businesses has created a new class that represents “emergent capitalism,” for they
are the seeds of a potential capitalist class (Feinberg, 2014). In all of these cases, there is
an equating (or “identification”) of private firms, regardless of their internal character,
with capitalism. Some Trotskyist tendencies have also arrived at similar conclusions. For
example, the Argentinian Trotskyist party, Socialist Left, argues that the presence of
foreign capital, the trend towards firm autonomy in state enterprises, and the expansion of
markets all confirm that Cuba can currently be considered a capitalist social formation
(Martínez, 2011). All of these analyses suffer from a series of theoretical problems that
cast doubt on their conclusions. If capitalism is equated with private enterprises operating
in a market economy, then even a market economy composed of worker-owned and selfmanaged cooperatives with the complete absence of exploitation would be considered a
capitalist social formation. The existence or predominance of private property or market
allocation clearly does not suffice to characterize a social formation as capitalist. The
presence of foreign capital does represent capitalist processes within Cuba, but they
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would only imply that Cuba is a capitalist social formation if they were to become the
predominant form of production on the island, which is still not the case.
By utilizing the alternative theory of transition developed in previous essays, this
essay will argue that Cuba can best be conceptualized as a precursor socialist social
formation which has not necessarily begun a transition to capitalism. As was previously
discussed, socialism is understood as the transitional stage between capitalism and
communism. Communism is defined as an economic form where the means of
production belong to society as a whole, surplus produced by direct producers is not
appropriated by another class (i.e. there is no exploitation of labor), and decisions
regarding the allocation of this surplus throughout society include the participation of all
citizens, including those that are not necessarily direct producers (i.e. some form of
democratic planning).
Regarding the distinction between socialism and communism, the latter will
certainly require political and ideological structures that promote reproduction. A
communist social formation will also have contradictions and there may even be various
forms of communism. However, communism is conceived of as a system where political
and economic institutions have matured and obtained a substantial degree of stability and
legitimacy. Socialism, precisely because it is a transitional stage, will require the active
involvement of the state in the continuous design and implementation of, and overall
experimentation with new political and economic institutions. Furthermore, socialism
will most likely inherit various processes from capitalism that will undermine it,
highlighting the importance of the state in ensuring that processes move toward
communism instead of back to capitalism. When no distinct class appropriates the surplus
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produced by direct producers, it can be considered a socialist economy. What
distinguishes it from communism, as explained above, is the degree of maturity, stability,
and legitimacy of its institutions.
This paper adopts the categories of precursor and mature socialism and combines
them with its focus on social reproduction. Precursor socialism is understood as the first
sub-stage within the socialist stage, occurring immediately after the political transition
from capitalism, and where 1) the democratic control over the means of production and
the decision-making processes regarding the allocation of the surplus throughout society
are characterized by rudimentary and inefficient institutions, 2) some types of private
ownership may still persist, 3) market forces may still be utilized as an allocation
mechanism, and 4) the system would be highly dependent on the state as a vehicle of
systemic reproduction. Mature socialism is the sub-stage where most of these
inefficiencies have been worked out, some form of democratic planning has become the
main allocation mechanism, and institutions are consistently improving in regards to
maturity, stability, and legitimacy. In other words, no assumptions or arguments are made
regarding which institutions should be used in precursor socialism. However, the
transition to communism would have to include the transition into some form of
participatory planning. The transition into participatory planning would take place within
the transition from the precursor socialism sub-stage to the mature socialism sub-stage.
Nevertheless, this transition could theoretically be in the distant future, as certain
conditions might favor the use of market forces for an extended period of time during the
transition from capitalism to socialism (i.e. in the precursor socialism sub-stage). The
opposite holds as well. Certain conditions might favor the rapid abolition of market
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forces as allocation mechanisms.
The evolution of institutional arrangements in early socialism can be expected to
vary depending on concrete historical conditions. The following section will evaluate
Cuba's current reform process, with emphasis on the fact that the island is adjusting its
precursor socialist form to the new global context, without this necessarily representing a
step back toward capitalism. On the contrary, as further sections will argue, new
dynamics associated with the new Cuban cooperative movement may even become
foundational for a transition into a mature socialist form characterized by participatory
planning.

The New Cuban Cooperative Movement in Theory
Cuban cooperativism was limited to agriculture for most of the revolutionary
period and it remained relatively stagnant until the 1990s. During the Special Period
crisis, a new agricultural cooperative form, the Basic Units of Cooperative Production
(UBPCs), was established. The agricultural area cultivated by cooperatives rose from
15% in 1989 to 70% in 1999 (Nova, 2012, 285). UBPCs are of particular interest, for
they attempted to combine aspects of both cooperatives and state firms. For example,
UBPCs have legal ownership over most of their means of production, they own their
production and surplus, they exercise cooperative democracy, they have independent
legal status and management autonomy, they sign contracts with customers and suppliers,
they have bank accounts, and they conduct monetary/mercantile transactions. At the same
time, they are created by the initiative of the state. Ownership of their key means of
production, land, belongs to the state. They enjoy economic aid for a given amount of
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time, allowing them to work with losses. They receive guidelines for production,
technology, and investment. Their leaders are often proposed or replaced from the
outside, and they may be summoned as if they were units of a state enterprise (Rodríguez
Membrado and López Labrada, 2012, 306).
In theory, UBPCs reflect a concept of enterprise where each enterprise cedes a
certain amount of decision-making power to the network’s “center” and has extensive
management autonomy. The “center” makes strategic decisions and conducts operations
in the chain that do not create value or that are convenient to conduct centrally, while
enterprises make their own operational decisions and conduct all other operations in the
chain (Rodríguez Membrado and López Labrada, 2012, 307). Nevertheless, in practice,
there have been significant problems in the UBPC model. The state enterprise hinders the
work of its associated UBPCs because it holds decision-making power, does not identify
with the UBPCs, and views itself as being above them. Furthermore, the state enterprise
fulfills the function of state control over member UBPCs (it decides production levels
and variety, soil and water use, crops’ health, distribution of resources, and compliance
with legislation), as well as the function of an enterprise (selling material resources and
supplying a wide variety of services) (Rodríguez Membrado and López Labrada, 2012,
308). Despite their poor performance, the case of the UBPCs is instructive because it
consists of a redesign of state property that combines productive units administered under
a management model close to cooperativism, with a state enterprise as the decisionmaking center of the network (Piñeiro Harnecker, 2012, 16.) Despite the shortcomings in
agricultural cooperatives, many Cuban authors defended the need to expand cooperatives
to other sectors, acknowledging the necessity of making sure mistakes were not repeated
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(Piñeiro Harnecker, 2012, 17). In late 2012, it was announced in Granma, the PCCs
official newspaper, that 200 non-agricultural cooperatives (CNAs) were to be established,
in sectors such as transport, the food industry, domestic and personal services, recycling,
and production and services associated with construction (Cubadebate, 2012). These
cooperatives began operations between July and October 2013 and their experiences will
be discussed in the following sections.
In the recent economic literature within Cuba (in work ranging from economic
geography to econometric models) there are two main ideas consistently present: 1) Cuba
is in transition to socialism and 2) state property is not equivalent to social property
(García Brigos et al, 2012; Fernandez Peiso, 2012; Marcelo Yera, 2013; Perez Villanueva
& Torres Perez, 2013; García Rabelo & Hidalgo de los Santos, 2013; Hidalgo-Gato,
2012; Alhama Belamaric, 2013). The idea of Cuba being in a transitional stage is not
new. In all Communist Party congresses (including the three prior to the Special Period
Crisis), the Central Reports clearly referred to Cuba as an economy in the process of
building socialism with the objective of transitioning to communism in a later stage. The
difference in recent work is the expected length of the transitional stage. For example, the
Central Report of the Second Congress of the PCC (held in 1980), under the heading of
'Perspectives until the Year 2000,' stated, “The fundamental objective of the country's
economic and social development is to complete the construction of the technical and
material base of socialism.” It later stated, under the heading 'The Young Communist
League': “To complete the construction of socialism and advance toward communism are
the fundamental challenges of this generation” (emphasis added). In other words, it was
clear that in 1980 it was understood that the youth wing of the Communist Party would
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live to see the transition into mature socialism completed. Given the new global and local
context, no such assumptions are held regarding the length of the transitional stage.
A more significant break with previous conceptions is the now widely held
consensus among Cuban economists that state property is not equivalent to social
property. Social property generally refers to the process by which means of production
are controlled by the working class. It is in this regard that cooperatives have been
proposed as an alternative. However, despite having the same underlying idea, Cuban
authors have put forward diverse analyses and recommendations on this subject. In Cuba,
people speak of a non-state sector, instead of a private sector, because it includes
cooperatives, which are understood to be, at least potentially, social property (García,
2012, 13). This applies as well to state property. The idea that state property is not
equivalent to social property does not imply that it cannot become social property. Thus,
both state property and cooperative property are understood as potential social property,
and the task is to ensure practices that complete this socialization. Authors such as
Fernandez Estrada (2013, 62) place more attention on the task of socializing state
property through participation and conceive cooperatives as temporary transfers of
property that will eventually return to the state sector. This is distinct from authors such
as Piñeiro Harnecker (2013, 20), who argue:
If what defines socialism is the predominance of social property in the form of
freely associated labor guided by a plan... then cooperatives—and to the extent
that the conditions for them to carry out their social commitment are created—are
not a transitional but a constitutional enterprise form for any socialist project.
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Similarly, Fernandez Peiso (2012, 285) argues that in the context of an obsolete
and bureaucratic planning system, it is only through the expansion of cooperatives that
Cuban socialism can truly be “for the enjoyment of political liberty, social justice,
individual and collective wellbeing, and human solidarity.” Thus, we may identify two
main visions within Cuba regarding cooperatives. The first places emphasis on
socializing state property and understands cooperatives as temporary experiments that
would disappear in mature socialism. The second, while it does not deny the fundamental
importance of transforming state property, also places emphasis on utilizing cooperatives
in non-strategic sectors, not temporarily, but as constitutive elements of mature socialism.
It is in the context of these debates that it was announced that new nonagricultural cooperatives (CNAs in Spanish) were to be established, which will be further
discussed in the following section. The overall economic context is fundamental in
understanding why it was decided that cooperatives should expand into non-agricultural
sectors (instead of simply socializing state property). The main economic problems are:
1) the island’s trade balance is in deficit, with most exports consisting of services
(medical services and tourism); 2) material goods exports are undiversified, focusing
mainly on nickel, pharmaceuticals, tobacco, and sugar; 3) there is over-reliance on
tourism, which was basically pulling the rest of the economy throughout the 1990s, up
until 2006; 4) the state has had to incur significant expenses subsidizing firms operating
with losses; and 5) a variety of small activities or enterprises are currently being run by
the state, representing a significant drain of resources (Cruz Reyes, 2014).
Therefore, the updating of the Cuban model has among its objectives resolving its
trade deficit, promoting exports, promoting greater linkages within the Cuban economy,
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and promoting greater efficiency in the use of state resources. In this last objective, nonagricultural cooperatives and self-employment are expected to play a key role. One of the
most utilized examples within Cuba is that of state-run barbershops, many of which
consisted of a single barber in a small shop. Having to focus on controlling and
supporting them, many of these activities drained significant attention and resources from
a state in a very complicated fiscal situation. There seems to be consensus among most
Cuban policy makers on the idea that it was clearly more efficient to allow barbers and
similar workers to engage in self-employment and simply impose a tax on their activities
(Cruz Reyes, 2014).
The new Cuban cooperativism has its roots both in the popular debates that took
place prior to the PCC's Sixth Congress as well as in academia, where scholarly work
suggesting that cooperatives should be expanded outside of agriculture had also been
developed (Piñeiro Harnecker, 2014). Piñeiro Harnecker (2014) emphasizes that
cooperatives will be a way to transfer activities that are not central in the economy or
safety of the Cuban people away from the state and to another mode of management. She
also clarifies that in state-induced cooperatives what is being transferred is management,
not property, for the means of production remain in the hands of the state. The
government's decision to support CNAs is a reaction to demands that have existed for a
long time, which materialized with all the popular debates that took place and the
necessity for the state to reduce its scope (Piñeiro Harnecker, 2014). Cuban policymakers are aware that many goods and services are produced in an inefficient manner.
One example is the over-diversification within large state firms, leading to redundancy in
many operations. For example, many state firms assign resources to transport, while it
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would be more efficient to have another firm specialize in this auxiliary activity,
providing service to various state firms. These secondary activities are precisely those
that the state wishes to transfer to the non-state sector. Thus, cooperatives emerge as a
more socialized alternative (relative to self-employment or small private firms) to take
over these activities (Piñeiro Harnecker, 2014). The following section evaluates the
experience of the new non-agricultural productions after their first year of operations.

The New Cuban Cooperative Movement in Practice
Background
Decree-law 305, decree-law 306, and decree 309 of 2012 established, with
experimental character, the regulations regarding the creation and operations of nonagricultural cooperatives (or CNAs in Spanish). The decrees state that CNAs are to
follow seven principles, which are based on the cooperative principles promulgated by
the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA). These principles are: voluntary and open
membership; autonomy and independence; education, training, and information;
cooperation among cooperatives; and concern for community. CNAs are defined as
private entities, constituted voluntarily by their members, and although they would be
subject to the regulations related to the activities in which they participate, they would
not be directly subordinated to any state entity. The decision-making power within CNAs
resides within their worker general assemblies, where each worker has one vote. The
assembly will also elect the cooperative’s president and other administrative bodies.
Administrative bodies are intended to facilitate decision-making for the worker general
assembly, and will correspond to the complexity of the particular economic activity and
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to the number of worker-members. These are summarized in the following table and their
hierarchy is depicted in the following figure. In addition, CNAs will establish an Auditing
Commission, which will submit legal and accounting reports to the worker assembly.
These reports may be drafted by the Auditing Commission’s members or by technical
experts hired by them.
Table 4.2: Cooperative Structure according to number of workers
Number of Worker-Members

Complementary Administrative Bodies

Less than 20

Administrator

More than 20

Administrative Council

More than 60

Administrative Council & Board of
Directors

Figure 4.1: Hierarchy of Decision Making Authority

Worker	
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Board	
  of	
  
Directors	
  

Administrative	
  
Council	
  or	
  
Administrator	
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The cooperatives will be allowed to set their own prices on the goods and services
they sell, unless they are selling a product whose price is state regulated. CNAs may be
either first-degree cooperatives, composed of three or more workers, or second-degree
cooperatives, composed of two or more first-degree cooperatives. First-degree
cooperatives may be established through four channels: 1) asset contribution by
individuals to establish collective assets, where one worker equals one vote, no matter the
differentials in contributions; 2) association of individuals that conserve property over
their assets, and jointly acquire intermediate goods and services; 3) workers collectively
renting state means of production; and 4) a combination of the previous forms. In
practice, most Cubans speak of two types of CNAs, “induced-cooperatives,” referring to
those that are created out of the initiative of the state, transforming a state firm or
workshop into a cooperative, and “non-induced cooperatives,” referring to those that
emerge out of the initiative of individuals, creating an entirely new firm. More than 80%
of the CNAs are induced by the state (Piñeiro Harnecker, 2014).
In addition, as one of the objectives is that all who work in a cooperative be
members, the hiring of labor from non-members is limited to 10% of “shifts-members”
(jornadas-socios), computed by multiplying the number of worker members by working
time in any given fiscal period. Furthermore, no non-member hiring contract can surpass
three months of duration, regardless of the 10% rule. After the three months have passed,
the hired worker must be turned into a worker-member or the contract has to be
terminated.
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Table 4.3: Cooperatives According to Economic Activity
Economic	
  Activity	
  

Number	
  of	
  
Cooperatives	
  

Retail	
  Sale	
  of	
  Food,	
  Beverages,	
  and	
  Tobacco	
  

%	
  of	
  
total	
  

Cumulative
%	
  

102	
  

29.06	
  

29.06	
  

Restaurants,	
  Cafes,	
  &	
  Diners	
  

87	
  

24.79	
  

53.85	
  

Building	
  Construction	
  &	
  Civil	
  Engineering	
  

56	
  

15.95	
  

69.80	
  

Manufacturing	
  

33	
  

9.40	
  

79.20	
  

Other	
  Retail	
  activity	
  

16	
  

4.56	
  

83.76	
  

Metal	
  Recycling	
  

15	
  

4.27	
  

88.03	
  

Vehicle	
  Maintenance	
  &	
  Repair	
  

7	
  

1.99	
  

90.03	
  

Barbershops	
  &	
  Salons	
  

6	
  

1.71	
  

91.74	
  

All	
  Non-‐Rail	
  Passenger	
  Transport	
  by	
  Land	
  

6	
  

1.71	
  

93.45	
  

Accounting	
  &	
  Auditing	
  Services	
  

5	
  

1.42	
  

94.87	
  

Production,	
  Storage,	
  &	
  Distribution	
  of	
  Electricity	
  
Personal	
  item	
  &	
  Household	
  Appliance	
  Repair	
  
Services	
  	
  

4	
  

1.14	
  

96.01	
  

4	
  

1.14	
  

97.15	
  

Air	
  Conditioning	
  Services	
  

3	
  

0.85	
  

98.01	
  

Building	
  Completion	
  

2	
  

0.57	
  

98.58	
  

Textile/Garment	
  Cleaning	
  &	
  Dyeing	
  

2	
  

0.57	
  

99.15	
  

Printing	
  Services	
  

1	
  

0.28	
  

99.43	
  

Wholesale	
  of	
  Agricultural	
  Products	
  

1	
  

0.28	
  

99.72	
  

1	
  

0.28	
  

100.00	
  

351	
  

100.00	
  

Real	
  Estate	
  
Total	
  

	
  

According to Cuba's Office of Statistics and Information, in September 2014 there
were 314 registered CNAs. As of May 2015, there are 351 registered CNAs. As the
following tables and figures show, most CNAs (53.8%) are retail firms that sell food,
beverages, and tobacco, or they are restaurants, cafes, and diners. 25.4% of CNAs are
manufacturing or construction firms, while the remaining cooperatives are associated
with diverse services. As previously explained, CNAs are not directly subordinated to any
state agency, but are assigned an agency with which they are associated for economic and
regulatory purposes. Most CNAs (54.7%) are associated with provincial governments,
followed by the Ministry of Construction (19.4%), the Ministry of Sugar (7.8%), and the
Ministry of Tourism (5.1%). Geographically, most CNAs are concentrated within the
134

Province of Havana (50.1%), followed by the Province of Artemisa (18.8%), and the
Province of Matanzas (5.7%). Within Havana, most CNAs (54.4%) are located within the
municipalities of Plaza de la Revolución, Playa, Boyeros, Diez de Octubre, and Cerro (in
that order).

Table 4.4: Cooperatives and Associated Agency
% of
Government Agency Number of CNAs
Total
Provincial Government
96
27.35
(Havana)
Ministry of Construction
68
19.37
Provincial Government
62
17.66
(Artemisa)
Provincial Government
34
9.69
(Other)
Ministry of Sugar
28
7.98
Ministry of Tourism
18
5.13
Not subordinated to any
17
4.84
agency
Ministry of Transport
8
2.28
Ministry of Energy &
5
1.42
Mining
Ministry of Finance &
5
1.42
Prices
Ministry of Food
3
0.85
Industry
Office of the City
3
0.85
Historian of Havana
Ministry of Interior
2
0.57
Commerce
National Institute of
Sports, Physical
1
0.28
Education, & Recreation
Ministry of the
Revolutionary Armed
1
0.28
Forces
Total
351
100.00
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Cooperatives according to Province

Figure 4.3: Distribution of Cooperatives according to Municipalities of Havana
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Assessing the CNAs
The author conducted field research in Cuba in order to gain first-hand knowledge
of the cooperatives, and to gain access to written materials, compare notes with other
researchers, and discuss the socialist revolution with both workers and researchers. The
Cuban government publishes a list of all registered non-agricultural cooperatives,
including phone numbers for some of the cooperatives. Thus, the selection process began
by compiling a list of those available for contact via telephone, with priority for those
who had been part of the first batch of experimental cooperatives induced by the state.
Three cooperatives, all belonging to this first batch of experimental cooperatives,
were visited. Fortunately, they each contained particularities that make them ideal
choices. First, they each have varying degrees of linkages with tourism. As was
previously discussed, the Cuban economy has been over-reliant on tourism, which was
basically pulling the rest of the economy throughout the 1990s, up until 2006. It might
have been expected that only CNAs with linkages with tourism would have been
successful. One cooperative (the vehicle reconstruction cooperative) has strong links to
Cuban tourism as it repairs taxis and rental cars specifically for tourists; another
cooperative has relatively weaker links to tourism, as it is a nightclub only occasionally
frequented by tourists; and the other cooperative has no link to tourism, for it is a textile
manufacturing firm whose main production line is military uniforms. As will be further
discussed, linkages with tourism did not determine success or failure within these
cooperatives.
Finally, the three cooperatives represent an ideal sample due to their locations.
The Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy (CEEC) of the University of Havana,

137

jointly with the National Association of Cuban Economists (ANEC) has been conducting
field interviews in CNAs in different municipalities in the province of Havana. Focus has
been placed in this province, as approximately 60% of cooperatives actually operating
(and not simply registered) are located within it (Ojeda Surís, 2014). They have only
published their results for three state-induced CNAs and four CNAs that originated from
private initiatives, located in the municipalities of Centro Habana and Habana Vieja
(Ojeda Surís, 2014). The three state-induced CNAs visited by the author were in three
additional municipalities within Havana: Cerro, Plaza, and Marianao. The questions
asked by the researchers are very similar to those asked by the author, therefore the
results may be compared to begin to assess whether there are similarities or differences
across municipalities. The author's findings will also be compared with CEEC
researchers' assessments of their unpublished findings in other municipalities (Piñeiro
Harnecker, 2014), as well as with other unpublished evaluations of CNAs, such as the
work of Cruz Reyes (2014), a professor of Political Economy at the University of Havana
who has also been conducting independent research.
The assessment of CNAs will certainly be preliminary, as more research with a
broader sample is required for a more conclusive evaluation. Hopefully, the CEEC will
continue to conduct this research and continue to publish their findings. Nevertheless, this
preliminary assessment, as I will argue, already demonstrates how the brief experiment
with non-agricultural cooperatives has provided insight into how Cuban policy could
transform existing structures into institutions that may become foundational for a socialist
social formation characterized by participatory planning.
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The Sample Cooperatives
As was previously discussed, primary data comes from the author's field study of
three non-agricultural cooperatives, which included both informal observation and indepth interviews with the firms' presidents.3 The first cooperative visited was a textile
cooperative in Marianao, Cuba, which was originally one of the many workshops of a
larger state firm dedicated to textile manufacturing. It was among the first state
workshops transformed into a cooperative, and officially began operating as a
cooperative in October 2013. The key means of production (the building and machines)
belong to the state, and are rented by the cooperative. However, workers have the right to
remodel the factory according to their needs and preferences. They decided not to take
out any loans, but instead began operations by having each worker-member contribute
200 Cuban pesos (approximately $8 USD), for a total start-up capital of 10,000 Cuban
pesos (approximately $400 USD). In total there are 51 worker-members, most of them
women (there are only seven men), and most being between 40 to 50 years of age. As a
state firm, production was limited to uniforms, while as a cooperative, they have
continued with this line of production but expanded to mostly any other type of garment
or fabric on demand (pants, shirts, sheets, towels, etc.)
The second cooperative is a vehicle reconstruction firm in Cerro, Cuba. It was one
of the largest workshops of a state firm dedicated to automotive services. It was also
among the first batch of cooperatives transformed from state workshops. During their
first year of operation as a cooperative, they have already gone from 48 to 60 workermembers, with possibly 20 more in process. The cooperative reconstructs deteriorated
3
In most state-induced CNAs, the previous state-appointed director was elected by the worker's
assembly to become the cooperative’s president, as he or she already possessed experience with
administration tasks.
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vehicles, focusing on bodywork, paint, and upholstery; it also provides repair services for
external damages to new or modern cars. Each worker contributed 1,000 Cuban pesos
(approximately $25 USD) for a total start-up capital of 48,000 Cuban pesos
(approximately $1,920 USD). As in the textile cooperative in Marianao, the key means of
production (the workshop and machines) belong to the state and are rented by the
cooperative. Most workers are between 28 and 30 years of age, and most are men (there
are only five women worker-members). The cooperative is fundamental in maintaining
vehicles for three state firms: ETECSA, Cuba’s main telecommunications firm; REX, a
state-owned luxury car rental service for tourists; and Cubataxi, the state-owned taxi
service.
Finally, the Karabalí Cooperative in Vedado, Cuba, is the most particular
experience because of its size and service. Karabalí is a “Nocturnal Center,” the official
term used to categorize the network of state-owned nightclubs in Cuba. Karabalí, similar
to the other two cooperatives, was among the first experimentally induced cooperatives in
late 2013. There are a total of 21 worker-members (14 men and seven women), mostly
between 30 and 40 years of age. The cooperative is located in one of the most frequented
areas within Havana, in “Calle 23,” popularly known as “La Rampa.” Thousands of
Cubans walk by, coming and going from Cuba’s “Malecón,” its famous walkway and
seawall, to the city center. Despite being surrounded by hotels filled with tourists, the
cooperative caters mainly to Cubans between 30 to 50 years of age.
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CNA
Vehicle
Repair
Shop
Textile
Factory
Nightclub

Table 4.5: Select Statistics of Sample Cooperatives
% Of
# Of
Female
StartWorker
worker- Average up
Members members Age
Capital Per Worker
60

8.35%

29

$1,920

$25

51
21

86.30%
33.30%

45
35

$400
NA

$8
NA

Income, Efficiency, and Non-Alienating Labor in CNAs
The following commonalities were present in the visited cooperatives: 1) worker's
incomes have increased substantially (two-fold or three-fold increases), 2) the state has
seen a net increase in revenues by transferring these workshops to the workers and taxing
them, 3) workers have transitioned from an alienating labor process to a non-alienating
labor process, and 4) enthusiasm regarding the role cooperatives may play in the Cuban
economy. Each aspect will be discussed in further detail.
These findings coincide with what Cruz Reyes (2014) has found in most of the
new cooperatives and what the CEEC report noted. For example, according to the CEEC
report, workers argue that their lives have improved; they have higher incomes, and now
enjoy a good-natured work environment characterized by happiness and solidarity (Ojeda
Surís, 2014). Despite deficiencies that will be further discussed, the results are clearly
positive, not only for the workers within cooperatives, but also for the general population,
which now has access to their products or services. For example, in Artemisa, Cuba,
transportation issues affecting the general population have been significantly improved,
not only in the provincial capital, but also in the neighboring populations. Meanwhile,
workers in the cooperative were earning significantly higher incomes. In some textile
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cooperatives, where most workers are women, husbands have taken over household work
because the women have become the main providers and get home late. (Cruz Reyes,
2014).
A key aspect behind their success is the issue of efficiency. Cruz Reyes (2014)
cites workers as saying: “we need to save on water and electricity, we used to squander
it.” The fact that their income grows in proportion to how much they save in utilities, how
many resources they recycle, and how much they avoid waste, has led to significant
improvements in efficiency within these firms.
Efficiency gains are also closely related to the issue of worker alienation and theft
in the state firm. All of the cooperative presidents interviewed agreed that within state
firms, their own workers stole a significant amount of resources. Two of the three
interviewed presidents expressed that this happened in their own firms when they were
state workshops. In Cuba, slowdown and theft are direct manifestations of the
estrangement of workers from their work. All of the cooperative presidents interviewed
emphasized a sense of belonging once the firm was organized into a cooperative, which
they related directly to the fact that resources are no longer stolen from any of the
cooperatives. The president of the Marianao textile cooperative, Exiquio Ramírez,
argued:
You can note that there is a sense of belonging because now nothing gets “lost.”
That is interesting. You used to have strict control of everything. With the
cooperative, that problem is over. I assess the sense of belonging as part of that
fact.
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In Karabalí, the issue was not theft of the firm's goods, but workers failing to
show up or consistently showing up late. Karabalí's president, Hector García explained
that this problem disappeared once they were transformed into a cooperative. Similarly,
the vehicle reconstruction cooperative's president, Marcelo González, argued the
following:
People have incorporated the concept of associate, not of wageworker. Before,
people had no responsibility. There were misappropriations. Painting a car in the
black market, you could make $500 or $800 USD. People painted cars in the
black market after their work hours. Today, that has completely disappeared.
People see their cooperative as theirs. They have a monthly advance of
$500 USD every month. That is three times the salary they earned before. People
take care of resources. If there is a can of painter’s putty and there is some left
after finishing a car, they use it on another car instead of stealing it.
Young people no longer think about leaving. Young people in our
cooperative, around 30 years of age, used to want to leave. Now they don’t want
to. They don’t want to work in a black market workshop; they want to work here
in the cooperative. It is a socialist model that works. We have to take advantage of
it, especially in socialism.
With cooperativism, people have higher quality of life in socialism. People
live okay [and] they don’t want to leave the country. They earn an income, our
youth can aim high, and it is socialist. There is no concentration of wealth, there
is no multi-party capitalist politics, no one tells you what to do, and people can
decide their destinies.
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Cooperatives have also seen improvements in working conditions. In the
Marianao textile firm, the condition of the lunchroom area was a significant concern for
workers, and it was only when it was transformed into a cooperative that they had the
autonomy and resources to fix it. They were also in the process of improving
lighting/visibility problems within the workshop, and repairing the floor and old
machinery to avoid accidents. Other types of improvements that were notable in fostering
a sense of belonging were the establishment of gifts or emergency funds, provided in
particular situations where workers incur significant expenses. All three cooperative
presidents mentioned explicitly the importance of helping fellow workers cover expenses
in situations such as a daughter's quinceañera (“coming of age” fifteenth birthday party),
while in the vehicle reconstruction cooperative one worker had already benefited from an
emergency fund when his house burned in a fire. These factors lead to a general feeling
of satisfaction and enthusiasm towards the possibilities of Cuban cooperativism. For
example, Ramírez stated: “what gets closest to socialism is the cooperative. Whoever is
given the opportunity to build a cooperative and does not take advantage of that
opportunity is lost in this country.”
Similarly, while most did not report specific numbers, all cooperative presidents
were emphatic that worker incomes have risen significantly between the time of their
transformation into a cooperative in late 2013 and July 2014. By law, cooperatives are
required to set aside contingency reserves, pay a 10% tax on sales, a 20% tax on nonmember labor contracts, and contribute to the social security fund of each worker. Yet,
even after transfer payments to the state, according to the interviewed presidents, many
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workers have double or tripled their monthly income. The cooperative's higher revenues
have been distributed more or less equally among the workers, with no particular subset
of workers having earnings substantially different from the collective average. The rise in
income is not only explained by the increase in efficiency discussed above, but also by
the fact that many cooperatives have been able to offer services directly to the population.
As Ramírez emphasized, this is also beneficial to the population, which previously might
not have been able to acquire these good or services, or not at the desired quality.
Ramírez explained:
All types of people come here to the cooperative. Some come and ask for three
shirts, because they need them. Their firm can’t provide them and their shirts are
dirty… And when people come here and ask for three shirts, whom are we
serving? The people! Notice how close this is to socialism. We provide services to
the population because they have certain needs… Before, when we were part of a
state firm, no one could come here. We were producing what we were told and
that was it. Now it’s different. Now, a neighbor comes and says “I need a pullover
for my son… a shirt… my sons having a party and I need three dress shirts.”

Similarly, González argued that the state firms for whom they provide services
now prefer to go directly to the cooperative instead of to their usual state-run shops, for
there are notable differences in speed and quality. In fact, he has calculated how much the
state is benefiting from their improvements in efficiency. For example, vehicles being
repaired for REX would usually stay between 11 and 15 days in the workshop. Now,
vehicles are usually out in five or six days. Over the past six months, 224 vehicles have
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been repaired for REX, which are rented to tourists at $150 USD per day. By reducing the
stay of each vehicle by five days, he argues, they have already produced more than
$160,000 in additional income for the state. While there is insufficient data to estimate
how much revenue the state has generated through transferring activities to CNAs, it is
clear that there has been a net increase in state revenues, for the state no longer has to
budget any funds for these firms and it is receiving income from taxes.
In Karabalí, as a state firm, central allocations had no direct link to what
consumers were purchasing from the cooperative. Thus, the firm would constantly find
itself with an over-stocked inventory, full of goods that local consumers had no interest in
purchasing. As a cooperative, by focusing on what actually sells and buying it on a daily
basis, the workers at Karabalí were able to remodel and make their inventory area
smaller, thus providing more space for clients. Similarly, their autonomy has allowed
them to adjust to certain situations, within and outside the firm, more efficiently than
state firms. García explained:
In a place like this, a lot of things constantly need fixing. Some things or services
were available but others weren’t. Sometimes a particular person had something,
but you couldn’t buy it from him. Now, the cooperative can do business with
anyone. There was recently a beer crisis in Havana and we never ran out of beer.
I drove to Varadero and bought it there. The other nightclubs that are still part of
the state firm couldn’t do that. Their units were empty.

Embryonic Participatory Planning
A useful way to conceive participatory planning is as having the ongoing and
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massive task of figuring out and implementing the enormous maze of human activities
(i.e. coordination) that take place both at the firm level and at the center, with the
creative, critical, rational involvement, and participation of all people. This is a process
referred to by David Laibman as “multilevel democratic iterative coordination”
(Laibman, 2013, 502-503). I argue that worker democracy within Cuban cooperatives is
providing concrete examples of how multilevel democratic iterative coordination could
actually take place, for the relation between their internal firm level plans and Ministrylevel plans are in practice multilevel democratic coordination.4 I will expand on this with
focus on 1) internal democracy within the cooperatives and 2) their relationship with state
planning. By law, the highest authority within the cooperative is its worker's assembly,
where each worker-member has equal rights. Many cooperatives have seen the
development of a democratic decision-making culture never witnessed before in Cuban
firms. Ramírez explained:
Previously, as Director, I would simply say, “this is what goes.” Now, it isn’t like
that. The worker’s assembly decides. Since the assembly can’t meet every day,
that is what the council is for, to execute the assembly’s decisions and keep
everyone informed about what’s going on… We [the administrative council] have
had to inform all workers of every step we take, in what and how money is spent.
Even if it is for a gathering, like the one we organized for New Year’s. It isn’t
simply informing workers, “There’s going to be an activity.” No, it’s actually
consulting them.

4
Due to the small number of cooperatives, no significant conflicts have emerged between firmlevel and Ministry-level plans, thus an iterative mechanism has not been necessary so far.
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Furthermore, it should also be noted that the Marianao cooperative has begun
integrating itself into the community where it is located in diverse ways. The cooperative
has increased the number of workers who actually live in the community where the firm
is located; it has a close relationship with the community's school, providing materials
and machinery for vocational courses, and it has initiated a study with the Federation of
Cuban Women and the Committee in Defense of the Revolution to identify retired
seamstresses that the cooperative may contract during unexpected increases in demand.
These practices hint at new institutional arrangements that may engage in multilevel
democratic iterative coordination (or participatory planning) simultaneously on both firm
and community levels.
The vehicle reconstruction cooperative is particularly interesting because it has
developed additional institutions to ensure genuine worker democracy in the firm. The
vehicle reconstruction cooperative has a schedule of ongoing meetings between the
different organisms (the administrative council, the board of directors, the supervision
board, and the worker’s assembly) set up biweekly, once per trimester, or once per
semester. However, due to its relatively large size, the workers in this cooperative have
approved an additional requirement, out of their own initiative. They require that the
board of directors must always include workers from each work brigade (upholstery,
painting, and bodywork) in addition to worker-members whose responsibilities are
strictly administrative. The objective is to ensure that the firm is functioning in a
participatory and democratic manner, with no subset of the workers having any superior
power regarding decision-making or use of resources. Piñeiro Harnecker (2014) argues
that there is also a political role in these practices. While she doubts that this will occur in
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the short term, or in a generalized manner, she explains that “to the degree [that] people
get used to resolving their problems with their own efforts, to making decisions
democratically, eventually, theoretically, there will be demands to democratize other
aspects of their lives.”
Regarding multilevel coordination, many CNAs have been successfully integrated
into Cuba's planning process. As González explains:
The cooperative is still integrated into the country’s planning process. Even
though our production plans are our own, we develop them, and the Ministry
integrates them. In the country’s planning, our production numbers are there. The
resources we use are all in the plan. We react with the state. We have a
government task. In this case, we work with and for state firms.

The Marianao textile cooperative also emphasized their links to the Cuban
planning process. Both firms purchase their inputs from state firms. Thus, they are not
simply reporting what they are producing to the state so that it is accounted for. On the
contrary, the state has to respond accordingly by allocating the required inputs. By
engaging in democratic planning at the firm level and then integrating these firm level
plans into their respective ministries' plans, they are in practice engaging in multilevel
coordination. If this were to be generalized, and an iterative element introduced for
dealing with conflicting plans, I argue that the Cuban model would be moving towards or
setting the foundations for a new form of participatory socialism. However, it should be
noted that these experiences are not necessarily representative of all CNAs. For example,
Karabalí does not purchase goods and services from their assigned state firms because
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they are typically understocked or provide services with substantial delay. Thus, they
prefer to buy goods at retail prices from other state shops and purchase services from
private self-employed workers. Thus, Karabalí is not as linked to the state planning
process. Piñeiro Harnecker (2014) explains: “The state discourse is that cooperatives will
be inserted into the planned economy, but that is not yet in sight.... The idea is that
cooperatives, including those that are not induced from the state, can request goods or
inputs to state suppliers, so these can include it in their plan... but that has not
materialized.” In practice, institutional rigidities and state bureaucracy have hindered this
process, as will be discussed in the following sections.

Free and Voluntary (?) Membership
Piñeiro Harnecker (2014) has also emphasized the problems found in many
cooperatives. In fact, she suggests that changes in the current regulatory framework are
necessary before proceeding with a mass transferal of activities from the state to the
cooperative sector. The main problems, according to Piñeiro Harnecker, are in how the
cooperatives are being created and are closely related to the problems that occurred with
the Basic Units of Cooperative Production (UBPC). UBPC cooperatives were created in a
period of crisis when there was insufficient time to engage in the process adequately.
Specifically, workers were abruptly told they were to be organized as a cooperative.
There was no education or training offered, and they were in essence forced to participate
in the new cooperative unit, no matter their preferences or concerns, as they had no
fallback option (Piñeiro Harnecker, 2014). That same dynamic has taken place once again
with many of the new non-agricultural cooperatives. Many workers were opposed to
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cooperatization, but accepted it, as the alternative was unemployment (Ojeda Surís, 2014,
51). Thus, the cooperative principle of free and voluntary membership has been seriously
undermined. Education and training is being provided a posteriori, instead of before the
transformation, so workers can decide if they actually wish to complete it (Piñeiro
Harnecker, 2014). While the cooperative presidents interviewed by this author did not
verbalize that they were necessarily coerced into becoming a cooperative, it was clear
that these firms were transformed as part of a top-down cooperatization process, where
workers as a whole initially experienced a great deal of uncertainty.

Institutional Rigidities: Clashes with State Socialism
The state firms that used to supply inputs to induced-cooperatives when they were
state workshops have the obligation to continue to do so until they have found an
alternative source. In many cases they have not fulfilled this obligation or have done so
partially (Ojeda Surís, 2014, 54; Piñeiro Harnecker, 2014). While the Marianao textile
cooperative has continued to receive its inputs from the state, it is clear that if the
supplies were to stop it would be difficult for the workers to continue operations. As
Ramírez explains:
When we were unlinked from the state firm and became a cooperative, we entered
into a service contract with them for reasons such as the fact that the state firm
has the inputs, and thus as a cooperative it was convenient to start at that level,
providing a service. If we didn’t provide this service to the state firm, where would
we get resources? First, we start there and solidify ourselves… If we were to cut
all ties and say, “we want nothing to do with the state,” we would be lost.

151

As was previously explained, cooperatives should in theory be integrated into
planning by engaging in contracts with state firms, which would then include these in
their own plans. In practice, cooperatives have found significant resistance from state
firms to establish contracts for the services provided when they were a state workshop,
and even further resistance to establish contracts for new activities (Ojeda Surís, 2014,
54; Piñeiro Harnecker, 2014). As González explains, “sometimes [state institutions say
that] cooperatives cannot buy here [and they] cannot buy there. They treat us like ghosts
[and] close our accounts at the bank… If those barriers are there, then the updating of
the Cuban model will be a failure.” Similarly, García explains:
Right now, we are trying to get a group of things we need from state firms. I go to
some state employee and he simply says, “I don’t know anything about
cooperatives.” They are not interested in doing business with me, in increasing
revenue in the state firm. And it isn’t the director; it’s always someone below. They
are not interested, but we are, because we are earning from what we actually do.
That is stalling development, not only for the cooperative, but also for the
country... Or people would say, “No, that’s with this Minister. No, that’s with this
other Ministry. No, we don’t’ know anything about selling to cooperatives.”

Piñeiro Harnecker (2014) argues that “many cooperatives cannot establish
contracts with state firms because, being accustomed to being told everything they have
to do, state firms will not enter into relations with the cooperative if they do not have
explicit instructions to do so.” Most CNAs have encountered that state firms argue that
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they cannot establish contracts because it is not in their annual plan, or they simply do not
know what the procedure is (Ojeda Surís, 2014). In practice, few firms, including both
cooperatives and state enterprises, are aware that the former have the right to request
additional contracts with the latter. Thus, if it is not communicated to state firms that they
have to supply to cooperatives, along with the steps they have to take to do so, this
problem will obviously continue. Another problem cooperatives are facing is lack of
goods or inputs within the state firms that they are assigned as suppliers. Worker
cooperatives are to be granted a 20% discount when purchasing inputs at state firms. In
Karabalí, as previously discussed, the state firm assigned to sell to them has such an
inadequate inventory that they have decided to purchase goods at market prices in state
retail stores.

An Embryonic Capitalist Class?
In theory, with no restrictions to the hiring of outside labor power, cooperatives
could easily engage in capitalist relations, with, for example, three worker-members
hiring outside labor power and appropriating their surplus. However, as previously
discussed, the law lists various limitations that ensure that this cannot take place. The
vehicle reconstruction cooperative and the Marianao textile cooperative have contracted
outside labor and are fully aware of the need to either terminate contracts after three
months or turn these workers into worker-members. However, current legislation has
overlooked that even among worker-members “on-paper,” it is possible that exploitation
may emerge. One or more worker-members could be appropriating and distributing the
surplus produced by the worker-members as a whole. For example, in a large
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cooperative, control over revenues could easily be monopolized by a subset of workers in
charge of management tasks. This minority of managers could withhold information,
appeal to their superior technical knowledge, and through these and/or other means
transform the workers assembly into an institution with de jure, but not de facto power.
Even in small cooperatives, a charismatic and/or authoritarian president could transform
the worker's assembly into a “rubber stamp.” Thus, if the Cuban government's objective
is to avoid the growth and development of a domestic capitalist class, supervision over
cooperatives is a fundamental aspect, and so far seems to be insufficient.
In most countries there is an entity in charge of supervising, supporting, and
fostering cooperatives. In Cuba, this task was assigned to the different ministries,
according to the good or service the cooperative is producing. Piñeiro Harnecker (2014)
argues that this decision was perhaps made in order to avoid further bureaucracy; but in
practice, it has resulted in a lack of supervision over the cooperatives' operations. She
explains that “There is one ministry with only 11 cooperatives, and it argues it does not
have the resources to supervise them. Imagine the ministries that have many more. In
reality, they are not being supervised. Some have not taken any measures to see if the
cooperatives are functioning properly, organizing their worker assembly, etc” (Piñeiro
Harnecker, 2014).
For this reason, proper training and education are equally fundamental. If all
worker-members have an in-depth understanding of their rights as worker-members, it is
less likely that they will allow a small group of worker-members to exploit them. Similar
to the case of supervision, the level of education and training provided has been
insufficient. Most of the CNAs that have been created out of the initiative of individuals
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have not received any type of training or education (Piñeiro Harnecker, 2014). In stateinduced cooperatives, most education and training offered is related to legal aspects,
therefore worker-members showed a weak understanding of the ideological aspects
associated with cooperativism (Ojeda Surís, 2014). Similarly, González argued the
following:
More training and education are needed. If you don’t develop in people an
understanding of what a cooperative is, it won’t work. If you want your pocket in
the cooperative but your mindset in the state model, like many people do, it won’t
work. And it will be the worst of failures. When creating cooperatives, there has to
be an education process. They must internalize what a cooperative is, the concept
of association, subordinating individualities to the collective, the concept of selfmanagement, and the concept that this is ours and we can’t steal... I see
cooperatives going well, but if that conception of association and selfmanagement is not inserted, it could be fatal. The responsibility of the country’s
top leaders is to train and educate.

In Karabalí, at least semantically, there was still a distinction between boss and
workers. However, in the vehicle reconstruction cooperative and the textile cooperative,
the cooperative presidents consistently referred to themselves as “we the workermembers.” In their expressions there was awareness of the fact they were not bosses. This
suggests that the nature of the work process may be fundamental in developing a
collectivist or cooperative ideology. Individual bartenders or waiters, who work more or
less independently, might be less likely to develop a cooperative attitude. This contrasts
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with workers assigned to brigades in the vehicle reconstruction firm or workers
coalescing around common issues (such as inadequate factory conditions) in the textile
firm. In Karabalí, the distinction could be simply semantic, out of habit, and the
cooperative could be operating in a truly democratic and participatory manner.
Nevertheless, this highlights the importance of developing a new conception of
association and democracy within these firms, which in some cases might not necessarily
arise organically from the transformation of a state firm into a cooperative on paper.
Che Guevara already stated the importance of education in a socialist transition
process in his discussion of the “new socialist man.” Guevara did not believe material
incentives had to be completely abolished in favor of only moral incentives. Instead,
Guevara's objective was to warn against over-relying on capitalistic processes during the
socialist transition. Revolutionary education aimed at building “new men and women”
was understood as an important aspect of the socialist transition, which should be
combined with material incentives. Guevara (1965) argued:
The pipe dream that socialism can be achieved with the help of the dull
instruments left to us by capitalism (the commodity as the economic cell,
profitability, individual material interest as a lever, etc.) can lead into a blind alley.
When you wind up there after having traveled a long distance with many
crossroads, it is hard to figure out just where you took the wrong turn. Meanwhile,
the economic foundation that has been laid has done its work of undermining the
development of consciousness. To build communism it is necessary, simultaneous
with the new material foundations, to build the new man and woman. That is why
it is very important to choose the right instrument for mobilizing the masses.
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Basically, this instrument must be moral in character, without neglecting, however,
a correct use of the material incentive– especially of a social character (emphasis
added).

In other words, over-relying on education could also be problematic. As
previously discussed, proper supervision and regulation, along with adequate material
incentives and/or sanctions on those firms that follow and/or deviate from social
objectives, would be crucial during this process. Furthermore, similar to how Guevara
hinted at the importance of material incentives of a social character, for Cruz Reyes
(2014), an additional mechanism that could hinder capitalist relations within cooperatives
lies in the relation they have to the community. He gives the example of agricultural
cooperatives, where there is a conflation of community and firm that he believes hinders
the development of a capitalist class. Yet, most local governments have not promoted
cooperatives as tools in resolving their communities' needs (Piñeiro Harnecker, 2014).
However, most non-induced cooperatives are not emerging with focus on what problems
they can resolve. The fact that cooperatives are autonomous private enterprises that can
set prices according to supply and demand, and pay fewer taxes, leads many Cubans to
see this as a way to simply increase their income, not as a vehicle to solve their
community's needs (Piñeiro Harnecker, 2014). Nevertheless, while Piñeiro Harnecker
(2014) believes it would be naive for policy makers to ignore the possibility of
cooperatives becoming capitalistic institutions, she argues: “The important thing is not
limiting the growth of cooperatives, but guiding their activities towards social goals,
instead of individual interests. To the extent that cooperatives are guided to social needs
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and function democratically, [the development of a domestic capitalist class will be
obstructed].”

The Future of the Cuban Model
It should be noted that the benefits that have emerged from the transformation of
these state workshops into cooperatives are not a result of the fact they are now private
cooperatives, but a result of the new democratic management structures, autonomy, and
flexibility these firms now possess. Using the Marianao textile firm as an example, as a
state workshop, it could have simply been restructured as a self-managed state workshop,
and given the autonomy to sell to third parties and to use a substantial part of its revenues
as the workers wished (e.g. for improving working conditions within the factory). In
other words, the improvements seen so far within cooperatives could have potentially
been achieved by promoting worker democracy and autonomy within state firms. Thus,
cooperatives could be understood as an unnecessary risk, as they could provide a space
for the development of capitalist relations, only to fulfill objectives that could have been
accomplished through other means. Yet, when asked if they thought that all the
improvements they have seen would have been possible by promoting worker selfmanagement and autonomy within state firms, the cooperative presidents were skeptical.
They did not express aversion or contempt toward state firms. On the contrary, they
consistently expressed how the state firm is “where they came from,” and emphasized that
the cooperative's achievements were only possible because of the precedent set by the
state firm.
Nevertheless, they insisted that these achievements would have never been
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possible if they remained as state workshops. The predominant reasons they mentioned
were bureaucracy and the “statist mindset” of making decisions from above, far from the
workers and from “what is actually going on.” In other words, the institutional rigidities
discussed might imply that in some cases, a model focused on worker self-managed state
firms may need to go through a first stage of cooperatization. Nonetheless, in other cases
it might be best to avoid cooperatization and instead emphasize democratizing the state
firm. For Cruz Reyes (2014), this is precisely the current challenge. He explains that
“[the feasibility of transforming the state firm] depends on if and how the ministers and
other leaders in the country comprehend that cooperative principles can be applied to the
state sector. In National Assembly sessions voices have appeared that point in that
direction. It remains to be seen if what is occurring in cooperatives can be applied in the
state, or how we can apply it.”
Even though in state firms workers are supposedly owners, and can supposedly
work with the elaboration of the plan and exercise control over the labor process,
ultimately none of this occurs (Piñeiro Harnecker, 2014). While in a state firm a higher
level of participation could theoretically be achieved, it would have to be inserted in a
system that enables it. For example, Piñeiro Harnecker (2014) explains:
In Cuba's planned economy there are state firms that want workers to participate,
but ultimately they cannot, or it is merely something symbolic because workers
decide one thing, management supports them, but then the ministry decides
something else. That is why autonomy is important. I'm not saying a state firm
cannot demand greater autonomy, but the way it is being implemented now makes
it difficult to achieve those levels of participation.
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Thus, Piñeiro Harnecker agrees with Cruz Reyes in that cooperatives can serve as
examples to reform the state firm, and push for participatory planning in the state sector
as well. She notes: “That is what they are doing implicitly, providing an example of
alternative management models that hopefully the state firm will take into account in its
own redesign” (Piñeiro Harnecker, 2014).
The new CNAs and state workshops are facing respectively each side of the coin
of the same fundamental problem: achieving multilevel democratic coordination. In
CNAs, internal decision-making is democratic, but problems have emerged linking these
decisions to the center's coordination process. In state workshops, they are effectively
linked to the center, but to such a degree that internal decision-making becomes nullified
as the center's plan has priority. For this reason, the original conceptualization of the
Basic Units of Agricultural Production points towards a strategic way to overcome this
problem. Workers could decide short-term, firm-level, operational decisions
democratically, while long-term and strategic decisions could be determined by the
center. As was discussed, in practice this did not occur within UBPCs, for, similar to state
firms that attempt to provide a space for worker participation, the center tends to
dominate and nullify the democratic aspect at the firm level. Thus, this is one of the key
challenges of the Cuban reform process and here lies the insight of the new cooperative
experiment. The new cooperatives have successfully engaged in internal democratic
coordination and at least partially linked it with coordination at the center. By combining
insight from state workshops and the new CNAs, as well as the deficiencies of the
UPBCs, the Cuban government could potentially develop a new form of socialist
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enterprise that could be the constitutive unit of a new participatory socialist formation.
In sum, this essay argues, on the one hand, that if 1) the institutional barriers (e.g.
resistance within state firms to establish new contracts with cooperatives) currently
obstructing cooperatives are corrected; 2) proper education, training, and support are
offered to both state-induced and non-induced cooperatives, before, during, and after
their establishment; 3) cooperatives are adequately supervised; and if 4) the state firm is
also transformed to achieve similar results regarding worker democracy, efficiency, and
non-alienating labor, Cuba could potentially move towards a socialist model closer to
participatory socialism. On the other hand, if none of these conditions are accomplished,
and/or less socialized forms, such as the new “own-account” workers or foreign capital,
are the predominant forms within the new non-state sector of the economy, Cuba could
potentially be beginning a process of transitioning into capitalism.
An additional question regarding the first case is how it would actually complete
the transition into participatory socialism. Laibman (2013) develops a model for this
transition period that uses as a point of departure hypothetical conditions that closely
resemble Cuba's actual conditions. Laibman (2013, 504) begins his analysis with a
hypothetical economy characterized by 1) a traditional market sector, particularly strong
in agriculture and services; 2) a state sector with pre-iterative planning and a commitment
to socialist values; and 3) a foreign trade/investment sector necessary for technological
and organizational resources. These conditions are basically identical to the Cuban
context. Laibman's transition model is characterized by creating an additional legislative
body called the “Core Economy Council,” which would function parallel to the Popular
Assembly. However, while the Popular Assembly is elected on the basis of the entire
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adult population, the “Core Economy Council” is elected only by workers in enterprises
that are part of the Multilevel Democratic Iterative Coordination (MDIC) system
(referred to as “core enterprises”). In Laibman's (2013, 505) model, “Private-sector
enterprises, whether individual, cooperative, or capitalist, are by definition outside of the
core.” Furthermore, state enterprises that do not participate in the MDIC system would be
outside the core economy as well. Another aspect of Laibman's model that is suggestive
is his idea of creating institutions with the specific purpose of regulating the private
sector, which he names “Committees for the Defense of the Revolution.”5 For example,
grassroots organizations may be created with the objective of identifying and reporting
practices in the private sector that undermine the revolutionary process during the new
“updating” process. These types of institutions may play a key role because cooperatives,
self-employment, and small businesses provide spaces where capitalistic processes may
arise.
Workers who are in core enterprises would be in an advantageous position with
respect to other workers, for they vote in an additional election and have access to the
resources of the MDIC sector. This is deliberate, as non-core enterprises can apply to
become core enterprises, and therefore the private sector would gradually cease to exist.
Eventually, “the distinction between the popular assembly and the core economy council
becomes atavistic, and the two bodies can be combined” (Laibman, 2013, 505). Laibman
(2013, 506) explains, initially, that the core economy might not work very well and the
iterative process might not be very sophisticated. The key requirement, for Laibman
5

Laibman’s concept of CDR is different from the existing Cuban CDRs, which are neighborhood
organizations created in 1960 with the objective of defending the socialist process from internal and
external reaction, as well as taking responsibility for local tasks such as inoculation and other health
campaigns, recycling, organizing political discussion groups, etc. (Albert and Hahnel, 1981, 181; Brenner
et al, 1989, 189).
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(2013, 506), is that “the core economy works well enough to serve as a progressive
attractor.” He argues that the right to vote for the core economy council, the experience of
participation, rising incomes made possible by core status, and the educational and
organizational opportunities afforded by access to planning authority resources should all
contribute to attract workers and their firms. Laibman adds that the “core economy”
could be significantly small at first, in a sort of “cocoon stage,” with private business
booming outside. Eventually, however, it should begin to grow quantitatively and
qualitatively until it can assume its role as a “progressive attractor.” This is basically the
inverse of Bukharin’s position during the primitive socialist accumulation debates in the
Soviet Union. For Bukharin, agricultural cooperatives could outcompete capitalist
farmers in the market during the transition period (c.f. Nove, 1989, 212). For Laibman,
core enterprises would “outcompete” private cooperatives and small capitalist firms by
being more attractive to workers.
Overall, Laibman’s model resonates with the Cuban “updating” process. His idea
of a “cocoon stage” of the socialist economy is particularly relevant, for it is the Cuban
private sector, specifically the self-employed and small firms, which is growing
substantially. The main difference is that in the current “updating” process, it is unclear
whether and when a new participatory socialist sector could become a “progressive
attractor.” For example, as was previously noted, the government’s expectations of
changes in employment and share of GDP suggest that they foresee the non-state sector
being more productive than the state sector. Laibman’s main assumption is that voting in
an additional election and having access to the resources of the MDIC sector will be
enough for the core economy to become a “progressive attractor.” In contemporary Cuba
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many firms have found that it is precisely the private sector, not the state, which has
superior resources. Similarly, if earnings in private activities are substantially larger than
earnings in “core activities,” voting in an additional election might not be sufficient.
While Laibman’s model could prove useful in designing future transformations in the
Cuban economy, the “progressive attractor” aspect would need to be further developed.
As this essay has argued, the Cuban government could learn from the experience
with the new CNAs and begin experimenting with iterative planning in select state
enterprises. The future challenge for the Cuban Revolution will consist of ensuring that
these new processes become the predominant ones. If the experience were successful, it
would be a substantial step towards strengthening the transition to mature socialism.

Concluding Remarks
The cooperative presidents perceived the ongoing “updating” process as
completing tasks that most people have deemed necessary for years. Ramírez explained:
“Every day the Cuban state announces a new policy. Most people say, 'about time!'.
People see the progress. The Communist Party’s sixth congress was clear: the country
has to change!” Similarly, González argued:
On one hand, the external blockade imposed by the U.S., and on the other, the
self-imposed ideological blockade imposed by pure state socialism formulas, are
what made the system go backwards. Now, I think Cuba is heading for a great
formula. And there is a willingness to go there in the country’s leadership. And it
isn’t doing it haphazardly. It’s analyzing appropriately, monitoring this
experiment. We have to have patience. What was not achieved in 40 years isn’t
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going to happen in 3 or 5 years.

However, Piñeiro Harnecker considers the absence of a clearly defined model to
be one of the main deficiencies of the “updating” process. She explains: “For me the
problem is that we started to make changes without a vision of the forest. We started to
plant trees, without planning ahead, or at least thinking about how the forest was going to
be. There are many points of view, and these are complicated questions” (Piñeiro
Harnecker, 2014). Regarding participatory planning models such as those developed by
economists such as Albert and Hahnel or Pat Devine, Piñeiro Harnecker (2014) explains
that “there is talk of participation [and] there is work within Cuba that talks about
participation in planning, but it seems to me that in the circles where decisions are made,
these [participatory planning models] are not seen as a real possibility. If they happen to
know of them, they see it as an academic proposal.”
Although the Cuban government may not be explicitly aspiring to build a
participatory planning model, its current “updating” process is setting the foundations of
a new socialist form, and it is already creating instances where new socialist dynamics
have taken place. While it would be naive to ignore the possibility of the transition to
socialism being reversed in Cuba, it should also be noted that capitalist media's assertion
that the country is already in a transition to capitalism is certainly premature. For Piñeiro
Harnecker (2014), what the Cuban people are doing is revolutionary in the sense that they
have decided not to follow China's path. They are quite aware that China has achieved
impressive growth rates, but have consistently refused that model. Instead, they have
decided to create their own model. Regardless of its outcome, Cuba's ongoing experiment
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will have profound and long-lasting implications for socialist movements across the
world.
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